The goal of this book has been to understand the role of propaganda in the Russian-Ukrainian war. Since the outbreak of the war in 2014, Russia and its proxies in Donbas believed strongly in their ability to sow doubt, discord, and discontent. However, despite Putin#x2019;s insistence on the supposed historical and ideological underpinnings of the Russian-Ukrainian war, this book shows that neither ideology nor ingroup identity played a meaningful role in media discourse, and instead focused heavily on demonising Ukraine and the West. This strategy failed to convince those who the Kremlin sees as a key ally, namely Russian-speaking and Kyiv-sceptic Ukrainians. The Kremlin’s colossal miscalculation was therefore to underestimate not only the unpopularity of its own actions in Donbas and Crimea after Euromaidan, but also the impotence of its propaganda among the very people it professed to come save.