3.2.1 Twitter (X) Protest Reports

Figure 2 illustrates the workflow to gather and generate the dataset on contentious events in Russia. The dataset utilizes social media posts by users on Twitter from January 2010 to March 2023 to account for the 2011–2023 time frame and the preceding year. While Reference DollbaumDollbaum (2021b) notes that the use of Twitter in Russia is considerably lower compared to the more popular social network, VK, especially outside of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, Twitter remains a key platform for opposition activists and politicians to communicate with their audiences (Reference Alieva, Moffitt and CarleyAlieva et al., 2022; Reference DollbaumDollbaum, 2021b) and overseas users, for example, English speakers or Russians living overseas. Reference Alexanyan, Barash and EtlingAlexanyan et al. (2012) argue that Twitter users form distinct clusters and maintain user communities within Russian regions, fostering more consistent engagement and community formation. The platform is widely used to discuss politics and contentious events (Reference Alexanyan, Barash and EtlingAlexanyan et al., 2012), and as a medium for “discursive struggles” between the state and opposition in restrictive contexts, such as in Iran and Russia (Reference Dehghan and GlazunovaDehghan & Glazunova, 2021, 743).

Figure 2 Methodological workflow for contentious events data collection in Russia.

Note: GER stands for Geographic Entity Recognition.

Twitter, functioning as a network of activists, encompasses media organizations operating both online and offline, as well as exclusively Twitter, alongside individual users who report and publish firsthand observations, such as their participation in contentious events. It makes Twitter a valuable source of additional data and details that might be underreported in traditional media outlets. Underreporting could occur for various reasons, including protests taking place in remote regions with scarce media presence or intentional media blackouts during specific events. Leveraging Twitter facilitates access to a wide array of data from diverse media sources, offering unique insights from individual activists and eyewitnesses.

The choice of Twitter was also guided by more practical considerations. There are serious limitations related to the use of other platforms in Russia. For example, there is evidence that content on VK, one of the most popular Russian social networks, is censored, and its users are more frequently repressed for posting content (Reference Bodrunova, Litvinenko and NigmatullinaBodrunova et al., 2021; Reference PanPan, 2017), potentially leading to self-censorship and biases when reporting on events. Other popular social media platforms, such as Facebook, YouTube, and Telegram, can potentially be sources of data on contentious action. However, these platforms restrict access to their API and impose other limitations on the collection of public data, which may negatively impact data availability and the quality of the dataset. Such limitations include the type of content and the usability of the platforms by users who post it.Footnote ⁷

Figure 3 illustrates the diversity of actors reporting on contentious events on Twitter, derived from users’ interactions with protest-related tweets included in the final dataset. In this network, each node represents a Twitter user, while each directed edge signifies interactions (retweet, reply, or quote) with the posts of influential users who reported on protests from 2011 to 2023. The contributions of these users were crucial in creating the final protest dataset, demonstrating how other Twitter users engaged with the authors of the original tweets. Retweets and similar forms of interaction are regarded as reliable indicators of a user’s influence within social networks (Reference Cha, Haddadi, Benevenuto and GummadiCha et al., 2010; Reference Riquelme and González-CantergianiRiquelme & González-Cantergiani, 2016). Although this is not an exhaustive network of users who posted about protest events, it highlights the central users in disseminating protest information and enables the identification of which Twitter users were most notable in doing so. The accounts of influential users were classified based on a manual assessment of their accounts.

Figure 3 Network of influential users based on interactions with tweets from the dataset, including anti-regime bloggers and activists () pro-regime media (), satirical and entertainment anti-regime media (), anti-regime opposition actors () and CPRF ().

Note: The network, a directed bipartite graph, initially comprised 243,226 nodes and 960,875 edges. It was filtered based on an in-degree threshold of 450 interactions, resulting in a network of 362 nodes and 6,965 edges. The nodes represent two distinct categories: influential users and users interacting with these influentials via reposts, replies, or quotes.

