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Preface

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Jeffrey A. Winters
Affiliation:
Northwestern University, Illinois
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Summary

When Michael Bloomberg was running for his third term as mayor of New York, he was compared unfairly in the media to the Roman oligarch Marcus Licinius Crassus, who had “deployed his wealth in the service of his political ambitions” (Hertzberg 2009, 27). Drawing on a fortune estimated in 2010 at $18 billion, Bloomberg had “spent more of his own money than any other individual in United States history in the pursuit of public office.” It is true that both men are oligarchs. However, the comparison is misleading because it fails to recognize important changes in oligarchy over the centuries. When oligarchs like Crassus spent their resources to become consul, it was one of the most important things they could do politically to secure their core oligarchic interests. For modern American oligarchs like Bloomberg, buying public office with private funds is driven more by vanity than motives of oligarchic survival. Unlike in Rome, oligarchs in America enjoy strong property rights enforced by others, and thus do not need to rule to pursue their core interests. When they do hold office, it is neither as nor for oligarchs. It is unlikely that Bloomberg the billionaire would do anything differently as mayor had his political career been entirely funded by donations or public resources.

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Chapter
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Oligarchy , pp. xi - xviii
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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  • Preface
  • Jeffrey A. Winters, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book: Oligarchy
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793806.001
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  • Preface
  • Jeffrey A. Winters, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book: Oligarchy
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793806.001
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Preface
  • Jeffrey A. Winters, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book: Oligarchy
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793806.001
Available formats
×