Book contents
- Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action
- Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Holism in Action
- 2 Davidson’s Wittgensteinian View of Meaning
- 3 Davidson and Wittgenstein
- 4 Rule-Following and Charity
- 5 Davidson’s Treatment of Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox
- 6 Davidson and Wittgenstein on Meaning and Understanding
- 7 The Search for “The Essence of Human Language” in Wittgenstein and Davidson
- 8 Wittgenstein and Davidson on Animal Minds
- 9 Wittgenstein and Davidson on First-Person Authority and the Univocality of Mental Terms
- 10 The Harmony of Thought and Reality
- 11 Davidson, Russell, and Wittgenstein on the Problem of Predication
- Index
- References
11 - Davidson, Russell, and Wittgenstein on the Problem of Predication
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 October 2017
Edited by
Book contents
- Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action
- Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Holism in Action
- 2 Davidson’s Wittgensteinian View of Meaning
- 3 Davidson and Wittgenstein
- 4 Rule-Following and Charity
- 5 Davidson’s Treatment of Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox
- 6 Davidson and Wittgenstein on Meaning and Understanding
- 7 The Search for “The Essence of Human Language” in Wittgenstein and Davidson
- 8 Wittgenstein and Davidson on Animal Minds
- 9 Wittgenstein and Davidson on First-Person Authority and the Univocality of Mental Terms
- 10 The Harmony of Thought and Reality
- 11 Davidson, Russell, and Wittgenstein on the Problem of Predication
- Index
- References
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action , pp. 205 - 225Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2017
References
Bacon, John. 1995. Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of Being. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Brandom, Robert. 2000. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Burge, Tyler. 2007. “Predication and Truth.” Journal of Philosophy 104 (11): 580–608.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Candlish, Stewart. 1996. “The Unity of the Proposition and Russell’s Theories of Judgment.” In Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy, edited by Monk, R. and Palmer, A.. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 2000. “Truth Rehabilitated.” In Rorty and His Critics, edited by Brandom, R.. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 2001a. “The Emergence of Thought.” In Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 2001b. “Rational Animals.” In Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 2001c. “The Second Person.” In Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 2005. Truth and Predication. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Long, Peter. 1969. “Are Predicates and Relational Expressions Incomplete?” Philosophical Review 78: 90–98.Google Scholar
MacBride, Fraser. 2006. “Predicate Reference.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by LePore, E. and Smith, B. C.: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
MacBride, Fraser. 2011. “Impure Reference: A Way Around the Concept Horse Paradox.” Philosophical Perspectives 25: 297–312.Google Scholar
Pears, David. 1977. “The Relation between Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory of Propositions and Russell’s Theories of Judgment.” Philosophical Review 86: 177–96.Google Scholar
Potter, Michael. 2009. Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Price, Huw. 2011a. “Moving the Mirror Aside.” In Naturalism Without Mirrors. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Price, Huw. 2011b. “Truth as Convenient Friction.” In Naturalism Without Mirrors. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rorty, Richard. 1986. “Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth.” In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by LePore, E.. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Russell, Bertrand. 1984. “Theory of Knowledge: the 1913 Manuscript.” In The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 7, edited by Eames, E. R. and Blackwell, K.. London: Allen & Unwin.Google Scholar
Russell, Bertrand. 1992. “What Is Logic?” In The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 6: Logical and Philosophical Papers, 1909–1913, edited by Slater, J. G.. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Skyrms, Brian. 1981. “Tractarian Nominalism (For Wilfrid Sellars).” Philosophical Studies 40:199–206.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by Pears, D. F. and McGuinness, B.. 2nd ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Original edition, 1961.Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin. 1998. “Why Frege did not Deserve his Granum Salis: A Note on the Paradox of ‘The Concept Horse’ and the Ascription Bedeutungen to Predicates.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 55: 239–63.Google Scholar
Zalabardo, José L. 1996. “Predicates, Properties and the Goal of a Theory of Reference.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 51: 121–62.Google Scholar
Zalabardo, José L. 2000. “Realism Detranscendentalized.” European Journal of Philosophy 8 (1): 63–88.Google Scholar
Zalabardo, José L. 2001. “Towards a Nominalist Empiricism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101: 29–52.Google Scholar
Zalabardo, José L. 2015. Representation and Reality in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar