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How do people living in small groups without money, markets, police and rigid social classes develop norms of economic and social cooperation that are sustainable over time? This book addresses this fundamental question and explains the origin, structure and spread of stateless societies. Using insights from game theory, ethnography and archaeology, Stanish shows how ritual - broadly defined - is the key. Ritual practices encode elaborate rules of behavior and are ingenious mechanisms of organizing society in the absence of coercive states. As well as asking why and how people choose to co-operate, Stanish also provides the theoretical framework to understand this collective action problem. He goes on to highlight the evolution of cooperation with ethnographic and archaeological data from around of the world. Merging evolutionary game theory concepts with cultural evolutionary theory, this book will appeal to those seeking a transdisciplinary approach to one of the greatest problems in human evolution.Read more
- Gives a theoretical framework to explain the emergence of social complexity in non-state societies that avoids overly reductive neo-Darwinian models
- Offers a merger of evolutionary game theory concepts with cultural evolutionary theory
- Will be of interest to those seeking a transdisciplinary approach to one of the greatest problems in human evolution
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- Date Published: September 2017
- format: Hardback
- isbn: 9781107180550
- length: 348 pages
- dimensions: 235 x 157 x 22 mm
- weight: 0.61kg
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
1. The evolution of human cooperation
2. Economic anthropology of stateless societies: the rise and fall of homo economicus
3. Conditional cooperators: the evolutionary game theory revolution
4. The role of coercion in social theory
5. The ritualized economy: how people in stateless societies cooperate
6. An anthropological game theory model for the evolution of ritualized economies
7. The evolution of ritualized economies: the archaeological evidence
8. Epilogue: 'no beans, no Jesus'.
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