In section 1 of this chapter, we examine the right to freedom as Kant understands and posits it in his axiom of external freedom. We are examining this axiom because it is an assumption upon which Kant's entire system of rights is built. Kant conceives of the right to external freedom broadly. It thus comprises a number of rights we might see today as being distinct from the right to external freedom, such as the right to a good name or the right to equal protection under the law. In section 2 we consider Kant's notion of internal freedom both in the negative and positive sense to set the stage for our argument in section 3 that external freedom also has a negative and a positive aspect to it. The negative aspect of external freedom is well known but the positive is not. We argue that the positive aspect is embodied in the postulate of public law, which commands us to move to a juridical state, where individual rights are secured. In section 4, we draw two conclusions from the right to external freedom. In section 4A, we claim that because Kant's command is to move to a juridical state, his prohibition against revolution refers to revolting in a juridical state and not in some despotic state. So understood, Kant's seemingly extreme stance against revolution becomes more appealing. Indeed, the prohibition against revolution is merely the opposite side of the coin to the postulate of public law.