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Elements of Moral Cognition
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  • Page extent: 432 pages
  • Size: 228 x 152 mm
  • Weight: 0.8 kg

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  • Dewey number: 170
  • Dewey version: 22
  • LC Classification: BJ44 .M55 2011
  • LC Subject headings:
    • Language and ethics
    • Rawls, John,--1921-2002.--Theory of justice
    • Generative grammar
    • Chomsky, Noam

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Elements of Moral Cognition
Cambridge University Press
9780521855785 - Elements of Moral Cognition - Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment - Edited by John Mikhail
Index

Index

Note: Entries followed by a lowercase f or t represent subject material contained in figures or tables.

abduction, or inference to the best explanation 17, 68–69

acceptability judgments:

and competence–performance distinction 232

and distinction with grammaticality judgments in linguistics 233–235, 238–239, 248–251

and distinction with permissibility judgments in moral theory 251–252

acquisition models, of language and morality 88–91

act (action):

basic 176

and circumstances 81, 86–87, 112f, 125–129, 132, 255

and consequences 80–81, 86–87

definition of 126

deontic status of 85

descriptions of, in trolley problems 81, 112t, 256

distinction with event 87–88

and distinction between tokens and types 111–117, 112f, 115–116f, 124–125, 130, 134–136

infinitely varying circumstances of 81

mental representations of 114–117

and plans 118–120, 118–119f, 174f

as primary object of moral judgment 87–88

structural descriptions of 118–120

structural features of 80–81, 85–86, 92–93

and tree diagrams 39, 118–120, 126–128, 175–178

unconscious appraisals of 82–85, 111–117, 118–120, 121–122, 162–175

voluntary 88, 158

See also action plans, act trees, directly intended action, harm, and acts, permissible acts, possible acts

action-descriptions 81, 256

action plans 118–121, 128, 127–128f, 174f

act-token representation 129, 176–177

See also complex act-token representation

act trees:

definition of 39

and explanations of variance in trolley problems 126–8

and structural descriptions 118–120, 175–178

Adams, John 307, 317

Alexander, Richard 24

American Law Institute 130–131, 134

Anscombe, G. E. M. 6n7

appraisal theory 111–117, 120–122, 162–174

Aquinas, St. Thomas 148, 296

Aristotle 7n8, 47, 132n4, 219

Asperger’s syndrome 121

Austin, John 50n4, 176

autism 121

Ayer, A. J. 4, 317

Baier, Kurt 315n2

Bain, Alexander 6n7, 8t, 83n5, 187, 315

basic action 176

battery:

definition of 117, 133–137

derivation of 171f, 173, 174f

distinction between harmful and offensive 134n6

division of into purposeful (I-generated) and knowing (K-generated) 136, 146t, 154–156t, 159–161t, 319–350

location of in act trees as element of structural descriptions 120, 174f

and means-side effect distinction 118, 154–156t

and moral–conventional distinction 104

multiple counts of as partial explanation of variance in trolley intuitions 126–128

and Principle of Double Effect 149–150

prohibitions of 133–134, 135–136

and trolley problems generally 324, 326, 327–329, 331, 334

voluntary act requirement for 158

behavioral adequacy 29

behaviorism:

and competence–performance distinction xv, 17–19, 51–55

and contrast with mentalism 18–19, 236

damage to moral theory caused by 19

inability to account for projection problem in moral theory 95

and Kohlberg’s moral psychology 263n15

shift of focus of moral theory away from 19

See also mentalism

Bentham, Jeremy 8t, 9n9, 129, 131, 133, 144, 299, 300, 315

binding theory 70

biolinguistics 23

Black, Hugo L. 298

Blackburn, Simon 221

Blackstone, William 133

Blair, James 24

Bloom, Paul 23

Botha, R. P. 69n10

Boyd, Richard 221

Bradley, F. H. 20, 83nn4–5

Brandt, Richard 5, 8t, 40, 97, 186, 247, 263, 315n2

Brentano, Franz 20, 77, 83n5

Brink, David 221, 315n2, 316n6

Broad, C. D. 191, 316n7

Bromberger, Sylvain xii, 9n10

Burlamaqui, Jean Jacques 303n12

Butler, Joseph 88n8, 191, 244, 315n2, 316

“by” test, as a tool for constructing structural descriptions and act trees 119–120, 177–178

Carnap, Rudolf 193

categorical imperative 96, 133

causal structure 86, 130–132, 134, 172

causation:

and C-generation (causal generation) 131–132

computational theory of 132

and definitions of battery and homicide 134–136

as element of problem of descriptive adequacy and its solution 86, 117–122

as implied by notion of K-generation 132

and moral calculus of risk 135–144

and Periodic Tables of Moral Elements 154–156t, 159–161t

and Principle of Double Effect 148–152

and Rescue Principle 144–148

and Self-Preservation Principle 136–137

as a universal feature of moral psychology and legal systems 104–105

certitude:

as criterion of considered judgments 51–52, 245–246

and distinction with certainty 245

as property of trolley problem judgments 97–99

See under uncertainty

ceteris paribus clause 144

C-generation (causal generation) 131–132

children:

intuitive jurisprudence of 104

linguistic abilities of 4, 58–60, 70

moral competence of 258–264, 346–350

and trolley problems 82, 259–261, 346–350

Chomsky, Noam:

and ambiguity in Quine’s notion of grammaticalness or meaningfulness 95–96

and analysis of “knowledge of language,” 24–25, 61–63, 68n9, 220

and argument for linguistic grammar 17, 46–47, 68, 189

and competence–performance distinction 17–19, 52–53, 231, 239, 240, 252–253, 255, 257n12

and considered judgments 264n16

and distinction between descriptive and observational adequacy 49

and distinction between methodological and metaphysical naturalism 194n6

and generative grammar 87, 89–90, 184, 204, 233, 314

and human rights 299

and I-language interpretations of language 24–25, 61–63, 211

and linguistic analogy 3, 8t, 9n9, 64, 98, 102, 104, 175, 229, 262n15

and linguistics and philosophy at MIT 9n10

and mentalism 19, 236

nativist, modular, and representationalist theory of mind 216n15

and new framework for theory of moral cognition 13–41, 307–308

and problem of language acquisition 69–70

and rationalism 4, 48

and scientific revolution 275–276

and theoretical grammar 60–61

and transformation of linguistics and psychology 4, 6

Cicero 126, 255, 296

circumstances:

and acts as elements of structural descriptions 125–130

Bentham on etymology of 129

Cicero’s list of 126, 255

descriptions of in trolley problems 111–112

as element of problem of descriptive adequacy and its solution 48–49, 85–86, 91–93

indefinitely varying quality of 81

insufficient information about as illustration of poverty of perceptual stimulus 111–117, 120–121, 162–174

notation of in complex act-token representations 125

and question-formation in linguistic theory 255

closure rule 132–133, 310

See also Principle of Natural Liberty, Residual Permission Principle

cognition, as substitute for “knowledge,” 68

See also cognitive science, moral cognition

cognitive science:

and artificial experiments 94–96, 104

and computational theory 36–38, 91–93, 102–104, 178

and framing the problem of descriptive adequacy 87–93

and future of moral philosophy 11, 317–318

and levels of empirical adequacy 21–23

and mental representations 46–48, 114–117

and modularity 216n15, 314–315

and nativism 35, 216n15

and Rawls’ assumptions about moral development 35–36

and unconscious inference 175

Cognitive Science Society (CSS) 319

coherentism 287

See also hypothetico-deductive method, reflective equilibrium

common law:

and concepts of “intent,” 130–132

and definition of act 126

and definitions of battery and homicide 133–136

and Dworkin’s constructive model of adjudication 266, 269–270

and particularism 72–73

and Rescue Principle 117, 144

and traditional model of adjudication 93, 101

and trolley problems 159–161t, 163–167t

and unreasonable risk (negligence) 140–141, 158, 159–161t

competence–performance distinction:

and basic elements of Rawls’ linguistic analogy 51–56, 59t

in Chomsky’s framework 17–19

and Nagel’s criticism of Rawls’ linguistic analogy 228–265

theory-dependence of 55–56, 59t

and trolley problems 342

competent judge:

as element of Dworkin’s interpretation of Rawls 266–267, 269–270

as idealized component of explication 196, 246

completion, rule for dating of action by time of 125

complex action-description 111

See also action-descriptions

complex act-token representation 117, 124

See also act-token representation

complex omission-token representation 144–145, 147

See also omission

computational theory 36–38, 91–93, 102–104, 178

conceptual analysis 4, 184, 192, 218–219

Confucianism, and concept of li xv

conscientia (conscience) 93

and argument for moral grammar 44

and distinction with synderisis 93

and Universal Declaration of Human Rights 307, 317–318

consent, concept of in definition of battery 136–137

consequence, as element of problem of descriptive adequacy and its solution 86–87

consequentialism:

descriptive inadequacy of simple forms of with respect to trolley problems 96

and trends in contemporary moral philosophy 317

considered judgments:

and competence–performance distinction 51–52, 53

distinction between moral intuitions and 282–283

distinction between reflective equilibrium and 99–100

as evidence for moral theory 236, 282–287

and explication 196

moral competence and revisability of 55–56

and moral intuitions of ordinary persons 237

and Nagel’s criticism of Rawls’ linguistic analogy 240–265

and prejudice 162n11, 263

Rawls’ use of concept 40–41, 221–222

and trolley problems 86t, 110, 111t

constituent questions, in linguistic theory 255

constructive model (Dworkin) 266–267, 269–271, 273–274, 278t, 280, 294, 304

constructivism, Rawls on Dworkin’s understanding of 267n1

See also social constructivism

contact, and definition of battery 134–165

contractual argument, in A Theory of Justice 198–202

conversion rules 117, 120–121, 162–174

cost-benefit analysis:

and moral calculus of risk 141–143, 158

and Principle of Double Effect 150–152

and Rescue Principle 147–148

criminal law:

as element of moral grammar and intuitive jurisprudence 102–103

and periodic table of moral elements 158–162

universal grammar of 105

See also battery, homicide, legal theory

Damasio, Antonio 24

Damasio, Hanna 24

Dancy, Jonathan 48, 71

Daniels, Norman 5, 30, 40, 44n1, 47, 52n5, 186, 198, 211–212, 237n5, 247, 293

Danto, Arthur 176

Darley, John 5

Darwall, Stephen 6n7, 316n6

Darwin, Charles 8t, 23, 24n7, 66, 183, 187, 315

decision procedure 26, 27

deductive-nomological explanation 91

degeneracy of stimulus 70–71

deontic concepts and deontic modalities in natural language 104, 105f

deontic logic:

and periodic table of moral elements 157

and square of opposition and equipollence 104, 105f

deontic rules: 117–118, 132–152

and problem of descriptive adequacy 225

deontic status:

of acts and problem of descriptive adequacy 85, 86

and periodic table of moral elements 154t, 156t, 157

and simplifying assumptions in moral grammar hypothesis 124–125

deontic structure, as feature of structural descriptions of trolley problems 173–174

deontology, and trends in contemporary moral philosophy 317

Descartes, René xvii, 4, 17

descriptive adequacy:

and cognitive science 87–93

and normative adequacy 223–224

problem of 77–100, 195–197

and Rawls’ linguistic analogy 29–30, 37, 48–50, 51, 59t

and trolley problems 78–82, 106–110, 111f

use of term 21, 22–23, 28

descriptive ethics 29n11, 48–49, 218

See also descriptive adequacy

De Waal, Frans 24

dharma, Hindu concept of xv

directly intended action 149, 150

See also I-generation

discounted expected benefit, and cost-benefit analysis 141

discovery procedure 26, 27

Donagan, Alan xvii, 8t, 97

Duncan-Jones, Austin 315n2

Durkheim, Emile 189

Dworkin, Ronald 5, 7, 40, 41, 42, 58, 66, 186, 198, 204, 214, 266–304, 303n12, 313

Dwyer, Susan 3, 8t, 64n7

Einstein, Albert xvii

E-language 62, 211

See also I-language

E-morality:

distinction between I-morality and 63–64, 266–304

See also I-morality

emotion:

and considered judgments 244–245

and Greene’s dual process theory 121–122

and intuitive appraisal theory 111–117, 121–122

and overemphasis in recent moral psychology 178

empirical adequacy:

distinction between normative adequacy and 183–227

and formal model of moral grammar and intuitive jurisprudence 123–179

and moral grammar hypothesis 101–122

and new framework for theory of moral cognition 21–23, 32

and problem of descriptive adequacy 77–100, 223–224

use of term 30n12

Enlightenment:

and competence–performance distinction 259

and discussions of moral psychology in treatises on moral philosophy, natural law, and law of nations 5n4

and grounding of human rights in theory of human nature 296

and moral cognition 315

and noncognitivism in ethical theory 218–219

and rationalism 174–175

and theory of moral sentiments 216

equipollence relations 105f

ethical theory:

and moral intuitions 248–256

and particularism 317

and Rawls’ use of term “moral theory,” 257

and virtue ethics 317

See also descriptive ethics, metaethical adequacy, moral theory, normative ethics

evaluation procedure:

for grammars 26, 27

and reflective equilibrium 213, 272

evidence, for moral theory, as element of Dworkin’s misinterpretation of Rawls 282–7

See also considered judgments, moral intuitions

evolution:

and Darwin’s theory of moral sense 183, 187

of human language 23–24

of human morality 23–24, 258–264

and instinct for self-preservation 172

and moral and intentional structure of trolley problems 172–173

and origin of prejudice 258–264

evolutionary adequacy 29

explanandum phenomenon 91

explanatory adequacy:

and justice as fairness 208

and Rawls’ linguistic analogy 29, 33, 51, 59t

and reflective equilibrium 212–213

and trolley problems 82

use of term in linguistics and cognitive science 21–23, 28

explication 191–195, 196–197

express principles 19–21, 30, 50–51, 59t, 84–85

See also operative principles

extensionality, as property of E-language and E-morality 62, 64

externalization, as property of E-language and E-morality 62, 64, 299, 303

fairness 201–202, 207, 208, 210, 297

Ferguson, Adam 3, 7, 8t

Firth, Roderick 64n8

Fletcher, George 8t, 73n11

Fodor, Jerry 35, 68, 149, 216n15

Foot, Philippa xvii, 7, 38, 77, 309, 320

“for the purpose of” test, as tool for constructing structural descriptions and act trees 119–120, 177–178

forbidden acts 85, 105f, 124

framing effects 345–346

Frankena, William 8t, 315n2

Frege, Gottlob 123

Freud, Sigmund vi, xv, 35, 66

Fried, Charles xxii, 9n10

Galileo 16, 275–276

Gall, F. J. 315

Gardner, Howard 315n2

generative grammar:

Chomsky’s concept of 87, 89–90, 204

and competence–performance distinction 233

and problem of descriptive adequacy 87

requirement of perfect explicitness 87

as theory of linguistic competence 53–54

use of term 14

generative linguistics:

and basic elements of Rawls’ linguistic analogy 57

and competence–performance distinction 236, 238–240

use of term 13–14

Geneva Conventions (1949) 335

Gert, Bernard 8t, 234–235, 236

Gibbard, Allan 6n7, 316n6

Gilligan, Carol 7, 8

Ginet, Carl xviii, 124

goal:

and action plans 118–120, 176

and recursive definition of I-generation 131

goal(s) of moral theory 6, 14–15, 23–24, 26–33, 48–49, 67t

as element of Dworkin’s misinterpretation of Rawls 276, 277, 280–282, 293

See also descriptive adequacy, explanatory adequacy, normative adequacy

Goldman, Alvin xvii, 3, 8t, 124, 125, 130, 176

Goodman, Nelson 31, 46, 188, 204n10, 207–208, 209, 212–213, 293, 312

Gould, Stephen Jay 23

grammar:

argument for linguistic (Chomsky) 17, 44–46

argument for mental (Jackendoff) 44

argument for moral 17, 43–48

argument for tacit knowledge of 4, 17, 44

different meanings of in generative linguistics 14, 58–60

distinction between theoretical and mental 22n6, 60–61, 250

distinction between theoretical and pedagogical 58–60

distinction between universal and particular 14–15

and grammaticality judgments of linguists versus acceptability judgments of native speakers 232, 233–235, 237–240, 248–249, 252, 256

and speaker’s knowledge of language in Chomsky’s framework 15–16

as system of unconscious principles or rules 15

See also generative grammar, linguistic grammar, mental grammar, moral grammar, Universal Grammar, Universal Moral Grammar

Green, Leon 73n11

Greene, Joshua 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 39, 102, 112, 113f, 121, 310, 315n2, 338

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 298

Grotius, Hugo vi, xv, 5n4, 8t, 296, 303n12

Grounds.

See Study in the Grounds of Ethical Knowledge, A

Guest, Stephen 299

Haegeman, Liliane 233, 239n7, 248–249, 253n10, 256

Hague Convention of 1907 336

Haidt, Jonathan 39, 111–112, 113f, 315n2

Hall, Jerome 73n11

Halle, Morris 69

Hampshire, Stuart 8t, 241

Hand Formula 140–141

Hare, R. M. 5, 7, 29n11, 40, 42, 58, 96, 97, 183–227, 229, 267, 271, 294, 299, 311–312, 316

harm:

and acts 145–147, 146t

bodily 136

concept of in definition of battery 135–136

concept of in moral calculus of risk 137–144

and contact requirement in definition of battery 135–136

and distinction between harmful and offensive battery 134n6

and omissions 144–145, 146t

and Principle of Double Effect 150–152

and Rescue Principle 144–148

Harman, Gilbert xxi, 3, 5, 8t, 9n10, 220, 236, 320

Harrison, Jonathan 315n2

Hart, H. L. A. 223, 296

Hegel, G. W. F. 315–316

Helmholtz, H. V. 83n5, 175

Hempel, Carl 91, 134n5, 193

Henkin, Louis 317

Hilliard, Francis 73n11, 135, 324

Hinduism, and concept of dharma xv

Hobbes, Thomas 50n4, 133

Hofstadter, Richard 315n3

Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb 178, 299, 300, 301f

Holmes, Oliver Wendell 84n5, 101, 176, 299

homicide:

definition of 117, 133–134

division of into purposeful (I-generated) and knowing (K-generated) 134, 146t, 154–156t, 159–161t, 319–350

location of in act trees as element of moral geometry 120, 174f

and means-side effect distinction 118, 154–156t

and Principle of Double Effect 149

prohibition of 104, 133–136, 172

as universal feature of legal systems 104–105

human nature:

and a common moral nature 296–297, 308, 318

competing accounts of in Freud and St. Paul xv

and human rights 296

and mentalism versus behaviorism 19

human rights 57, 295–303, 317–318

See also rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Humboldt, Wilhelm von 35

