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Delegation and Agency in International Organizations

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations

$134.00 (C)

Part of Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, Mona Lyne, J. Lawrence Broz, Michael Brewster Hawes, Helen V. Milner, Lisa L. Martin, Mark A. Pollack, Wade Jacoby, Alexander Thompson, Andrew P. Cortell, Susan Peterson, Erica R. Gould, Karen J. Alter, Mathew McCubbins
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  • Date Published: October 2006
  • availability: Available
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9780521862097

$ 134.00 (C)
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About the Authors
  • Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.

    • A comprehensive discussion of delegation and principal-agent theory in international relations
    • Includes 12 empirically orientated chapters covering a broad range of the most important international organisations in the world today
    • Draws explicit links between international relations and economics, comparative politics and American politics
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    Reviews & endorsements

    "Delegation and Agency in International Organization develops a sophisticated Principal-Agent approach to elucidate the sources, limits and consequences of IO autonomy. The volume is unified by thoughtful application of the theory to a range of important cases and also includes more critical perspectives questioning whether PA theory provides an adequate analysis. There is no better statement of how PA models help us understand the importance and operation of international institutions and organizations. It is essential reading for scholars and students who want to really understand international organizations."
    Duncan Snidal, University of Chicago

    "This volume represents a timely ans stimulating contribution to the newly invigorated study of international organizations...the quality of the contributions to the volume is high...In sum, Delegation and Agency in International Organizations represents a substantial and stimulating organization...the volume stands as a much needed effort to examine critically the utility of the approach as applied to the design and functioning of international organizations."
    Thomas J. Doleys, Journal of Politics

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    Product details

    • Date Published: October 2006
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9780521862097
    • length: 428 pages
    • dimensions: 229 x 152 x 27 mm
    • weight: 0.8kg
    • contains: 23 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    Part I. Introduction:
    1. Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney
    Part II. Variation in Principal Preferences, Structure, Decision Rules, and Private Benefits:
    2. A problem of principals: common agency and social lending at the multilateral development banks Mona Lyne, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney
    3. US domestic politics and international monetary fund policy J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes
    4. Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems Helen V. Milner
    5. Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality Lisa L. Martin
    6. Delegation and discretion in the European Union Mark A. Pollack
    Part III. Variation in Agent Preferences, Legitimacy, Tasks, and Permeability:
    7. How agents matter Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby
    8. Screening power: international organizations as informative agents Alexander Thompson
    9. Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson
    10. Delegating IMF conditionality: understanding variations in control and conformity Erica R. Gould
    11. Delegation to international courts and the limits of recontracting political power Karen J. Alter
    Part IV. Directions for Future Research:
    12. The logic of delegation to international organizations David A. Lake and Mathew McCubbins.

  • Editors

    Darren G. Hawkins, Brigham Young University, Utah
    Darren G. Hawkins is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Brigham Young University.

    David A. Lake, University of California, San Diego
    David A. Lake is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego.

    Daniel L. Nielson, Brigham Young University, Utah
    Daniel L. Nielson is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Brigham Young University.

    Michael J. Tierney, College of William and Mary, Virginia
    Michael J. Tierney is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at The College of William & Mary.

    Contributors

    Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, Mona Lyne, J. Lawrence Broz, Michael Brewster Hawes, Helen V. Milner, Lisa L. Martin, Mark A. Pollack, Wade Jacoby, Alexander Thompson, Andrew P. Cortell, Susan Peterson, Erica R. Gould, Karen J. Alter, Mathew McCubbins

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