Multi-Ethnic Coalitions in Africa
Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns
$33.99 (P)
Part of Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
- Author: Leonardo R. Arriola, University of California, Berkeley
- Date Published: October 2012
- availability: In stock
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9781107605435
$
33.99
(P)
Paperback
Other available formats:
Hardback, eBook
Looking for an examination copy?
If you are interested in the title for your course we can consider offering an examination copy. To register your interest please contact collegesales@cambridge.org providing details of the course you are teaching.
-
Why are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals.
Read more- Focuses on the formation of multiethnic coalitions in democratizing countries
- Shows how politics has influenced the development of financial institutions in Africa
- The first book on the business-state relationship in African countries that uses cross-national data on banks, private credit provision and chambers of commerce
Awards
- Co-Winner of the 2012 Best Book Award, African Politics Conference Group
Reviews & endorsements
"A major contribution. Arriola draws not only from Africanist literatures, but also from scholarship on other regions. His account will be broadly read and influential. Learned, rigorous, and deeply thoughtful. Full marks!"
Robert H. Bates, Harvard UniversitySee more reviews"Under conditions in which the benefits of political office are presumed to accrue only to those who share the ethnicity of the officeholder, how can a multiethnic opposition coalesce to unseat an incumbent? Leonardo Arriola provides an original and compelling answer rooted not in politics, but business: financial deregulation and banking reform liberates private capital holders from government control, which frees them to contribute to the regime’s opponents. Opposition leaders then use this money to buy, upfront, the endorsements of leaders from multiple ethnic groups. By demonstrating the connections between financial and political liberalization, and by solving the long-standing puzzle of explaining the existence of multiethnic coalitions, Arriola makes a valuable contribution to the study of African political economy."
Daniel N. Posner, Massachusetts Institute of Technology"Arriola's book argues with impressive verve and great learning that African incumbents owe their political longevity to their ability to control domestic capital. In the process, he takes the reader through a comprehensive and compelling tour of post-colonial African political economy, shedding new light on a number of issues in novel ways, from the salience of ethnicity, to the relationship between independence parties and the private sector, and the success of opposition coalitions in the past decade. I believe this book represents an impressive achievement and will be considered one of the landmark works in African political economy."
Nicholas van de Walle, Cornell UniversityCustomer reviews
Not yet reviewed
Be the first to review
Review was not posted due to profanity
×Product details
- Date Published: October 2012
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9781107605435
- length: 324 pages
- dimensions: 233 x 155 x 16 mm
- weight: 0.46kg
- contains: 31 b/w illus. 1 map 15 tables
- availability: In stock
Table of Contents
1. The puzzle of opposition coordination
2. A theory of pecuniary coalition formation
3. The emergence of financial reprisal regimes
4. The political control of banking
5. The liberalization of capital
6. The political alignment of business
7. Opposition bargaining across ethnic cleavages
8. Multi-ethnic opposition coalitions in African elections
9. Democratic consolidation in Africa.
Related Books
related journals
Sorry, this resource is locked
Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email lecturers@cambridge.org
Register Sign in» Proceed
You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.
Continue ×Are you sure you want to delete your account?
This cannot be undone.
Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.
If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.
×