Hume, David xvii, 8t, 35, 42, 72, 187, 208, 294, 296–297, 316, 317

Hutcheson, Francis 8t, 20–21, 259, 303n12, 315n2, 317

hypothetico-deductive method:

and coherentism 287

and common law adjudication 93, 101, 266, 269–270

and deductive-nomological explanation 91

and Dworkin’s interpretation of Rawls 289, 291

and medieval theory of conscience 93

and problem of descriptive adequacy 91–93

and Rawls’ conception of scientific method 287n5, 288

and reflective equilibrium 291

use of by Chomsky 287n5

use of by Kant and Sidgwick 287n5

idealization:

and considered judgments 54

and linguistic competence 233

and moral diversity 56–57

as property of I-language and I-morality 25, 26, 62

and Rawls’ linguistic analogy 56–57, 59t, 64–65

ideal theory, versus non-ideal theory 199

I-generation:

and act-token representations 176

definition of 130–132

and periodic table of moral elements 154t, 156t

and Principle of Double Effect 150

and recursive definition 131

See also K-generation

I-language:

Chomsky’s interpretation of 211

and competence–performance distinction 233, 236

explanation of concept 25, 62–63

and heart of Rawls’ linguistic analogy 67t

and metaethical adequacy 219–221

immediacy, as property of moral judgments 83n4

I-morality:

and Chomsky’s concept of I-language 25–26

and difference between wide and narrow reflective equilibrium 211

and distinction with E-morality in Dworkin’s commentary on Rawls 266–304

and heart of Rawls’ linguistic analogy 67t

and metaethical adequacy 219–221

moral theory as theory of 63–67

and subject matter of moral theory 276–277

impartiality, as property of moral judgments 244–245

implicit bias 162n11

See also prejudice

“in order to” test, as tool for constructing structural descriptions and act trees 119–120, 177–178

inaction, distinction with omission 151

“Independence of Moral Theory, The” (Rawls 1975) 10, 49n3, 65, 66, 190, 198, 210–211, 213–217, 283, 293

individualization, as property of I-language and I-morality 25, 62, 63

induction:

and abduction 17, 68–69

and explication 192–193

and reflective equilibrium 207–209

initial situation, role played by in Rawls’ theory of justice 198, 200, 201, 202

initial state, role played by in Chomsky’s theory of language 14–15n2

innateness:

Descartes’ and Chomsky’s dispositional sense of 17

different views of Reid and Mill on with respect to rules of justice and rules of grammar 9n9

Dworkin’s “profound” interpretation of Rawls and 266, 268

and initial state of language faculty 14–15

and language acquisition 4, 69–71

of moral knowledge or moral principles xv, 36n16, 82, 183, 187–190, 266, 268, 307, 317–318, 320, 346–350

and moral and intentional structure of trolley problems 172–173

and nativism in cognitive science 35–36

and poverty of the stimulus arguments 14–17, 69–71, 82, 346–347, 349–350

See also explanatory adequacy, poverty of the stimulus, Universal Grammar, Universal Moral Grammar

instantaneous language acquisition, idealization of 69

intensionality:

as property of I-language and I-morality 25, 62, 63

and Rawls’ conception of moral principles as functions 64, 66

intention:

in Anglo-American jurisprudence 130–131

Bentham’s distinction between direct and oblique 131

computational theory of 130–131

and construction of act trees 175–178

and definitions of battery and homicide 134–136

and distinction between intended and foreseen 130–132

as element of problem of descriptive adequacy and its solution 86–87, 117–122

and I-generation 130–132

and means-side effect distinction 118–121, 154–156t, 159–161t

ordinary language and 130–131

and Periodic Tables of Moral Elements 154–156t, 159–161t

and Principle of Double Effect 148–152

recursive aspect of explication of 131

and Rescue Principle 144–148

and theory of mind 143, 178

as universal feature of moral psychology and legal systems 104–105

use of by children to distinguish two acts with the same result 104

See also “for the purpose of” test, I-generation, “in order to” test, intentional structure

intentional structure 172–173

internalism, as property of I-language and I-morality 25, 62, 63, 220

intersubjective stability 243

intersubjective validity 223, 226

intuition(s), and linguistic judgments of native speakers 232–236

See also intuitionism, moral intuitions

intuitionism:

and contrast with justice as fairness 198

and descriptive adequacy 133

and Moore, Prichard, and Ross 316

See under intuitions

See also social intuitionist model

intuitive jurisprudence:

and appraisal theory 111–117, 121–122

formal model of moral grammar and 123–179

young children’s possession of 104

Irwin, Terence xviii, 93n11, 241

Islamic rationalism xv

Jackendoff, Ray xxi, 17, 58, 68

Jefferson, Thomas 307, 317

justice:

and natural rights theory 297

distinction between conceptions of and concept of 199

sense of 4, 65, 66

Rawls’ two principles of 31n13, 200

See also fairness, social justice

justification: 191–192, 201–202, 219, 222

and trolley problem experiments 321–323, 329–330, 332–333t, 340, 345, 348

Kagan, Jerome 8t

Kagan, Shelly 263, 314

Kant, Immanuel 4, 8t, 13, 20, 35, 75–76, 93n12, 96, 123, 131, 191n4, 198, 285, 287n5, 303n12

Kaplow, Louis 5

Katz, Jerrold 62–63, 64n7, 68, 124, 211

K-generation:

and act-token representations 176

definition of 130–132

and periodic table of moral elements 154t, 156t

and Principle of Double Effect 148–152

and Rescue Principle 146–147

and trolley problem experiments 320–321

See also I-generation, knowing battery, knowing homicide, knowingly harmful acts and omissions

knowing battery, representation of 136

knowing homicide, representation of 134, 148

knowingly harmful acts and omissions 145, 146t, 147

knowledge:

and competence–performance distinction 18, 53

and distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that 68

and justified true belief 68

and possession of a mental structure 61–62

See also moral knowledge

Kohlberg, Lawrence 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 8t, 9, 10, 11, 21, 34, 35, 66, 82n2, 84, 94n12, 96, 189, 243, 262, 263n15, 309, 315n12, 346, 349

labeled brackets, and linguistic structural descriptions 253

language acquisition, psychological and logical versions of problem of 69–70

LaPiana, William 315n3

legal theory:

and formal model of moral grammar and intuitive jurisprudence 123–179

and human rights 268, 295–303

and intuitive emotional appraisal 121–122

and legal positivism 50n4, 299–300

and moral grammar hypothesis 101–104

and principle of natural liberty 132–133

and rule of dating action by time of completion 125

and structural descriptions of act-token representations 125–132

transformation of in past decade xvi–xvii

See also criminal law, human rights, intuitive jurisprudence

Leibniz, G. W. 4, 20, 35, 36n16, 303n12

Levi, Edward 73

Lewontin, Richard 23

li (Confucian concept) xv

libertarianism, and principle of natural liberty 133

linguistic analogy:

basic elements of Rawls’ 42–73

concluding remarks on 314–318

Dworkin’s commentary on 266–304

Hare’s and Singer’s criticisms of 183–190, 226–227

Nagel’s criticism of 228–258

place of within history of philosophy 7–9

preliminary clarifications about 27–33

and problem of empirical adequacy in moral theory 77–179

question presented by 1–12

See also moral theory, Universal Grammar, Universal Moral Grammar

linguistic competence:

and competence–performance distinction 18, 233

Chomsky’s use of term 4

See also generative grammar

linguistic grammar, argument for 44, 58

linguistic performance 15

linguistic theory:

and linguistic intuitions 248–256

and summary of Rawls’ linguistic analogy 67t

use of term 13–14

linguistics:

and competence–performance distinction 54n6, 257–258

influence of Chomsky on 6

initial comparisons between moral theory and 14–27

and intuitions of native speakers 232–236

See also generative linguistics, linguistic analogy, linguistic grammar, linguistic performance, linguistic theory

See under grammar, linguistic competency

Locke, John 198

logical positivism 316

Lorenz, Konrad 66

Lyons, David xviii, 200, 247, 263

Mackie, J. L. 220–221, 315n2

Macnamara, John 3n1, 93n11

Mahlmann, Matthias xix, 3, 8t, 9n10

Mardiros, A. M. 195n7

Marr, David 103, 149, 178

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) xix, 9n10, 77–78, 319, 320, 338

“maximin” rule 201

McDowell, John 48

Mead, G. H. 189

means-based moral principles, and trolley problems 96, 337

See also categorical imperative, “for the purpose of” test, I-generation, intention, intentional structure, “in order to” test

mental capacity:

and moral sense as complex illustration of 55

and Rawls on sense of justice as 65, 281

and subject matter of Rawls’ conception of moral theory 277–280

mental chemistry 127f, 129

mental grammar:

argument for 44, 58, 59t

distinction between theoretical grammar and 60–61

mentalism:

and contrast with behaviorism 18–19

and moral theory 19, 224–225

and subject matter of linguistics 19, 236

mental representation, and moral grammar hypothesis 38, 114, 116–117

mental state attributions, and trolley problems 337

metaethical adequacy:

problem of 31, 32, 217–221, 223, 226–227

and reflective equilibrium 212–213

use of term 28, 29t

See also metaethics

metaethics 9, 29n11, 217–221

metaphysics:

and conceptions of naturalism and physicalism 184

and Dworkin’s interpretation of Rawls 270, 296, 298

and independence of moral theory 213, 216

and logical positivism’s verificationist criterion of meaning 316

and metaethics 217–222

and moral realism 219

and Rawls’ interpretation of justice as fairness 298

method, as element of Dworkin’s interpretation of Rawls 287–291

See also hypothetico-deductive method, scientific method

Mikhail, John 8t, 82n1

Mill, John Stuart xvii, 8t, 9n9, 35, 84n5, 127f, 129

Miller, Richard 73n12

mind-independence 220, 279

See also externalization

Model Penal Code 158

modularity, and cognitive science 216n15

modus ponens 92

Moore, G. E. 4, 228, 315n2, 316

Moore, Michael S. 73n11, 176, 220

moral agent, concept of 87–88, 302n11

Moral Calculus of Risk 137–144, 148, 158

moral cognition:

brain regions involved in 105–106

modeling theory of on Universal Grammar 3–12

and naturalism 34–39, 303–304, 313

new framework for theory of 13–41

and nineteenth-century neuropsychology 315

moral competence:

of children 346–350

as distinct from moral performance 18, 52

and parallel to linguistic competence 6

and rationality 33

and Rawls’ use of alternative terms for 4n2

moral diversity:

innate constraints on 15–17

problem of 215

and Rawls’ use of idealization 56–57

significant influence of culture on 90

moral faculty xv, 44, 269, 276–287, 303–304, 307, 314–318

See also conscientia (conscience), moral grammar, “Sense of Justice, The”

moral geometry:

and mental representation of trolley problems 119–120, 174f

Rawls on theorems of 36–37

moral grammar:

argument for 17, 30, 43–48, 58, 59t

and conversion rules 120–121, 162–174

and deontic rules 117–118, 132–152

and distinction between K-generation and I-generation 130–132

as feature of Rawls’ conception of moral theory 43–48, 58, 59t

formal model of intuitive jurisprudence and 123–179

generative character of 15

hypothesis of 38–39, 101–122, 310–311

and human rights 295–303

initial evidence for 104–106

and intuitive legal appraisal 121–122

and particularism 71–73

and poverty of the perceptual stimulus 111–117

and problem of descriptive adequacy 30–31, 106–110, 111f

and problem of normative adequacy 30–31

and simplifying assumptions 124–125

and structural descriptions 118–120, 125–132, 153–162

use of term 16

See also Universal Moral Grammar

moral intuitions:

and comparison with linguistic intuitions 4–5, 16–17, 43–48, 232–256

as data for moral theory 236–238, 240–256, 257–265

distinction between considered judgments and 40–41, 51–55, 282–283

as evidence of mental structure rather than as subject matter of psychology 236n4

malleability and revisability of 229, 247–250

and Nagel’s criticism of Rawls’ linguistic analogy 236–238, 248–256

and particularism 71–73

and reflective equilibrium 197–213

and trolley problems 78–82, 82–86

See also considered judgments, moral judgment

moral judgment:

and descriptive adequacy 82–85

expanded perceptual model of 114f

impartiality of 51–55, 242, 244–246

intuitive character of 16–17, 82–83, 97, 246

and nature of explication 194

novelty and unboundedness of 72–73

properties of 16–17, 72, 82–85, 242–246

spontaneous character of 16–17, 83, 97, 243

stability of 72, 83, 97, 242–244

See also considered judgments, moral intuitions

moral knowledge:

and competence–performance distinction 17–19, 51–56, 228–265

and main questions of the theory of moral cognition 15, 24, 27, 29t

and skepticism 68

and use of term 61–67

morally preferable alternatives 151–152

morally-worse-than relation 138–139

moral patient, concept of 299, 302

moral performance:

and competence–performance distinction 54n6

distinction between moral competence and 18, 52

and use of moral knowledge 15

moral personality 297

moral philosophy:

academic status of xvi

and recent discussions of moral faculty 44, 314

and Hare’s and Singer’s criticisms of Rawls’ linguistic analogy 184, 186

main trends in since 1950s 317

and problems of empirical and normative adequacy 216

Rawls’ distinction between moral theory and 213–214

Rawls’ knowledge of history of 9n10

Raz’s distinction between moral psychology and 286

moral principles:

comparative 145–147

conditional 81, 91–93

decision procedure for 10, 27

and descriptive adequacy 22–23

discovery procedure for 27

evaluation procedure for 27, 213, 217, 221–223, 226–227

and explication 191–196, 223

and metaethical adequacy 28, 31–32

and normative adequacy 28, 31–32

and particularism 71–73

simplicity requirement for 291n7

See also moral grammar

moral psychology:

development of as an academic discipline xvi–ii, 5n4, 19, 20–21

importance of for moral philosophy 6n7, 41–49, 63–67, 77–179, 181–304

importance of for political, social, and legal theory 318

negative impact of behaviorism on 19, 20–21

Rawls’ approach to cognitive development and 35–36

Rawls’ conception of moral theory and 6

Raz’s distinction between moral philosophy and 286

See also moral cognition, moral theory

moral realism, and metaethical adequacy 219–220, 270

moral reality, Dworkin’s use of term 278–279

moral relativism, and problems of empirical and normative adequacy 216

See also relativism

moral structure, of trolley problems 170f, 172

moral theory:

features of Rawls’ conception of 43–57, 67t

goal of 276, 277, 280–282, 293

Hare’s and Singer’s criticisms of Rawls’ conception of 226–227

and I-morality 63–67

initial comparisons between linguistics and 14–27

and Nagel’s criticism of Rawls’ linguistic analogy 228–229, 236–238, 252

noncognitivism and Rawls’ conception of 218–219

Rawls’ distinction between moral philosophy and 213

and Rawls on problems of empirical and normative adequacy 213–217

and subjectivity 222

subject matter of 276, 277–280

motive, as element of problem of descriptive adequacy and its solution 86–87

Mu’tazalites xv

Nagel, Thomas 5, 7, 40, 42, 58, 78, 228–265, 267, 312–313, 341

nativism, in cognitive science and philosophy of mind 35–36, 38, 216n15

See also innateness, Universal Grammar, Universal Moral Grammar

naturalism:

and distinction between methodological and metaphysical 194

and jurisprudence xvi, 266–268, 295–303

and theory of moral cognition 34–39, 303–304, 313

See also physicalism

natural law:

and Grotius xv–xvi

and human rights 296–297, 317–318

and jurisprudence 266, 295–303

and Pufendorf 266

and St. Paul xv

natural liberty, principle of 132–133

See also Residual Permission Principle

natural model (Dworkin) 266–267, 269–274, 278t, 279, 283, 288, 289, 295, 303–304

natural rights, Rawls’ theory of 295, 297–299

necessity:

as affirmative defense 148, 158

cases of xvi, 117

negative act, and complex omission-token representation 144–145

negative utilitarianism 158

negligence:

common law of 140–141, 158, 159–161t

and Hand Formula 140–141

and moral calculus of risk 137–144

and trolley problems 159–161t, 163–167t

Nelson, Sharon 3, 4

neurocognitive adequacy 23–24, 28–30, 29t

neuroscience:

and brain regions involved in moral cognition 105

and computing structural descriptions 118–121, 162–174

and inadequate appraisal theory of trolley problems 112–117, 121–122

and neurocognitive adequacy 23–24, 28–30, 29t

Nietzsche, Friedrich 8t, 33

noncognitivism, and metaethical adequacy 218–221, 316–317

normal form, of complex act-token representation 124

normative adequacy:

distinction between empirical adequacy and 183–227

and Rawls’ linguistic analogy 29–30, 31

and descriptively adequate moral theory as a presumptive solution to problem of 30, 40, 187, 192, 195–197, 215–217, 221–222, 225–226

and problems of descriptive and explanatory adequacy 223, 225

and reflective equilibrium 31–33, 40

and requirement of rationality 32–33, 191, 230, 265, 313

use of term 28

See also normative ethics

normative ethics 29n11, 184, 186, 215, 218, 219, 227, 292–293

See also normative adequacy

novelty:

of linguistic expressions 45–46, 94–95

of moral judgments 46–48, 72–73, 78

and unfamiliarity of trolley problems 95

Nowell-Smith P. 315n2

Nozick, Robert 8t, 9, 54–55, 64n7, 98

nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law) and nullem peona sine lege (no penalty without law) 132

obiter dictum (“something said in passing”) 20n4

objection from insufficient normativity 188, 190

objection from prejudice 40, 246–247

objective validity 223, 226

objectivity, in moral judgment 83

See also subjectivity

obligatory acts 85, 105f, 124

observational adequacy:

and problem of descriptive adequacy in moral theory 49–50, 59t, 252

use of term in linguistics and cognitive science 21–23

omission:

and complex omission-token representation 144–145, 146t, 147

and equipollence relations 105f

and periodic table of moral elements 157

and Principle of Double Effect 151–152

operative principles 19–21, 30, 50–51, 59t, 84–85

See also express principles

order of priority, and problems of descriptive and normative adequacy 30, 197

original position 198, 200–201

“Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics” (Rawls 1951) 10, 27, 40, 49n33, 66, 187, 190, 195–197, 212, 217, 221, 242, 246

pacifism, and knowing homicide 148

parsing problem 16

See also perception problem

particularism 71–73

Paul, St. vi, xv

Pauline Principle 337, 338t

PDE.

See Principle of Double Effect

perception problem:

in linguistics and moral theory generally 16, 17

in moral cognition

perceptual model 88–91, 111–117

performance.

