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Look Inside The Political Logic of Poverty Relief
eBook forthcoming

The Political Logic of Poverty Relief
Electoral Strategies and Social Policy in Mexico

$105.00 (C)

Part of Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

  • Date Published: February 2016
  • availability: Available
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9781107140288

$ 105.00 (C)
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About the Authors
  • Poverty relief programs are shaped by politics. The particular design which social programs take is to a large extent determined by the existing institutional constraints and politicians' imperative to win elections. The Political Logic of Poverty Relief places elections and institutional design at the core of poverty alleviation. The authors develop a theory with applications to Mexico about how elections shape social programs aimed at aiding the poor. Would political parties possess incentives to target the poor with transfers aimed at poverty alleviation or would they instead give these to their supporters? Would politicians rely on the distribution of particularistic benefits rather than public goods? The authors assess the welfare effects of social programs in Mexico and whether voters reward politicians for targeted poverty alleviation programs. The book provides a new interpretation of the role of cash transfers and poverty relief assistance in the development of welfare state institutions.

    • Proposes a new interpretation of the role of transfers and poverty relief assistance in the development of welfare state institutions
    • Provides an understanding of clientelism as a political exchange that emerges from a theory of conditional party loyalty, where core voters become the prime targets of public largesse
    • Offers a comprehensive study not just of clientelism but of social programs and the political logic behind their transformation
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    Product details

    • Date Published: February 2016
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9781107140288
    • length: 258 pages
    • dimensions: 229 x 152 x 19 mm
    • weight: 0.55kg
    • contains: 19 b/w illus. 16 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    Introduction
    Part I:
    1. Poverty relief in Latin America
    2. Poverty relief in Mexico - a geographic approach
    3. Political machines and vote buying
    4. Clientelism and the political manipulation of Pronasol
    Part II: The consequences of clientelism and entitlements
    5. Improving communities - transfers and basic public services
    6. Saving lives - social programs and infant mortality rates
    7. Electoral pay-offs of antipoverty programs
    Conclusion - the future of social protection.

  • Authors

    Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Stanford University, California
    Alberto Diaz-Cayeros is Senior Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University, California.

    Federico Estévez, Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
    Federico Estévez is Professor of Political Science at Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM).

    Beatriz Magaloni, Stanford University, California
    Beatriz Magaloni is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University, California.

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