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Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory

Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory

2nd Edition

Part of Classics in Applied Mathematics

  • Date Published: December 1998
  • availability: This item is not supplied by Cambridge University Press in your region. Please contact Soc for Industrial & Applied Mathematics for availability.
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9780898714296


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About the Authors
  • Recent interest in biological games and mathematical finance make this classic 1982 text a necessity once again. Unlike other books in the field, this text provides an overview of the analysis of dynamic/differential zero-sum and nonzero-sum games and simultaneously stresses the role of different information patterns. The first edition was fully revised in 1995, adding new topics such as randomized strategies, finite games with integrated decisions, and refinements of Nash equilibrium. Readers can now look forward to even more recent results in this unabridged, revised SIAM Classics edition. Topics covered include static and dynamic noncooperative game theory, with an emphasis on the interplay between dynamic information patterns and structural properties of several different types of equilibria; Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts; multi-act games; Braess paradox; differential games; the relationship between the existence of solutions of Riccati equations and the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions; and infinite-horizon differential games.

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    Product details

    • Edition: 2nd Edition
    • Date Published: December 1998
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9780898714296
    • length: 535 pages
    • dimensions: 230 x 153 x 29 mm
    • weight: 0.718kg
    • availability: This item is not supplied by Cambridge University Press in your region. Please contact Soc for Industrial & Applied Mathematics for availability.
  • Table of Contents

    Preface to the classics edition
    Preface to the second edition
    1. Introduction and motivation
    Part I:
    2. Noncooperative Finite Games: two-person zero-aum
    3. Noncooperative finite games: N-Person nonzero-sum
    4. Static noncooperative Infinite Games
    Part II:
    5. General Formulation of Infinite Dynamic Games
    6. Nash and Saddle-Point Equilibria of Infinite Dynamic Games
    7. Stackelberg Equilibria of Infinite Dynamic Games
    8. Pursuit-Evasion Games
    Appendix A: Mathematical Review
    Appendix B: Some notions of probability theory
    Appendix C: Fixed point theorems
    Table: Corollaries, Definitions, Examples, Lemmas, Propositions, remarks and theorems

  • Authors

    Tamer Basar

    Geert Jan Olsder

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