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10 - Rousseau and human dignity

from Part I - Origins of the concept in European history

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 March 2015

Theo Verbeek
Affiliation:
Utrecht University
Marcus Düwell
Affiliation:
Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands
Jens Braarvig
Affiliation:
Universitetet i Oslo
Roger Brownsword
Affiliation:
King's College London
Dietmar Mieth
Affiliation:
Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, Germany
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Summary

Any discussion of Rousseau (1712–78) in connection with the notions of ‘human dignity’ and ‘human rights’ runs up against two problems. First of all, Rousseau rejects the idea that man would have an exalted place in nature – in fact, even primitive man is in a way disadvantaged as compared to other animals. The second problem is that Rousseau rejects the traditional notion of ‘natural right’ as an ideological ploy to protect the rich against the poor. These two problems are of course intimately connected, dignity, as conferred by reason and language, being since Grotius (1583–1645) the feature that serves as the basis of natural right. Nonetheless – and this is the real puzzle – the shadow of Rousseau hovers over any modern debate on human rights.

Man's natural condition

Many modern representatives of the natural right tradition make use of the idea of a state of nature, basically in two different ways. Either they postulate that in their ‘natural state’ men are driven by egoistic passions and engaged in a continual war of all against all, or they believe that by his very nature man is guided by the rule of reason and that he seeks a relation with his fellow men that corresponds to his specific dignity. In both cases, the creation of a civil society and a body politic would be a deliberate break with the past, which would be motivated either, as in Hobbes (1588–1679), by man's natural inclination to preserve his own being; or, as in Grotius and Locke (1632–1704), by the wish to protect and consolidate values of which man is naturally aware. Although therefore civil society is an artifact and in many respects constitutes a break with ‘nature’ it is in a way also ‘natural’, either because it embodies values inherent in human nature (the rule of reason), or because it is the prolongation, albeit with different means, of individual action; the enactment of a natural obligation or the best way to protect our own interests. In either case, we would sacrifice some of our ‘natural’ freedom but have something better in return, like safety, prosperity and culture.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity
Interdisciplinary Perspectives
, pp. 117 - 125
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

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References

Jellinek, G. 1901. The Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizens: A Contribution to Modern Constitutional History, trans. Farrand, M.. New York: Holt (online edition, )Google Scholar
Rousseau, J. J. 1994. Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, trans. Philip, F.. Oxford University PressGoogle Scholar
Rousseau, J. J. 2004. The Social Contract, trans. Cranston, M.. London: PenguinGoogle Scholar
Scott, J. T. (trans.). 2012. The Major Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Chicago University PressGoogle Scholar

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