Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Creativity
- The Cambridge Handbook of Creativity
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- An Introduction to the Second Edition
- Part I An Introduction to Creativity
- Part II Underpinnings of Creativity
- Part III Differential Bases for Creativity
- Part IV Creativity in the World
- Collaborative Creativity
- 24 Improving Creativity in Organizational Settings
- 25 Leading for Creativity
- 26 Individual and Group Creativity
- 27 Creativity in Classrooms
- 28 Play and Creativity
- 29 The Creative City
- 30 Creativity’s Role in Everyday Life
- Manifestations of Creativity
- Index
- References
26 - Individual and Group Creativity
from Collaborative Creativity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 April 2019
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Creativity
- The Cambridge Handbook of Creativity
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- An Introduction to the Second Edition
- Part I An Introduction to Creativity
- Part II Underpinnings of Creativity
- Part III Differential Bases for Creativity
- Part IV Creativity in the World
- Collaborative Creativity
- 24 Improving Creativity in Organizational Settings
- 25 Leading for Creativity
- 26 Individual and Group Creativity
- 27 Creativity in Classrooms
- 28 Play and Creativity
- 29 The Creative City
- 30 Creativity’s Role in Everyday Life
- Manifestations of Creativity
- Index
- References
Summary
In this chapter, I discuss creativity defined as a particular type of process through time. I argue that all creative processes occur on two levels of analysis simultaneously– the individual and the group. Psychologists who study creativity hold that individuals are the causal drivers of each creative process and that groups and societies are secondary considerations. Sociologists and anthropologists are more likely to hold that the group level of analysis provides a more complete explanation of specific creative processes, although individual factors may still play a role in those explanations. In this chapter, I attempt to reconcile these two explanatory approaches by providing a framework of collaborative emergence. I argue that all creative processes involve both an individual and a group level of analysis and that a complete explanation of the creative process must incorporate explanations at both levels.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Creativity , pp. 567 - 586Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
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