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John Quigley’s controversial book seeks to provide a corrective on the character of the June 1967 war, widely perceived as being forced on Israel to prevent the annihilation of its people by Arab armies hovering on Israel's borders. Using period documents declassified by key governments, Quigley shows the lack of evidence that the war was waged on Israel's side in anticipation of an attack by Arab states, and gives reason to question the long-held view of the war which has been held up as a precedent allowing an attack on a state that is expected to attack.Read more
- Based on declassified documents not used by previous authors
- New analysis in this book renders obsolete books previously written about the Six-Day War
Reviews & endorsements
"A masterly contribution to international law scholarship on the crucial and much contested question of anticipatory self-defense as critically analyzed by way of the 1967 June War, which has been misleadingly relied upon ever since as the main legal precedent to justify weakening legal constraints on aggressive uses of international force."
-- Richard Falk, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law Emeritus, Princeton UniversitySee more reviews
"Quigley shows that the Six Days War, seen by many governments and scholars as a precedent for the legitimate use of force in anticipatory self-defense, is based on a faulty premise. Recently declassified documents reveal that Israel misrepresented the facts of 1967 to justify its attack on Egypt, and that governments and scholars have allowed themselves to be misled without a proper examination of the facts. Quigley raises serious questions about the manipulation of the facts surrounding the Six Days War and the integrity of legal scholarship on this subject."
-- John Dugard, Professor of International Law, Universities of Pretoria and Leiden
"In a brilliant and lucidly presented analysis, grounded in recently (circa 1990) publicly available documents from Great Britain, the United States, France, Russia and the United Nations as well as contemporary admissions by Israeli participants, John Quigley repudiates the claim that the June 1967 war was a legal exercise of preventive war against an imminent attack by Egypt. In demonstrating conclusively that Egypt was not prepared to attack Israel and that Tel Aviv was responsible for a war of aggression, Quigley refutes the doctrine of 'anticipatory self-defense' or 'preventive war' for which Israel’s claims in 1967 have set a precedent that has been the reference point for many subsequent military actions including the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Simultaneously, he establishes that if Israel’s responsibility for initiating the 1967 War had been acknowledged, Israel would have had no claim over the territories occupied in that conflagration and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would not have devolved into 40 years of Occupation. This enormously important contribution to the applicability of international law, the failure of scholars to utilize available documents to assign responsibility for the resort to force in 1967, and the deleterious canon of preemptive war that grew out of that failure should be required reading for all scholars, official practitioners, media analysts, etc., who have neglected or intentionally covered-up the facts surrounding the war and perpetuated the dominant dogma officially expressed in our National Security Strategy (2002)."
-- Cheryl A. Rubenberg, Editor, The Encyclopedia of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
"Quigley, a recognized legal scholar on the applicability of international law to the question of Israel's invasion of Egypt in 1967, argues that the invasion was not a war of self-defense, but rather a "war of aggression"...Summing Up: Recommend"- R.W. Olson, emeritus, University of Kentucky, CHOICE Magazine
“provides many new insights into the origins of the war……..lucid and splendidly readable account of the Six-Day War” - Victor Kattan, National University of Singapore, International Affairs
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- Date Published: December 2012
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9781107610026
- length: 280 pages
- dimensions: 228 x 152 x 15 mm
- weight: 0.38kg
- availability: In stock
Table of Contents
Part I. A War Is Generated:
1. Who was to blame and why it matters
2. The Syrian connection
3. Egypt flexes its muscle
4. Historical opportunity for Israel
Part II. Cold War Togetherness:
5. Britain has a plan
6. Southern passage: Aqaba as cause for war
7. The Americans will not sit shiva
8. How to attack: we have to be the victims
Part III. The First Victim of War:
9. Turkey shoot
10. Cover-up in the Security Council
11. Security Council in the dark
12. Cover-up in the General Assembly
Part IV. Rallying Round Self-Defense:
13. How to read the silence on aggression
14. The experts fall in line
15. No threat? No matter
Part V. War Without Limit?:
16. War by mistake
17. Defending in advance
18. A new doctrine of preventive war
Part VI. Peace Sidelined:
19. Permanent takeover?
20. Blocking the path to peace.
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