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Multiagent Systems
Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations

$74.99 (P)

  • Date Published: December 2008
  • availability: Available
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9780521899437

$ 74.99 (P)

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About the Authors
  • This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multiagent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics. The authors emphasize foundations to create a broad and rigorous treatment of their subject, with thorough presentations of distributed problem solving, game theory, multiagent communication and learning, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, cooperative game theory, and modal logics of knowledge and belief. For each topic, basic concepts are introduced, examples are given, proofs of key results are offered, and algorithmic considerations are examined. An appendix covers background material in probability theory, classical logic, Markov decision processes and mathematical programming. Written by two of the leading researchers of this engaging field, this book will surely serve as THE reference for researchers in the fastest-growing area of computer science, and be used as a text for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses.

    • First rigorous introduction covering multiagent systems
    • Covers broad area including computer science, game theory, and logic
    • Does not require knowledge beyond typical undergraduate study and offers background material for probability theory, classical logic, and mathematical programming
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    Reviews & endorsements

    "This is by far the best text in the field of multiagent systems, one of the fastest-growing areas in computer science."
    Stuart Russell, University of California at Berkeley

    "The integration of methodologies that study different aspects of interactive strategic systems is of vital importance in modern society. Through excellent side-by-side presentation of the main approaches in computer science, game theory and economics, this pioneering textbook is a major advance towards the education of a better-equipped generation of computer scientists as well as social scientists."
    Ehud Kalai, Northwestern University

    "This is a rich and comprehensive text on multiagent systems, written by two of the leading researchers in the area in an engaging and accessible style. It is unique in covering the diverse foundations of multiagent systems, including logic. Its extensive treatment of the interplay between computer science and game theory will define how the subject should be taught. I recommend the book for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, as well as researchers in both computer science and economics trying to learn the basics of the field."
    Joseph Halpern, Cornell University

    "With the emergence of the Internet, the focus of much of the research in computer science and in artificial intelligence is shifting from the the study of the single program to the study of the interactions among different computers and programs. Multiagent Systems presents for the first time this cutting-edge research in a textbook form. The book transcends the traditional boundaries of artificial intelligence and touches all aspects of multiagent systems: from artificial intelligence to algorithms to game theory, to logic, and beyond. Written by leaders in this research area, this book is certain to become the textbook of choice for classes on multiagent systems."
    Noam Nisan, Hebrew University

    "Shoham and Leyton-Brown traverse several disciplines to bring together the most salient and useful technical principles for understanding multiagent systems. This text is the first to provide computer scientists with a comprehensive treatment of the mathematical machinery they need to analyze systems of autonomous agents, integrating their computational and strategic dimensions."
    Michael Wellman, University of Michigan

    "... a useful reference volume for researchers and a good foundational body of knowledge for those just starting their exploration of the field. It is rich in examples... With its 13 chapters, this volume definitely deserves a handy place on the shelves of those studying MAS... Highly recommended.
    G. Trajkovski, Laureate Higher Education Group for Choice Magazine

    "The book with its comprehensive and broad treatment promises to become the standard textbook on multiagent systems. It provides a useful and easy to read survey of a rapidly growing field. The text is one of the clearest expositions of concepts in game theory. The book easily deserves to be on the shelf of any modern theoretical computer scientist."
    Haris Aziz, SIGACT News

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    Product details

    • Date Published: December 2008
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9780521899437
    • length: 504 pages
    • dimensions: 257 x 185 x 36 mm
    • weight: 1.07kg
    • contains: 14 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    1. Distributed constraint satisfaction
    2. Distributed optimization
    3. Introduction to non-cooperative game theory
    4. Computing solution concepts of normal-form games
    5. Games with sequential actions
    6. Richer representations
    7. Learning and teaching
    8. Communication
    9. Aggregating preferences
    10. Protocols for strategic agents
    11. Protocols for multiagent resource allocation
    12. Teams of selfish agents
    13. Logics of knowledge and belief
    14. Beyond belief.

  • Instructors have used or reviewed this title for the following courses

    • Game-Theoretic Artificial Intelligence
    • Multi-Agent Systems
    • machine learning
  • Authors

    Yoav Shoham, Stanford University, California
    Yoav Shoham is Professor of Computer Science at Stanford University, where he has been since receiving his PhD in computer science from Yale University in 1987. Shoham is a Fellow of the Association for Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) and charter member of the International Game Theory Society. Aside from authoring four books and numerous other works, he is director of TARK (Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge), a non-profit organization.

    Kevin Leyton-Brown, University of British Columbia, Vancouver
    Kevin Leyton-Brown is an Assistant Professor of Computer Science at the University of British Columbia. His affiliations include the Laboratory for Computational Intelligence (LCI) and the Bioinformatics, and Empirical and Theoretical Algorithmics Laboratory (BETA-Lab) and membership on the editorial board of the Journal of AI Research (JAIR).

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