See competence–performance distinction

periodic table, of moral elements 153–162

permissibility judgments 251–252

permissible acts 85, 105f, 124

Perry, Ralph Barton 25n8

personal-impersonal distinction (Greene) 112–114, 113f, 121–122

Petrinovich, Lewis 110n1, 323

philosophy of science, Dworkin’s misconceptions about 276

See also scientific method

physicalism, distinction between methodological and metaphysical 194

See also naturalism

Piaget, Jean 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8t, 11, 21, 34, 35, 82n2, 84, 96, 189, 243, 346, 349

Pinker, Steven 8t, 23, 50n4, 57

P-language 62–63

Plato 4, 305

P-morality 63, 64

political philosophy, of Rawls in 1980s and 1990s 298

political science, and Rawls’ theory of justice 280n4

Popper, Karl 288n5

Posner, Richard 8t, 224–225, 315n2

possible acts 85

Potts, Timothy 93n11

Pound, Roscoe 73

poverty of the stimulus:

as argument for innate knowledge 17, 70–71, 82, 90

and distinction with degeneracy of the stimulus 70

and moral perception 111–117

See also innateness, Universal Grammar, Universal Moral Grammar

prejudice:

and competence–performance distinction 258–263

and considered judgments 162n11, 263

See also implicit bias, objection from prejudice, racial discrimination

prescriptivism, and noncognitivism 317

Price, Richard 316

Prichard, H. A. 316

primary act-token and act-type descriptions 111, 114, 115–116t

primary agent-description 111

Principle of Double Effect (PDE):

decomposition of 149

and deontic rules 117–118

and empirical adequacy 148–152

historical roots of (Aquinas) 148

and negative utilitarianism 158

and periodic table of moral elements 154t, 156t

as principle of justification 152, 158

and self-defense 148

and trolley problems 154t, 156t, 324, 335, 336, 343

Principle of Natural Liberty.

See natural liberty, principle of

probability, and Rawls on explication 193

See also Moral Calculus of Risk

production problem, in linguistics and moral theory 16–17

projection problem 30, 46–47, 72–73, 78, 94–96

and argument for moral grammar 30, 43–48

and novelty and unboundedness of moral judgments 47–48

proper names, potential prejudicial effect of on moral intuitions 162n11

properties of moral judgment 51–55, 82–85, 241–236

Prosser, William 134, 324

provisional justification 201–202

Pufendorf, Samuel 8t, 266, 303n12

pure procedural justice 201, 203, 207

purposeful battery, representation of 136

purposeful homicide, representation of 134, 148

purposely harmful acts and omissions 145, 146t, 147

Putnam, Hilary 35

Quine, W. V. O. 8t, 9n9, 68, 95, 271

Quinn, Warren 68n9

Rachels, James 147

racial discrimination:

and considered judgments 258–261

and reflective equilibrium 203

See also prejudice

Railton, Peter 6n7, 314n1, 316n6

Rashdall, Hastings 316

ratio decidendi (“reason for deciding”) 20n4, 93, 101

rationality:

compatibility of principles of moral competence with requirements of 33

and Enlightenment 174–175

and problem of normative adequacy 209

and Rawls’ approach to ethical theory 191–192

and theory of rational choice 31–33

and trolley problems 97

See also rational judgments, reasonable men, rational reconstruction

rational judgments, and Rawls on considered judgments 192, 242, 245–246

rational reconstruction (real and virtual) 191n4

Rawls, John: assumptions about cognitive development 35–36

author’s conversations with about moral theory xvi, 36n16

and basic elements of linguistic analogy 18, 21, 23, 26, 42–73, 308

and concluding remarks on linguistic analogy 307–318

and considered judgments 97, 99, 102, 110, 341

and contractual argument in A Theory of Justice 198–202

and distinction between operative and express principles 21

and Dworkin’s commentary on distinction between I-morality and E-morality 266–304

and eight reasons for pursuing moral theory 215–217

and empirical and normative adequacy in Grounds 191–195

and empirical and normative adequacy in Independence 213–215

and empirical and normative adequacy in Outline 195–197

on explication of commonsense morality xvii

Hare’s and Singer’s criticisms of linguistic analogy of 183–190

and hypothetico-deductive method 91–93

and lexical order of moral principles 146n7

and linguistics and philosophy at MIT 9n10

and metaethics 27, 217–221, 221–227

and modeling of theory of moral cognition on Universal Grammar 3–12, 229

and Nagel’s criticism of linguistic analogy 228–266

and outline of plan of book 33–38, 39–41

and preliminary clarifications about linguistic analogy 27–33

and principle of natural liberty 133

and problem of descriptive adequacy 30, 78, 85–86, 88, 89, 96, 221

and reflective equilibrium 31, 32, 99–100, 102, 179, 197–198, 202–212

See also “Independence of Moral Theory, The” “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics”;, Study in the Grounds of Ethical Knowledge, A, Theory of Justice, A

Raz, Joseph 5, 284–285, 286–287

reasonable men, Rawls’concept of in Grounds 192, 242, 246

reflective equilibrium:

concept of 31, 32, 102, 179, 202–213

and considered judgments 99–100

distinction between narrow and wide 209–212

and Dworkin’s constructive model 273–274

and Dworkin’s natural model 271–274, 289–291

and Rawls on goal of moral theory 293

and scientific method 31, 99–100, 291

Singer’s commentary on Rawls’ concept of 188–189

as state of affairs, rather than method or technique 204–205, 289

in A Theory of Justice 197–213

Reichenbach, Hans 317

Reid, Thomas xvi, 8t, 9n9, 187, 303n12, 317

relativism, and Dworkin on natural and constructive models 270, 272–273

See also moral relativism

religious intolerance, and reflective equilibrium 203

representationalism, in cognitive science 216n15

Rescue Principle 117, 144–148, 151, 152

Residual Permission Principle 124

Residual Prohibition Principle 132–133

Restatement of Torts 73n11, 158, 176

rewrite rules:

and linguistic structural descriptions 253

and moral structural descriptions 129, 137

rights:

Bentham’s paraphrastic analysis of 299–300

derivative status of in computational theory of moral cognition 299

derived expressions about trolley problems incorporating 300–302

Hohfeld’s analysis of 299, 301t

human or natural 57, 295–303, 317–318

See also human rights, natural rights

risk:

gratuitousness of 141

magnitude of 140

marginal calculus of 141

moral calculus of 137–144, 148, 158

necessity of 140–141

utility of 140, 142–143

Robinson, Paul 5

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 57

Rorty, Richard 9, 315n2

Ross, W. D. 8t, 68n9, 191, 316

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 8t, 20, 35, 36n16, 198, 303n12

