Looking for an examination copy?
If you are interested in the title for your course we can consider offering an examination copy. To register your interest please contact email@example.com providing details of the course you are teaching.
Equality is a key concept in our moral and political vocabulary. There is wide agreement on its instrumental value and its favourable impact on many aspects of society, but less certainty over whether it has a non-instrumental or intrinsic value that can be demonstrated. In this project, Shlomi Segall explores and defends the view that it does. He argues that the value of equality is not reducible to a concern we might have for the worse off, or to ensuring that individuals do not fall into poverty and destitution; instead he claims that undeserved inequalities, wherever and whenever we might find them, are bad in themselves. Assessing the strength of competing accounts, such as sufficientarianism and prioritarianism, he brings together for the first time discussions of the moral value of equality with luck- or responsibility-sensitive accounts of distributive justice. His book will interest readers in political and moral philosophy.Read more
- Explores the value of equality
- Offers a luck egalitarian account of telic egalitarianism
- Provides a comprehensive account of egalitarianism and its rivals
Reviews & endorsements
'… this book is a tour de force through the important but dense literature on telic egalitarianism, which makes it required reading for anyone interested in this area.' Adina Preda, Ethics
Not yet reviewed
Be the first to review
Review was not posted due to profanity×
- Date Published: January 2019
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9781107570313
- dimensions: 230 x 153 x 19 mm
- weight: 0.43kg
- contains: 14 tables
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
Part I. Egalitarianism:
1. The variety of objections to equality
2. Why inequality matters
3. When does inequality matter?
4. Who is inequality bad for?
Part II. Alternatives to Egalitarianism:
5. What is the point of sufficiency?
6. Prioritarianism and the person-affecting view
7. Prioritarianism and time
Part III. Chances and Choices:
8. Should egalitarians care about chances?
9. The badness of voluntary inequalities.
Sorry, this resource is locked
Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email firstname.lastname@example.orgRegister Sign in
You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.Continue ×