Skip to content

Your Cart


You have 0 items in your cart.

Register Sign in Wishlist

High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil

$113.00 (C)

  • Date Published: September 2012
  • availability: Available
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9781107008281

$ 113.00 (C)

Add to cart Add to wishlist

Other available formats:

Looking for an examination copy?

If you are interested in the title for your course we can consider offering an examination copy. To register your interest please contact providing details of the course you are teaching.

Product filter button
About the Authors
  • High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil analyzes how high courts and elected leaders in Latin America interacted over neoliberal restructuring, one of the most significant socioeconomic transformations in recent decades. Courts face a critical choice when deciding cases concerning national economic policy, weighing rule of law concerns against economic imperatives. Elected leaders confront equally difficult dilemmas when courts issue decisions challenging their actions. Based on extensive fieldwork in Argentina and Brazil, this study identifies striking variation in inter-branch interactions between the two countries. In Argentina, while high courts often defer to politicians in the economic realm, inter-branch relations are punctuated by tense bouts of conflict. Brazilian courts and elected officials, by contrast, routinely accommodate one another in their decisions about economic policy. Diana Kapiszewski argues that the two high courts’ contrasting characters – political in Argentina and statesman-like in Brazil – shaped their decisions on controversial cases and conditioned how elected leaders responded to their rulings, channeling inter-branch interactions into persistent patterns.

    • Examines both judicial decision-making and elected leaders' compliance with Court rulings, while most studies of comparative judicial politics in Latin America examine only the former
    • Cross-national comparison
    • Employs an original, systematic case selection technique
    Read more

    Reviews & endorsements

    “This is a wonderful book – meticulously crafted, with close attention to methods and concept formation, presenting a nuanced and persuasive argument. Kapiszewski’s analysis places the strategic calculus of courts within their historical and institutional contexts, ultimately producing an account that feels more true to the way judges actually decide and the way politicians interact with their courts. Her argument incorporates what is unique about courts as legal institutions, while remaining fully political in its analysis. An excellent addition to the burgeoning comparative judicial politics literature.” – Daniel M. Brinks, University of Texas, Austin

    “A fascinating, methodologically astute, and theoretically sophisticated book. Kapiszewski’s comparative account of high court–elected branch interaction in Brazil and Argentina provides a textbook illustration of how quality political science scholarship is essential to our understanding of law and courts.” – Ran Hirschl, University of Toronto

    “Empirically rich and theoretically generative, this study marks a significant advance for the literature on comparative judicial politics. By contrasting patterns over time in two important cases, Kapiszewski gives us a new framework for thinking about judicial interaction with political branches. A major achievement.” – Tom Ginsburg, University of Chicago

    “High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil is an important empirical and theoretical contribution to the burgeoning literature on judicial politics in Latin America and to the broader literature on historical institutionalism. Diana Kapiszewski shows that high courts developed identifiable, relatively stable characters that help explain the pattern of interactions between courts and elected officials. By emphasizing court character, she challenges accounts that focus exclusively on judges’ or politicians’ short-term strategic incentives. Kapiszewski also skillfully analyzes the origins of the differences in court character in Argentina and Brazil.” – Scott Mainwaring, Eugene and Helen Conley Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame

    See more reviews

    Customer reviews

    Not yet reviewed

    Be the first to review

    Review was not posted due to profanity


    , create a review

    (If you're not , sign out)

    Please enter the right captcha value
    Please enter a star rating.
    Your review must be a minimum of 12 words.

    How do you rate this item?


    Product details

    • Date Published: September 2012
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9781107008281
    • length: 300 pages
    • dimensions: 242 x 160 x 18 mm
    • weight: 0.55kg
    • contains: 3 b/w illus. 8 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    1. High court-elected branch institutions in Latin America
    2. Setting the scene: Latin America's triple transition and the judicialization of economic governance
    3. Politicization and the political court in Argentina
    4. Professionalism and the statesman court in Brazil
    5. The political court and high court submission and inter-branch confrontation in Argentina
    6. The statesman court and inter-branch accommodation in Brazil
    7. Conclusions and implications.

  • Resources for

    High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil

    Diana Kapiszewski

    General Resources

    Welcome to the resources site

    Here you will find free-of-charge online materials to accompany this book. The range of materials we provide across our academic and higher education titles are an integral part of the book package whether you are a student, instructor, researcher or professional.

    Find resources associated with this title

    Type Name Unlocked * Format Size

    Showing of

    Back to top

    *This title has one or more locked files and access is given only to instructors adopting the textbook for their class. We need to enforce this strictly so that solutions are not made available to students. To gain access to locked resources you either need first to sign in or register for an account.

    These resources are provided free of charge by Cambridge University Press with permission of the author of the corresponding work, but are subject to copyright. You are permitted to view, print and download these resources for your own personal use only, provided any copyright lines on the resources are not removed or altered in any way. Any other use, including but not limited to distribution of the resources in modified form, or via electronic or other media, is strictly prohibited unless you have permission from the author of the corresponding work and provided you give appropriate acknowledgement of the source.

    If you are having problems accessing these resources please email

  • Author

    Diana Kapiszewski, University of California, Irvine
    Diana Kapiszewski is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. Her PhD dissertation won the American Political Science Association's Edward S. Corwin Award for best dissertation in public law. Her articles have appeared in Perspectives on Politics, PS: Political Science and Politics, Law and Society Review, and Law and Social Inquiry.

Sign In

Please sign in to access your account


Not already registered? Create an account now. ×

Sorry, this resource is locked

Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email

Register Sign in
Please note that this file is password protected. You will be asked to input your password on the next screen.

» Proceed

You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner Please see the permission section of the catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.

Continue ×

Continue ×

Continue ×

Find content that relates to you

This site uses cookies to improve your experience. Read more Close

Are you sure you want to delete your account?

This cannot be undone.


Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.

If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.

Please fill in the required fields in your feedback submission.