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The Economic Vote
How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results

$34.99 (G)

Part of Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

  • Date Published: March 2008
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9780521707404

$ 34.99 (G)
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About the Authors
  • This book proposes a selection model for explaining cross-national variation in economic voting: Rational voters condition the economic vote on whether incumbents are responsible for economic outcomes, because this is the optimal way to identify and elect competent economic managers under conditions of uncertainty. This model explores how political and economic institutions alter the quality of the signal that the previous economy provides about the competence of candidates. The rational economic voter is also attentive to strategic cues regarding the responsibility of parties for economic outcomes and their electoral competitiveness. Theoretical propositions are derived, linking variation in economic and political institutions to variability in economic voting. The authors demonstrate that there is economic voting, and that it varies significantly across political contexts, and then test explanations for this variation derived from their theory. The data consist of 165 election studies conducted in 19 different countries over a 20-year time period.

    • A rigorously reasoned rational choice theory of why the 'economic vote' differs cross-nationally and from one time period to the next within any particular country
    • A unique and ambitious data collection and analysis project that analyzes 163 voter preference studies from 19 countries
    • Senior author is a renowned leading authority on quantitative analysis in political economy studies
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    Reviews & endorsements

    “Do elections offer voters the opportunity to select candidates of higher expected ability? Can voters evaluate the performance of the economy in order to do this? This bold book examines a quarter-century's data in eighteen countries to offer affirmative answers to these theoretical and empirical questions. It offers new and fundamentally important insights into relationship between economic management and candidate choice.” - James E. Alt, Harvard University

    “Duch and Stevenson have produced a formidable scholarly accomplishment in this book. They have synthesized and extended more than a quarter century of work on how the economy affects voter behavior in advanced industrialized nations. They have done so by carefully developing a unified theoretical model that gives conditions under voters do and do not exercise the economic vote and, more importantly, testing the predictions of this model on a new cross-national data-set using cutting edge methodology. It will surely influence the next generation of works.” - Jonathan Katz, California Institute of Technology

    “The Economic Vote is the definitive study of comparative economic voting in advanced Western democracies, as revealed by analysis of election surveys. Nothing close to it now exists in the literature.” - Michael Lewis-Beck, University of Iowa

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    Product details

    • Date Published: March 2008
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9780521707404
    • length: 418 pages
    • dimensions: 229 x 152 x 24 mm
    • weight: 0.64kg
    • contains: 25 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    1. Introduction
    Part I. Describing the Economic Vote in Western Democracies:
    2. Defining and measuring the economic vote
    3. Patterns of retrospective economic voting in western democracies
    4. Estimation, measurement, and specification
    Part II. A Contextual Theory of Rational Retrospective Economic Voting: Competency Signals:
    5. Competency signals and rational retrospective economic voting
    6. What do voters know about economic variation and its sources?
    7. Political control of the economy
    Part III. A Contextual Theory of Rational Retrospective Economic Voting: Strategic Voting:
    8. Responsibility, contention, and the economic vote
    9. The distribution of responsibility and economic voting
    10. The pattern of contention and the economic vote
    Part IV. Conclusion and Summary:
    11. Conclusion.

  • Instructors have used or reviewed this title for the following courses

    • Public Economics
    • Seminar in Comparative Political Institutions and Processes
  • Authors

    Raymond M. Duch, University of Oxford

    Randolph T. Stevenson, Rice University, Houston

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