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Veto Bargaining

Veto Bargaining
Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power

$42.99 (P)

Part of Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

  • Date Published: June 2000
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9780521625500

$ 42.99 (P)
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  • With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining is a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.

    • First book-length analysis of the American presidency using rational choice theory
    • First book to reconsider the American presidency in the age of divided party government
    • First detailed study of the use of the presidential veto in recent history
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    Reviews & endorsements

    "This pathbreaking study should be in the library of every serious student of US national politics." Choice

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    Product details

    • Date Published: June 2000
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9780521625500
    • length: 312 pages
    • dimensions: 229 x 152 x 18 mm
    • weight: 0.46kg
    • contains: 47 b/w illus. 26 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    1. Divided government and interbranch bargaining
    2. A natural history of veto bargaining, 1945–1992
    3. Rational choice and the presidency
    4. Models of veto bargaining
    5. Explaining the patterns
    6. Testing the models
    7. Veto threats
    8. Interpreting history
    9. Conclusions.

  • Author

    Charles M. Cameron, Columbia University, New York

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