Our aspiration in this book has been to develop an empirically grounded understanding of counter-terrorism review in the UK. When does it take place? How does it work? Who is involved? What kinds of impacts does it have? These questions were motivated not only by the potential insights that might flow from considering as an assemblage a variety of activities and actors more commonly considered separately, but also by our curiosity about whether counter-terrorism review contributes to making the counter-terrorist state accountable in a meaningful way. We were thus engaged not only in an act of description but also of re-description, articulating an understanding of counter-terrorism and counter-terrorism review in the UK that attempts to shift it out of the zone of exceptionality and to assess it against the constitutional value of accountability.

Our belief in the necessity of that exercise reflects not only our longstanding concerns with evaluation, review and secrecy in relation to counter-terrorism, but also constitutionalist anxieties about the counter-terrorist state. In particular, if counter-terrorism is now part of the everyday business of the state, as we argue it is, and if counterterrorism review is presented by that state as a means of ensuring oversight and accountability, as it is, then does the review assemblage deliver accountability and, if not, can the counter-terrorist state make any claims to liberal democratic legitimacy?

As has become clear throughout this book, the answers to these questions are mixed. To some extent counter-terrorism review does involve entities in undertaking the kind of evaluative review that we argue can constitute accountability-enhancing activities. Reviewers do assess the merits of counter-terrorism laws, policies and measures against, at least, standards of legality and operational effectiveness. They do engage with reality by gathering data, including in some cases generating their own qualitative and experiential evidence bases. They also have capacity for action inasmuch as they are often forward looking and engaged in making proposals for change. However, counter-terrorism review also has serious shortcomings. For some review mechanisms, establishing and enacting independence in a way that makes them credible across multiple constituencies and stakeholders poses a real challenge. For others, the difficulty may be in making themselves heard within the counter-terrorism review assemblage, especially if they have been marginalised or have lower ‘status’ in the eyes of key stakeholders (such as the Executive) than other actors.