Skip to content
Register Sign in Wishlist

Appointing Central Bankers
The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union

$45.99 (C)

Part of Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

  • Date Published: November 2006
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9780521029841

$ 45.99 (C)

Add to cart Add to wishlist

Other available formats:
Hardback, eBook

Looking for an examination copy?

If you are interested in the title for your course we can consider offering an examination copy. To register your interest please contact providing details of the course you are teaching.

Product filter button
About the Authors
  • Focusing on how the President and the Senate influence monetary policy by appointing Federal Reserve Board members, this book answers three questions about the appointment process and its effects. First, do politicians influence monetary policy via Federal Reserve appointments? Second, who influences the process--only the President or the President and the Senate? Third, how is the structure of the Federal Reserve appointment process explained? The study extends the analysis of the Federal Reserve Board to the European Central bank.

    • Political as well as economic analysis of monetary policy
    • Combines rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis
    • Inter-branch bargaining - i.e. executive and legislative branch bargaining - and its influence on policy
    Read more

    Reviews & endorsements

    "Appointing Central Bankers makes an important contribution to our understanding of appointment power dynamics and impact on monetary policy in the United States and the European Central Bank. It is a "must read" for students of these institutions and should become an important methodological reference for students of other central banks and other types of regulatory agencies."
    Irwin L. Morris, Perspectives on Politics

    Customer reviews

    Not yet reviewed

    Be the first to review

    Review was not posted due to profanity


    , create a review

    (If you're not , sign out)

    Please enter the right captcha value
    Please enter a star rating.
    Your review must be a minimum of 12 words.

    How do you rate this item?


    Product details

    • Date Published: November 2006
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9780521029841
    • length: 176 pages
    • dimensions: 227 x 150 x 13 mm
    • weight: 0.273kg
    • contains: 14 b/w illus. 31 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    List of figures
    List of tables
    1. Introduction
    2. A formal model of the appointment process
    3. Estimating monetary policy preferences
    4. Empirically testing the model's predictions
    5. Appointments to the European Central Bank
    6. The origins of the Federal Reserve appointment process
    7. Conclusions

  • Author

    Kelly H. Chang, UBS AG, Zurich

Sign In

Please sign in to access your account


Not already registered? Create an account now. ×

Sorry, this resource is locked

Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email

Register Sign in
Please note that this file is password protected. You will be asked to input your password on the next screen.

» Proceed

You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner Please see the permission section of the catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.

Continue ×

Continue ×

Continue ×

Find content that relates to you

Join us online

This site uses cookies to improve your experience. Read more Close

Are you sure you want to delete your account?

This cannot be undone.


Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.

If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.

Please fill in the required fields in your feedback submission.