Wittgenstein's verificationism

As described in the previous chapter, Wittgenstein's discussion of aesthetics and ethics in his lectures in May Term 1933 is prefaced and informed by his new account of meaning as use, which, applied to declarative sentences or propositions, leads to verificationism: ‘If you want to know the meaning of a sentence ask for its verification’ (AL 29). For any predicate ‘F’, you have to consider the language-game and see how it is used, that is, how a claim that something is F could be verified. For what characterises the use of a predicate is that its declarative application can be judged true or false, and that such a judgement can be vindicated or rejected on suitable grounds. Hence, the meaning of such a truth-apt predication is determined by the way its truth or falsity can be ascertained. For example, ‘to explain what is meant by “6 yards” we must shew a man how we measure it’ (M 311). Accordingly, the meaning of the proposition ‘The shed is 6 yards long’ is given by its possible methods of verification (or falsification).

It is worth noting that this core idea of verificationism – that to know the meaning of a predicate is to know how it is used, that is, amongst other things, on what grounds its application can be judged true or false – is indeed just an aspect of the view that meaning is use. Wittgenstein espoused it not only in the early 1930s but to the end of his life. What distinguishes his mature view from the scientistic verificationism of the Vienna Circle is that he came to realise that although there must be grounds for judging the application of a predicate as correct or incorrect, there need not always be methods of objective verification. And yet, in order to clarify the meaning of a predicate, it is always useful to ask if and how its application could be verified. In conversation, he explained that by a simile: