50479 results in International relations and international organisations
9 - Indonesia-Superpower Relations: Economic and Non-Economic Factors
- Leo Suryadinata, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 138-157
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Introduction
This chapter focuses on Indonesia’s relations with the two superpowers — the United States and the former Soviet Union — as well as the economic superpower, Japan. It examines the importance of Indonesia’s “economic dependence” on the United States and Japan during the early stage of the Suharto period and its impact on Jakarta’s foreign policy behaviour. It also looks at the non-economic factors which affected Jakarta-Moscow relations before the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991. In the last section of this chapter, Indonesian relations with major powers regarding regional order and security are also addressed.
Indonesia-US Relations: Convergence of Interests?
Indonesian-American relations were established during the revolutionary period when Indonesia was still fighting for its independence. Active support for Indonesia by the United States was only given after the Madiun Affair in 1948 when the Indonesian Government was under a Communist threat.
During the period of Constitutional Democracy, when the Islamic party, Masyumi, was in power, Indonesian-American relations could be described as close. An agreement on military alliance with the United States was made but it was short- lived. When Indonesian domestic politics moved towards the left and the nation’s foreign policy became even more militant and nationalistic, Indonesian-American relations deteriorated. This was also partly due to such anti-Sukarno, anti-Communist rebel groups that gained the support of the United States in their efforts to topple the central Government. The rebellions were crushed, but, as a consequence, Indonesian-American relations suffered. Meanwhile, Sukarno moved further to the left and made a formal alliance with the PRC. The nation’s relationship with the Soviet Union also became closer. The military group in Indonesia was basically anti-Communist, however, and quietly received support from the United States.
When the 1965 coup failed and the military emerged as the victor in Indonesia, Indonesian-American relations improved. The Indonesian economy before and soon after the coup was on the brink of collapse. Inflation was out of control, reaching 650 per cent annually. It was reported that, in 1966, inflation was as high as 900 per cent. The newly formed Government was aware that in order to maintain political stability, there had to be economic rehabilitation. It was also recognized that stabilizing the economy would be a way to legitimize the Suharto Government.
Annex A - List of documents issued by ASEAN in 2017
- Elizabeth Buensuceso
-
- Book:
- ASEAN Centrality
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 175-177
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
a. ASEAN Declaration to Prevent and Combat Cybercrime
b. ASEAN Declaration on Innovation
c. Action Agenda on Mainstreaming Women’s Economic Empowerment in ASEAN
d. ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Anti-Microbial Resistance (AMR): Combating AMR through One Health Approach
e. ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Disaster Health Management
f. ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Ending All Forms of Malnutrition
g. ASEAN Declaration on the Adoption of the ASEAN Youth Development Index
h. ASEAN Declaration on ‘Culture of Prevention’ for a Peaceful, Inclusive, Resilient, Healthy and Harmonious Society
i. ASEAN Declaration on the Gender-Responsive Implementation of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and Sustainable Development Goals
j. ASEAN Joint Statement on Climate Change to the 23rd Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP-23)
k. Joint Statement on Promoting Women, Peace and Security in ASEAN
l. ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Cross Border Transport of Passengers by Road Vehicles
In addition, the following documents were also either issued, signed or adopted:
APT documents
• Manila Declaration on the 20th Anniversary of the ASEAN Plus Three
• ASEAN Plus Three Leaders’ Statement on Food Security Cooperation
• ASEAN Plus Three Plan of Action 2018–2022
ASEAN+1 documents
• Chairman’s Statement of the 5th ASEAN-U.S. Summit to Commemorate the 40th Anniversary of ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue Relations
• Co-Chairs’ Press Statement of the ASEAN-Canada Commemorative Summit on the Occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the Establishment of ASEAN-Canada Dialogue Relations
• Press Statement of the ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit on the Occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the Establishment of ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations
• Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN-China 20th Summit
EAS documents
• Manila Plan of Action to advance the Phnom Penh Declaration on the East Asia Summit Development Initiative (2018–2022)
• Chairman’s Statement of the 12th East Asia Summit, Manila, 14 November 2017
• East Asia Summit Leaders’ Statement on Chemical Weapons, Manila, 14 November 2017
• East Asia Summit Leaders’ Statement on Cooperation in Poverty Alleviation, Manila, 14 November 2017
• East Asia Summit Leaders’ Statement on Countering Ideological Challenges of Terrorism and Terrorist Narratives and Propaganda, Manila, 14 November 2017
• East Asia Summit Leaders’ Statement on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, Manila, 14 November 2017
• Chairman’s Statement of the 7th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Manila, 7 August 2017
Brunei Darussalam in 2021: The Battle against COVID-19 and a Year of Short-Lived Optimism
- Edited by Daljit Singh, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, Thi Ha Hoang, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2022
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 91-106
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Optimism derived from the initially successful containment of the COVID-19 pandemic in Brunei was short-lived as new infections hit the country like a tsunami in the second half of 2021. Strict restrictions that had earlier been relaxed were reintroduced.
Amid the ongoing battle against COVID-19, Brunei assumed chairmanship of ASEAN in January 2021. The military coup in Myanmar in February put Brunei in a tight spot as all eyes were on ASEAN’s reaction to the crisis. Although an unusually bold decision was made to exclude Myanmar from the ASEAN Summit in late October hosted virtually by Brunei, on other occasions the ASEAN chair appeared to be lending legitimacy to the military regime.
Apart from addressing the issue of low growth rates as a result of overdependence on oil and natural gas, rising unemployment remains a major concern for the sultanate. In realizing economic diversification, a new blueprint, Towards a Dynamic and Sustainable Economy, unveiled in January, emphasizes the emergence of a strong private sector in Brunei. As a further move, the sultanate plans to nurture a digital economy.
Brunei maintained close security and defence relations with its traditional partners in 2021. The year also marked the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of relations between Brunei and the People’s Republic China (PRC). The PRC is Brunei’s largest foreign direct investor and has pledged to increase its investments, especially under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The COVID-19 Pandemic: The Tsunami of the Second Wave
Brunei began facing the COVID-19 pandemic when the first case was confirmed on 9 March 2020. It was triumphant in restraining the outbreak for much of 2020 and even into at least August 2021. In fact, as of 31 December 2020, Brunei only had 157 cases, with four deaths. For a country with a population of 429,999 (2021), this figure was indeed minuscule and spoke volumes of the government’s impressive efforts in curbing the pandemic. Further evidence of this was the absence of locally transmitted cases of COVID-19 for three hundred days by 4 March 2021. During this period, all infections that were reported in the country were imported cases.
As such, on 7 March 2021, the country’s Ministry of Health announced some relaxations to the restrictions that had been imposed to enable Bruneians to return to the new normal.
1 - Determinants of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: In Search of an Explanation
- Leo Suryadinata, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 5-21
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Introduction
This chapter identifies a number of factors which influence, if not determine, Indonesia’s foreign policy. These factors include Indonesian leaders’ perceptions of territorial boundaries, Indonesia’s role in world affairs, and the constraint on its behaviour posed by the country’s available resources. Indonesian political culture and elite perceptions of external threat will also be examined because they may throw light on Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour.
Indonesia’s Territory and Role in World Affairs
The perception of Indonesia’s territory and role in world affairs by its leaders is important because of its effect on Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour. The difficulty, however, is in determining whose perceptions should be accepted as valid. Should they be those of the foreign policy elite or should they be those of Indonesian leaders in general? It is reasonable to assume that the perceptions of Indonesian leaders responsible for formulating foreign policy are the crucial ones. In the case of Indonesia, however, domestic policy-makers and foreign policy leaders are often the same individuals. This has been reflected in the role of the President, especially during the Guided Democracy and New Order periods.
Indonesia’s history and traditions have been mainly responsible for the perceptions of Indonesian leaders concerning the nation’s territory and role in world affairs. Indonesia, before August 1945, was known as the Dutch East Indies and the country is still defined today by the former boundaries of the Dutch colony. (Since 1976, Indonesia has also included the former Portuguese East Timor.) Most Indonesian leaders, however, especially the pre-war nationalists and the 1945 generation, consider Indonesia to be a continuation of two ancient empires, Sriwijaya and Majapahit.
Before independence, Indonesian leaders debated the boundaries of an independent Indonesia. One view, represented by Mohammad Yamin, a nationalist poet and statesman, for example, subscribed to the “Great Indonesia” concept (Indonesia Raya). He maintained that the height of the Majapahit Empire was the period of greatest glory in Indonesia’s history. Citing the work of Prapanca, a fourteenth century poet of Java, Yamin said that Indonesia, under Majapahit rule, had included the Dutch East Indies, Malaya (Peninsular Malaysia), Borneo, Timor, and Papua (New Guinea). He believed that an independent Indonesia should include the former territory of the Majapahit Empire.
About the Author
- Elizabeth Buensuceso
-
- Book:
- ASEAN Centrality
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 204-204
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Bibliography
- Elizabeth Buensuceso
-
- Book:
- ASEAN Centrality
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 169-172
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Cambodia
- Edited by Daljit Singh, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, Thi Ha Hoang, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2022
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 107-108
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Preface
- Leo Suryadinata, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp x-x
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
In writing this book, I have benefited greatly from numerous discussions that I have had with many friends and scholars over the last 20 years. I have also profited from various seminars on Indonesia’s foreign affairs given by Indonesian officials, diplomats and academics. Many of these seminars and talks were behind closed doors or off the record, and therefore they cannot be cited. Nonetheless, they have had a strong influence on my study.
Many friends in Indonesia have shared their expertise with me, and in doing so have enriched my understanding of both Indonesia’s domestic politics and foreign policy. Their names are too many to be mentioned here but I would like to offer all of them my sincere thanks.
A significant portion of the study was conducted between 1988 and 1989 during my sabbatical leave in three institutions: the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore (ISEAS), Ohio University and Cornell University. Each possesses an excellent library, and I am grateful to the staff of those libraries for assisting me in my research.
A few friends have read the early version of my manuscript, either in part or in full. I would like in particular to thank Chin Kin Wah, N. Ganesan, Michael Leifer, Jamie Mackie and Nancy Viviani for their useful suggestions. I am also grateful to Triena Ong who has given me editorial advice. Nevertheless, for any mistakes and shortcomings which still exist in this book, I am alone responsible.
Leo Suryadinata
July 1995
Singapore
Biden’s First Year: Coping with Decline as China Rises in Southeast Asia
- Edited by Daljit Singh, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, Thi Ha Hoang, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2022
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 42-59
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
The remarkable negative shift in American policy against China dominates US policy in Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region, one of two top policy arenas of acute US rivalry with China. The other is competition for dominance in the high-technology industries determining which country will be the world’s economic and military leader. In both critical policy areas, the United States seeks to counter Chinese challenges and prevent feared Chinese dominance and its negative impact on American security and well-being.
President Joseph Biden entered office in January 2021 with clear priorities focused on countering the pandemic that ravaged the country amid the national government’s mismanagement, reviving and making more competitive the stalled economy in ways beneficial to American workers, reducing partisan divides that have caused government gridlock and mass protests that undermine the democratic process, and protecting minority rights against unjust law enforcement. Foreign policy was secondary. There was a strong emphasis on a return to close cooperation with allies and partners; cooperation with international groups seeking multilateral solutions to salient global issues involving public health, climate change and nuclear non-proliferation; and a priority on Asia as the most important region for American security, economic and political interests.
President Biden and senior members of his administration came late in endorsing the dramatic negative turn in US policy towards China carried out by senior leaders of the Trump administration and bipartisan majorities in Congress beginning with the administration’s National Security Strategy in December 2017. Candidate Biden disparaged China’s ability to challenge US power. By early 2021, however, the president and senior aides repeatedly warned against major dangers posed by China’s challenges. Biden stressed that China had reached a stage, through predatory economic practices, where it challenged the United States for leadership in high-technology industries that provided the foundation for US economic and military leadership, thereby threatening US domination by China. Meanwhile, the president’s countering of Chinese expansionism in Asia showed repeatedly in his meetings with key allies and partners, giving high importance to the four-party Quad grouping involving Australia, India, Japan and the United States to advance US interests in the region in contrast to China’s ambitions for dominance and control.
Brunei Darussalam
- Edited by Daljit Singh, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, Thi Ha Hoang, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2022
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 89-90
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Walking a Fine Line: How Cambodia Navigates its Way between China and Vietnam
- Edited by Daljit Singh, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, Thi Ha Hoang, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2022
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 126-138
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Over the course of the last decade, Cambodia’s relations with China have gone from strength to strength, deepening across every field imaginable, and at a pace that gives new meaning to the phrase “breakneck speed”. While the COVID-19 pandemic slowed—and for a brief period entirely halted—the constant stream of official and business delegations from China, Phnom Penh has been expecting their rapid return (some more eagerly than others) when normalcy and regularly scheduled flights resume. The sheer scale of Chinese engagement with Cambodia was well encapsulated by one Cambodian official who noted to the author that the number of official visits to his department was so high they could barely keep up—with at least one group arriving every week. At the same time, the vast amount of Chinese aid and foreign direct investment is omnipresent—hundreds of miles of new roads (of varying quality) built under the ambit of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), new Phnom Penh skylines dominated by Chinesebuilt office buildings and condominiums, and once-sleepy provincial towns and suburbs packed to the gunwales with Chinese-owned factories and shophouses. A visit to the port city of Sihanoukville, constantly touted as the kingdom’s “New Shenzhen”, regularly yields the inevitable joke by Cambodian colleagues when entering the city: “Did you remember your passport? We’re in China now.”
While English remains the second language of choice for the kingdom’s elite, professional class and students, one can easily live and work in Cambodia fully ensconced in putonghua—a far cry from the early 2000s when “Chinese language” meant Chaozhou and Hokkien, and traditional rather than simplified characters on shop signs. Confucius Institutes abound, including branches at various ministries (including the Ministry of Defence), and the kingdom’s Chinese language media regularly trumpets in laudatory terms a daily drumbeat of new initiatives demonstrating the unbreakable ties of Sino-Cambodian friendship. The appointment of Chinese-born, naturalized Cambodian businessman Chen Zhi—chairman of the Prince Group conglomerate—as advisor to Prime Minister Hun Sen last year demonstrated to many observers the incredible depth and new reality of Sino-Cambodian relations.
2 - Indonesia’s Foreign Policy before the New Order: In Search of a Format
- Leo Suryadinata, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 22-33
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Introduction
Using the various “determinants” discussed above as a backdrop, this chapter examines Indonesia’s foreign policy before Suharto came to power. What was its nature? What were the major issues? Who made the policies? A brief study of Indonesia’s foreign policy before the New Order is important because Suharto’s foreign policy, to a certain extent, has shown continuity with that of Sukarno.
Various factors which have been identified in the previous chapter, such as leaders’ perceptions of Indonesia’s territory and role, the dominant political culture and Indonesia’s capabilities, have affected Indonesia’s foreign policy throughout the period from the revolution to the Suharto era.
Pre-New Order policy can be divided into at least three periods: the revolutionary period (1945-1949), the Liberal Democracy Period (1950-1958), and the Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965).
The Revolutionary Period (1945-1949)
Before considering Indonesia’s foreign policy during the revolutionary period, it is necessary to ask whether there was a foreign policy before December 1949. Some observers argue that, prior to that time, Indonesia was not an independent state because the Dutch had not transferred sovereignty. Accordingly, prior to 1949-1950, Indonesia did not have any foreign policy.
Indonesian nationalists argue that Indonesia was already a sovereign state when independence was declared. A state is defined in terms of independent government (a republic), clear boundaries (those of the Dutch East Indies, although before December 1949 the nationalists were not in full control) and a population (Indonesian peoples who lived in the Dutch East Indies). Moreover, when independence was proclaimed, the Republican Government was the only government because the Japanese had capitulated on 15 August 1945, and Allied troops only arrived a few weeks later. After mid-September, the Allied Forces led by the British intended to restore Dutch rule in Indonesia. Their actions brought them into physical conflict with Indonesians who were then struggling for their independence. Although the republic was initially confined to a limited area and was not recognized by all the major powers, it was recognized by some small states (in the Middle East) and by some major powers (the Soviet Union in 1948, before the Dutch transfer of sovereignty). Since Indonesia was already a state in 1945, its foreign policy also began in that year.
In any case, the fact remains that the Republicans were able to establish a foothold in Java and expand their influence.
Acknowledgements
- Leo Suryadinata, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp xi-xi
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
7 - Indonesia-China Relations: Ideology, Ethnic Chinese and the President
- Leo Suryadinata, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 101-121
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Introduction
This chapter examines Indonesia’s policy towards China under Suharto. It explains why it took so long for Jakarta to normalize relations with Beijing and what obstacles arose in the process. What were the factors that contributed to the diplomatic breakthrough in 1989? What were the roles of the military and the President in this normalization process? Are there any issues which may affect the relations?
Sino-Indonesian Relations under Sukarno
It is a well-known fact that, during Sukarno’s time, Indonesia was on good terms with the PRC, especially in the mid-1960s when Indonesia, together with the PRC, attempted to set up the Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) headquartered in Jakarta. CONEFO was supposed to be a United Nations of poor countries because at the time, the PRC had not yet been admitted to the UN, and Indonesia had just left the organization. This did not mean, however, that all socio-political forces in Indonesia were in support of close Beijing-Jakarta relations. On the contrary, the army was worried about a Beijing-Jakarta axis but was not able to move Indonesia away from the PRC anti-colonialist coalition.
In the 1960s, prior to the emergence of the New Order, there were three political forces competing for influence in domestic politics. Communist influence continued to grow after the 1957 by-elections and the Army also gained in strength after crushing the 1958 regional rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi. The President, who was becoming more left-wing in his political orientation, initially attempted to balance the PKI against the Army and vice-versa, but gradually he moved closer to the PKI. Fearing the rise of the military, the PKI wanted to establish a Fifth Army under its control made up of peasants and workers. Sukarno lent his support to the idea and sent Omar Dhani, the chief of the Air Force, to negotiate with the PRC in the hopes of getting small weapons for the Fifth Force. Apparently, the President wanted to balance the army’s strength by aligning himself with the PKI and the Air Force.
This balance of power game came to a sudden end on 30 September 1965 when an alleged communist coup took place. Six generals were kidnapped and slain, but General Nasution escaped. General Suharto, who was the commander of the Strategic Unit in Jakarta, was not on the list.
Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto
- Aspiring to International Leadership
- 2nd edition
- Leo Suryadinata
-
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023
-
The book, which was first published in 1996, examines Indonesia's foreign policy under Suharto. It not only details Indonesia's foreign policy behaviour vis-à-vis Indonesia's neighbours and major powers, but also places it in the context of foreign policy analysis. Today, the book remains as the only full-length study on Indonesia's foreign policy under Suharto. It is now reprinted with a new postscript which discusses the post-Suharto era from B. J. Habibie to Joko Widodo.
Indonesia under Suharto had attempted to become a regional power to lead Southeast Asian states and beyond. As the largest country and also the richest in terms of natural resources, Suharto's Indonesia was held in deference by the ASEAN states. However, due to its limited capabilities, its lack of military strength, advanced technology and economic strength, the political influence of Jakarta was in fact quite limited. During the economic crisis, Suharto was forced to step down. He was succeeded by B. J. Habibie who was largely preoccupied with domestic issues, who in turn was followed by weak presidencies such as Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and Megawati. Only after the ex-general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono assumed presidency did he manage to stabilize the situation and attained economic growth. He even became known as the 'Foreign Policy President'. Nevertheless, he was constrained by the harsh Indonesian reality: limited resources, a weak military and absence of political influence. His successor Joko Widodo has been more concerned with economic matters and domestic politics; Indonesian regional leadership declines further.
Laos in 2021: (Im)Mobility with Infrastructure and COVID-19
-
- By Phill Wilcox
- Edited by Daljit Singh, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, Thi Ha Hoang, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2022
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 177-192
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
If 2020 was a year dominated by COVID-19 worldwide, it is difficult to label 2021 any differently, especially in Laos. While much of the Global North enters a stage of pandemic recovery, and talk of life in the post-pandemic world, this is just beginning in Laos; one of the early success stories of COVID-19, with only a small number of infections in 2020. From 19 September 2021, Vientiane entered its strictest ever period of lockdown, with cases of the delta variant soaring and concerns about the pandemic spreading throughout the capital causing strict restrictions on movement, including large numbers of roadblocks. The extended lockdown was only showing signs of easing at the time of writing in November 2021. Different parts of the country have been under various degrees of lockdown, but it is clearly unlikely that the country will return to a widespread state of pre-pandemic normality at the end of 2021.
While it is easy to view 2020 and 2021 in Laos as solely about COVID-19, and the initial sections of this chapter focus on that, there have been other significant developments in Laos. These can be split into three main themes. The first relates to infrastructural developments, particularly the completion of the Laos–China Railway, set to open on 2 December 2021—it also marks the rising presence of China in Laos. The second involves political developments aiming to strengthen the rule of law and the government campaign against drugs. This is pertinent as 2021 saw Southeast Asia’s largest ever drugs bust in Laos. Other political developments include attempts to combat corruption and the rise of repression against freedom of expression, especially around internet freedoms. The third theme is about economic developments, including concerns about rising levels of debt and inflation, attempts to stabilize the Lao kip, and the reform of state enterprises. The chapter finishes with some suggestions as to what 2022 may offer and some tentative predictions as to what is worth watching closely.
COVID-19 Arrives in Laos, Again
Laos escaped 2020 relatively unscathed by COVID, with only forty-one cases and zero deaths by the end of the year. Even in a region that experienced fewer COVID-19 cases than elsewhere in the world, this low level seemed positive. All went seemingly well until the Lao New Year in April 2021.
The Philippines
- Edited by Daljit Singh, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, Thi Ha Hoang, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2022
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 269-270
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Indonesia in 2021: In the Eye of the Storm
-
- By Sana Jaffrey
- Edited by Daljit Singh, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, Thi Ha Hoang, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2022
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 141-161
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Overview
Jokowi’s initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic was driven by a firm resolve to avoid lockdowns in the hope that Indonesia could evade a large wave of infections until vaccines became available. The arrival of the highly transmissible Delta variant in 2021 shattered this optimism. According to official estimates, 144,000 people in Indonesia have died from COVID-19. More than half of these deaths occurred during the intense wave of infections that engulfed the country between June and September 2021. The Delta wave caused a health system collapse and widespread economic disruptions. It also damaged President Jokowi’s personal credibility, as public trust in his ability to manage the crisis sank to the lowest levels since the pandemic began.
Amid the raging health crisis, the Indonesian Parliament (the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or DPR) took up two legislative priorities. The 2021 Law on Special Autonomy (Otsus) for Papua was passed in July despite sustained protests by Papuans and a challenge in the Constitutional Court. Touted by the government as means for accelerating development, the new law effectively ends Papua’s ability to govern itself by transferring key fiscal and political powers back to Jakarta. In contrast to the speedy passage of the Otsus law, the sexual violence bill that has languished in the DPR since 2016 was shelved once again. Lawmakers accommodated objections by Muslim organizations to the consent-based definition of sexual violence in the bill and dropped key provisions for victims’ rights. But even this watered-down version could not be passed when Islamist parties insisted on revising the law to ban sex outside of marriage, including LGBTQ relations.
Two regional developments tested Indonesia’s reliance on ASEAN for managing its foreign policy objectives. Following the coup in Myanmar, Indonesia’s foreign minister skilfully navigated a myriad of interests to prevent recognition of Myanmar’s military government, but the bloc’s five-point consensus had little success in curbing the regime’s atrocities against civilians. Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines through the AUKUS deal upset Indonesia’s longstanding efforts to prevent intensification of great power rivalry in Southeast Asia. Support for the deal from the Philippines and Singapore also exposed deep divisions within ASEAN, once again raising questions about ASEAN’s ability to serve as a buffer against geopolitical competition in the region.
6 - ASEAN Centrality as a Principle of Diplomacy with ASEAN’s External Partners
- Elizabeth Buensuceso
-
- Book:
- ASEAN Centrality
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 107-155
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Everywhere I spoke about ASEAN, I have always been asked about its importance, and even its relevance, in the face of its perceived failure to address at least three major issues—the South China Sea, the Northern Rakhine (Rohingya) problem and human rights. One of the quickest ways to counter arguments against the charges of the irrelevance of ASEAN is the fact that it has formal partnerships with all the major powers in the world—the United States, China, Russia, Japan and the European Union (EU) and many more are waiting in the queue. This is despite the long and arduous process of applying to become an External Partner. Even the seemingly simple act of signing the Instrument of Accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) follows the same long and sometimes cumbersome process that takes several months to complete. If ASEAN were irrelevant, I would say, why would these external parties go through all this? Obviously, the answer lies in their perception that indeed, ASEAN matters and that, of course, they would want to benefit from ASEAN’s growing economic and political/security importance as well as push their own agenda into that of ASEAN. The dynamics of how this happens will be the subject of this section, using the autoethnographic framework I described earlier.
ASEAN has not indicated any ranking or category of hierarchy for its external partners but it is generally understood that such a hierarchy exists. Among the Dialogue Partners (DPs), nine are sub-classified as Strategic Dialogue Partners (SDPs) while Canada has also indicated its desire to become one. This de facto categorization is reflected in Table 6.1.
The growing interest by other countries in ASEAN is also reflected in the number of applicants waiting to be accepted as external partners of ASEAN. These are: Bangladesh, the UK, Morocco, Fiji (Observer Status), Ecuador, Egypt, and Mongolia.
The TAC issued in 1976 is a fundamental peace treaty that all members, external partners and observers of ASEAN must accede to. Thus, countries and regional organizations desiring to apply for formal relationships with ASEAN regard it as their first step towards their acceptance for any category of external partnership.
Index
- Leo Suryadinata, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
-
- Book:
- Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 235-239
-
- Chapter
- Export citation