Book contents
- International Courts and Domestic Politics
- Studies on International Courts and Tribunals
- International Courts and Domestic Politics
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Abbreviations
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 ‘Missing in Action? The Rare Voice of International Courts in Domestic Politics’
- Part I
- 2 What Can Financial Markets Tell Us about International Courts and Deterrence?
- 3 The Strasbourg Court and Domestic Judicial Politics
- 4 It’s a Good Idea … Isn’t It? The Impact of Complementarity at the International Criminal Court on Domestic Law, Politics and Perceptions of Sovereignty
- 5 Rights-Protecting iCourts: The Curious Case of the OP-ICESCR
- 6 Reassembling the French State via Human Rights: Between Human Rights Internationalism and Political Sovereignism
- 7 Impact through Trust: The CJEU as a Trust-enhancing Institution
- Part II
- Index
- References
5 - Rights-Protecting iCourts: The Curious Case of the OP-ICESCR
from Part I
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 June 2018
- International Courts and Domestic Politics
- Studies on International Courts and Tribunals
- International Courts and Domestic Politics
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Abbreviations
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 ‘Missing in Action? The Rare Voice of International Courts in Domestic Politics’
- Part I
- 2 What Can Financial Markets Tell Us about International Courts and Deterrence?
- 3 The Strasbourg Court and Domestic Judicial Politics
- 4 It’s a Good Idea … Isn’t It? The Impact of Complementarity at the International Criminal Court on Domestic Law, Politics and Perceptions of Sovereignty
- 5 Rights-Protecting iCourts: The Curious Case of the OP-ICESCR
- 6 Reassembling the French State via Human Rights: Between Human Rights Internationalism and Political Sovereignism
- 7 Impact through Trust: The CJEU as a Trust-enhancing Institution
- Part II
- Index
- References
Summary
Principal-Agent theory predicts that States will only create international courts where the benefits exceed the costs. Recently, a small number of States empowered a quasi-judicial body to receive and adjudicate economic, social and cultural rights complaints under a new Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This is a surprising occurrence given the highly contested nature of these rights and the unclear benefits that enure to States from this regime. This chapter reviews and applies Principal-Agent theory to the Optional Protocol, finding that the theory explains some of its features but not its creation. The chapter argues that the creation of the Optional Protocol is the result of three interrelated global phenomena: (1) the proliferation of international courts, (2) the widespread adoption of constitutional review and (3) the increased acceptance of economic, social and cultural rights. These phenomena are mutually reinforcing and function to socialise key legal specialists within States who are responsible for assessing the benefits and costs of international court creation, resulting in an increased willingness to accept rights-protecting international courts. This socialisation process is thus crucial for understanding how and why international courts have an impact on domestic political and legal systems.
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- Information
- International Courts and Domestic Politics , pp. 117 - 138Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2018