This chapter outlines the different analytical perspectives that can be used to study the EU. It first discusses three different integration theories (neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism and postfunctionalism) and their spin-offs. These theories seek to explain why and how countries have decided to establish European cooperation and what role key actors (governments, interest groups, the public, politicians and civil servants) play in this. The chapter subsequently outlines theories of EU politics which seek to explain the actual functioning of the EU. In doing so it places a strong emphasis on the comparative politics approach, where the functioning of the EU is analysed by employing theories and concepts that are used in analysing domestic political systems. Additionally the chapter also discusses multi-level governance and federalism as two additional ways to understand EU politics. These theories provide complimentary insights in to the EU’s functioning. The choice to employ a certain theoretical perspective depends upon the types of questions asked and the actors that are of interest.

This chapter zooms in on the dynamics of decision-making in the EU. Whereas Chapter 4 sketches the structures and procedures used to take decisions in the EU, this chapter discusses the processes that take place within those structures and procedures. It distinguishes between three types of decision (history-making, policy-setting and policy-shaping) that show different decision-making dynamics. In relation to history-making decisions, the chapter provides an introduction to negotiation theory and identifies the various strategies actors use in negotiations. In relation to policy-setting decisions, it discusses the dynamics of interinstitutional decision-making, using Tsebelis’ veto player theory. This is followed by a discussion of the role of different types of policy networks in EU policy-making. The chapter ends with sections on the role of technocracy in the EU (using the better regulation programme as an example) and the debate about flexibility and inertia in EU policy-making (engaging with Scharpf’s joint-decision trap thesis).

This chapter puts the two-logics theory under a thorough and systematic empirical test. It conducts a comprehensive macro-qualitative comparison of all autocratic regime episodes in East Asia since 1945. It argues that the stability of autocratic rule can be explained by logically reducing possible configurations to a small number of stability recipes. It singles out soft repression as the most crucial and polyvalent INUS condition for stabilizing autocratic rule and provides empirical support for the two logics of over-politicization and de-politicization. Particular emphasis is paid to contextualizing the empirical results. In methodical terms, it relies on Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) that is particularly capable of detecting conjunctural causation, making it the best-suited method for the book’s configurational argument.

Chapter 7 provides the first empirical exploration and serves as a plausibility probe for the two-logics theory. It examines two typical, paradigmatic cases: North Korea for the over-politicization and Singapore for the de-politicization logic. These two lead cases are supplemented with empirical material from other East Asian countries, demonstrating the inner workings of the two contrasting logics. The case selection is designed to present the inner workings in utmost clarity and with least disturbing “noise.” Chapter 7 discusses in detail the ideational and performance legitimation efforts, the use of soft and hard repression, as well as the forms of co-optation in these paradigmatic cases and shows how these factors interact with each other.

The Conclusion summarizes the main theoretical propositions of the book, reviews the empirical results, and offers a critical reflection on the methodological approach. It also identifies several avenues that future research might want to consider. Based on the experience of this book, macro-theorizing has proven to be a fruitful complement to micro-approaches. Equally important, the interplay of factors and the idea of “chemical causation” (Mill) deserve more scholarly attention. The polysemic and multidimensional nature of the concepts has been a critical issue throughout the book. This holds particularly true for the role of ordinary citizens and the key concept of legitimation. Lastly, the chapter argues that future research might want to tackle the enormous task of systematizing autocratic political thought. While we have consolidated and almost canonical knowledge about the different theories of democratic rule, the autocratic pole is less explored. The conclusion contends that future projects that bring order into the rich reservoir of autocratic political thought will be a promising endeavor.

Chapter 1 is dedicated to the explanandum of the book. In a first step, the chapter asks how to conceptualize autocratic rule and how to delineate it from rivalling concepts like authoritarianism and totalitarianism, but also sultanism, tyranny, despotism, and dictatorship. In a second step, the chapter clarifies different understandings of stability: persistence vs. continuity. In a third step, the chapter establishes the rationale behind the two logics of autocratic rule. Drawing on a Schmittian conception of the political, over-politicization is portrayed as the process of ideologically inflating a (political, social, religious, ethnic, etc.) difference, thereby defining an absolute foe (hostis), thus justifying the usage of hard repression and relying on formal ways of co-optation. In contrast, de-politicization is the reverse process of neutralizing contested issues, pulling conflictive issues out of the political arena by emphasizing performance legitimation, shying away from hard, but using soft repression and by being indifferent in its forms of co-optation.