Russell, Bertrand xvii

Ryle, Gilbert 8t, 68

Salmond, John 178

Scanlon, T. M. xviii, 144, 284, 285, 286, 303n12

Schlick, Moritz 181, 317

Schneewind, J. B. 21n5, 294n9

scientific method:

and competence–performance distinction 54–55

and Dworkin’s interpretation of Rawls 267, 269, 271–272

and “Galilean” style of inquiry 275–276

and hypothetico-deductive method 91–93, 287n5

and preference for explanatory depth to mere coverage of data 274–276

and Rawls’ notion of idealization 54, 56, 65

and reflective equilibrium 31, 99–100, 291

and scientific revolution 275

secondary act-type descriptions 111, 114, 115–16t

self-defense, and homicide 148

self-preservation principle 136–137, 172

semantic properties, and causal structure 172

“Sense of Justice, The” (Rawls 1963) 66

Shavell, Steven 5

side-effect effect 121, 143

Sidgwick, Henry 5n4, 34, 35, 84n5, 93n12, 96, 131, 186, 187, 212, 219, 227, 285–286, 287n5, 294, 312, 315, 316

simple expected benefit, and cost-benefit analysis 141

Singer, Peter 5, 7, 34, 40, 42, 58, 144, 183–227, 267, 293n8, 294, 299, 311–312, 315n2

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter 11n12

skepticism:

and Dworkin on natural and constructive models 270

and use of term “knowledge” to describe linguistic or moral principles 68

Skinner, B. F. 95

Smith, Adam xvi, 1, 7, 8t, 187, 294, 303n12, 317

Soames, Scott 62–63

social constructivism 35, 189

social instincts, and moral structure 172

social institutions, and Rawls on concept of justice 199

social intuitionist model, of moral judgment (Haidt) 113f

social justice:

no computational theory of 37

Rawls’ concept of in A Theory of Justice 199

Social Science Research Network (SSRN) 319

Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD) 319

Sorrentino, Cristina xix, 8t, 77, 82n1, 319

Spelke, Elizabeth xvii, xix, 8t, 35, 77, 319

Spencer, Herbert 84n5

spontaneity, as property of moral judgments 83n4, 243

square of opposition and equipollence 104, 105f

See also deontic logic

stability, as property of moral judgments 83n4, 243–244

Stanley, Jason xviii, 230n1, 237, 238, 258n13, 264n16

steady state, of language and moral faculties 14–15n2

Stevenson, Charles L. 4, 316

Stich, Stephen xxiii, 3, 8t, 11

Stone, Julius 73, 134n5, 310

strong generation 89n9, 252–256

structural features:

of acts 92, 118–120, 125–132

of omissions 144–148

and periodic table of moral elements 153–162

structure-dependent rules, of language acquisition 70

Study in the Grounds of Ethical Knowledge, A (Rawls 1950) 10, 49n3, 66, 187, 190, 191–195, 196, 197, 212, 217, 219, 241–242, 246

Sturgeon, Nicholas xviii, 221, 315n2

subjective stability 243

subjectivity:

in moral judgment 83

and Singer’s critique of Rawls 222–223

See also objectivity, subjective stability

subject matter, of moral theory, as element of Dworkin’s interpretation of Rawls 276, 277–280

See also conscientia (conscience), moral competence, moral faculty, moral grammar, I-morality, “Sense of Justice, The”

Sunstein, Cass 11n12

SVO hypothesis 239n7

synderesis (first principles of practical reason) 93

Syntactic Structures (Chomsky 1957) 26, 46–47, 49, 89, 253

Taking Rights Seriously (Dworkin) 291, 296, 304

temporal structure 171, 337

Tenenbaum, Josh xix, 3n1

Terry, Henry 176, 178

Theory of Justice, A (Rawls 1971) xvii, 3–12, 21, 26–27, 31–38, 40, 42–43, 66–67, 73, 88, 133, 183–190, 197–213, 215n14, 217, 228, 241, 242, 249, 251, 253, 266–304, 308, 309, 311, 312, 313, 318

Thomson, Judith Jarvis xvii, xxiii, 7, 14, 38, 77, 158, 309, 320, 337

thought experiments xvi, 78–80, 96, 106–109t, 163–167t

Toulmin, Stephen 262

tree diagram, and linguistic structural descriptions 253

Trivers, Robert 24, 66

trolley problems:

artificiality of 94, 95–96, 97

and cognitive mechanisms 80–81

and considered judgments 86t

and cost-benefit analysis 142–143

description of experiments 319–350

explanations of variance in 126–128

and manipulation of structural features 163–167

originating in the work of Foot and Thomson 7, 77–78

permissibility versus acceptability judgments in 251–252

and problem of descriptive adequacy 78–82, 94–100, 106–110, 111t, 112t

racism and prejudice in moral judgments and 259–261

structural descriptions of 118f, 119f

unfamiliarity of 94–95

unboundedness:

of linguistic judgment 46

of moral judgment 72–73

uncertainty, of trolley problems 94, 97–99

unconscious inference:

Helmholtz’s concept of 175

and Leibniz’s argument for innate moral knowledge 36n16

Unger, Peter 144

Universal Declaration of Human Rights 57, 303, 307

Universal Grammar (UG):

and acquisition models 90

and Chomsky 3, 14

and criminal law systems 105

and distinction with particular linguistic grammar 14

general introductions to theory of 14n1

modeling of theory of moral cognition on 3–12

See also acquisition models, explanatory adequacy, innateness, linguistic analogy, linguistic grammar, Universal Moral Grammar

Universal Jurisprudence 300

Universal Moral Grammar (UMG):

and acquisition models 90

and author’s overriding objective 11

and a common human moral nature 73, 317–318

and comparisons between linguistics and moral theory 14, 15

and conclusions on theory of moral cognition 307–318

and distinction with particular moral grammar 15

See also acquisition models, explanatory adequacy, innateness, linguistic analogy, moral grammar, Universal Grammar

Urmson, J. O. 316n6

utilitarianism:

descriptive inadequacy of simple forms of 96

inadequacy of with respect to prohibitions of battery and homicide 133

justice as fairness as a viable alternative to 198, 210

and necessity defense 158

negative version of 158

Rawls and refutation of 191, 198

See also consequentialism, cost-benefit analysis, necessity, negative utilitarianism

voluntary act 87–88

Von Savigny, F. C. 8t, 9n9, 123

weak generation 89n9, 252–256

Weinrib, Ernest 144

Westermarck, Edward 316

Whewell, William 20, 21n5, 84n5

White, Alan 315n3

Williams, Bernard 5, 44n1, 186, 247, 314, 315n2, 316n6

Wilson, E. O. 24

Wilson, James 307, 317

Wittgenstein, Ludwig 61

Wolff, Robert Paul 31n14, 191n4

Wood, Allen 9n9, 258n13

Xu, Fei 331n4

Xu, Yaoda 331n4

yes–no questions, and phrase structure in syntax 255

Young, Robert M. 315




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