3.2.2 Data Collection

The primary goal of this data collection process is to identify posts detailing contentious events across Russia. The main selection criterion is that the posts should provide information about the event’s date, location, repertoire, and the number of attendees. Such posts are either from media outlets or individuals who attended these events, reported on the occurrences there, claimed to witness what appeared to be a contentious event, or shared others’ observations and comments. Notably, the most significant events receive coverage from multiple Twitter accounts, each offering varying levels of detail. In contrast, smaller regional events usually have coverage from fewer accounts.Footnote ⁸

For the initial data collection, 5,713,892 tweets, including retweets containing the words “rally” and “protest,” were collected.Footnote ⁹ These results encompassed tweets discussing any topic using these two keywords. For example, it included references to contentious events abroad or unrelated issues, such as casual meetups or family disagreements. In order to streamline the dataset, empty tweets, reposts, and tweets composed of just one word were excluded. Furthermore, tweets not specifically referencing instances of contentious action or not providing event and location details were labeled for further removal. Given the vast volume of tweets, machine learning was chosen as a more efficient solution than manual labeling due to time and resource considerations.

3.2.3 Binary Classification Using RuBERT

The approach entailed a binary classification of tweets. Those tweets that provided information about a geographic location, specific sites in Russian cities or regions, the number of detentions, participants, overarching event features, or discussions were tagged as “1.” Conversely, tweets with content deemed irrelevant or ambiguous were marked as “0.” To solve this binary classification problem, I used a pre-trained Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) Natural Language Processing (NLP) model (Reference Devlin, Chang, Lee and ToutanovaDevlin et al., 2018). This open-source, state-of-the-art language model, developed by Google, is efficient at classification tasks that demand a contextual grasp of the content to assign an appropriate classifier (Reference Mapes, White, Medury and DuaMapes et al., 2019). Being open-source, BERT offers flexibility in fine-tuning its parameters to enhance performance and requires fewer computational resources for classification.

Given that the dataset is in Russian, I fine-tuned a Russian model based on DeepPavlov’s pre-trained BERT variant, RuBERT (Reference Burtsev, Seliverstov and AirapetyanBurtsev et al., 2018; Reference Kuratov and ArkhipovKuratov & Arkhipov, 2019). For training, I labeled 10,000 tweets, randomly sampled from between 2010 and 2023 (Reference Grießhaber, Maucher and VuGrießhaber et al., 2020).Footnote ¹⁰ Fine-tuning of the model’s parameters was conducted until achieving optimal performance on the validation dataset and an optimal F1 score on the test dataset.Footnote ¹¹

3.2.4 Geographic Entity Recognition

To pinpoint the geographic references within tweets, the OpenAI GPT-3.5 model was deployed. This output underwent manual refinement and leveraged Google’s Geocoding API to determine the exact positions (i.e., latitude and longitude) of specified cities and federal subjects mentioned in the tweets. Duplicate entries that pertained to the same event but varied in event-related information (e.g., adjustments in repertoire, numbers, and location) were amalgamated. The remaining semantic duplicates were discarded by evaluating the cosine similarity of at least 80 percent. The comparison is based on sentence embeddings generated via RuBERT (Reference Kuratov and ArkhipovKuratov & Arkhipov, 2019; Reference Reimers and GurevychReimers & Gurevych, 2019). Tweets devoid of details related to the place, location, and nature of contentious activities were also excluded.

This data collection process resulted in a final dataset of 66,935 reports that span across all federal subjects over 2010–2023 (March). To protect the identities of the tweet authors, the content associated with tweets was translated and succinctly summarized utilizing GPT-3.5 and Google’s Translation API. The data related to identifying the original posts (post and author ID) were removed.Footnote ¹² Table 2 demonstrates several examples drawn from this dataset.

3.2.5 Paired Comparison and Cluster Analysis

To examine how contentious action compares across different federal subjects and find the most similar and different regions, I conducted a paired comparison. The analysis observed longitudinal changes in contention trends across regions. Given that some regions are significantly more populous than others and may, therefore, demonstrate variations in the number of contentious events, the focus was solely on trends illustrating how event occurrences evolved over time. The underlying assumption is that if contention trends shift similarly across regions, these changes might be influenced by authoritarian innovation.

Due to variations in event counts across different regions and times, these counts were normalized.Footnote ¹³ This normalization ensured that the absolute magnitudes of the event counts did not influence trend comparisons, allowing for a focus solely on shifts in trends over time. The equation for normalization is

$X_{i,j}^{\prime }=\frac{X_{i,j}-{\mu }_j}{{\sigma }_j},$(1)

where $X_{i,j}$ represents the number of events in region $j$ at time $i$ . Here, ${\mu }_j$ denotes the mean of the number of events for region $j$ across all time points, while ${\sigma }_j$ signifies the standard deviation of the number of events for region $j$ across all time points (months and years):

$\begin{array}{cc}{\mu }_j& =\frac{1}{N}\sum _{i=1}^N{X}_{i,j},\end{array}$(2)

$\begin{array}{cc}{\sigma }_j& =\sqrt{\frac{1}{N}\sum _{i=1}^N(X_{i,j}-{\mu }_j{)}^2},\end{array}$(3)

where ${\sigma }_j$ represents the spread of the numbers around ${\mu }_j$ . N denotes the total number of data points for each region’s time series – specifically, 159 months from the dataset, spanning from January 2010 to March 2023.

After the normalization process, the standardized values or trends $X_{i,j}$ for each region and time point were compared in pairs using the Euclidean distance.Footnote ¹⁴ The Euclidean distance acts as a metric to quantify the differences between regions’ trends. In this context, a smaller Euclidean distance between two regions indicates more similar trends, while a larger distance suggests greater dissimilarity. The distance is calculated as follows:

$d(p,q)=\sqrt{(p1-q1{)}^2+(p2-q2{)}^2+\dots +(pn-qn{)}^2}.$(4)

The Euclidean distance is subsequently used for hierarchical clustering. In this approach, the two entities (either individual data points or existing clusters) with the shortest distance between them are merged. This process is repeated iteratively until all entities are merged into a single overarching cluster.Footnote ¹⁵ Figure 4 illustrates the hierarchy of the clusters in a dendrogram. The height at which two clusters merge in the dendrogram represents the degree of their dissimilarity: the higher the merging point, the greater the dissimilarity. The colors and merging heights delineate distinct clusters of regions with the most similarity.

Figure 4 Clusters of similar and dissimilar regions in terms of contentious trends based on Euclidean distance.

In total, eight clusters were identified for further qualitative analysis using existing regional data on reactive and proactive repression forms, as well as reports on contention, to discern their similarities and differences. The list of clusters is shown in Table 3.

3.3.1 Repressive Legislation

Legislation is considered repressive if it violates fundamental human rights or can be potentially used to infringe on civil liberties of citizens. The determination of whether a specific legislative act is repressive is carried out by international and human rights organizations, such as the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) and the International Federation for Human Rights. Repressive legislation can influence the rights of certain social groups to voice their opinions (Reference CommissionVenice Commission, 2013).

Legislative acts passed by the parliament and signed by the president are publicly published by the Russian government. Reports classifying repressive legislation published by human rights organizations and media were consulted to determine whether a specific legislative act could be deemed repressive. Changes in punishments for violation of regulations related to political participation are documented in the Code of Administrative Violations and the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and were included in the analysis.

3.3.2 Detention during Contentious Events

Individuals detained for participating in contentious events in Russia are most commonly convicted under Article 20.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences and typically receive a warning or a fine. Law enforcement officers predominantly invoke this code for most detainees unless the participant committed additional offenses (e.g., an alleged assault on an officer, consumption or possession of drugs or alcohol, verbal attacks against specific social groups or the state). Detentions under violation of Article 20.2 are documented by the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court (Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 2022). In some cases, detentions are marked by instances of violence and torture, as reported by the media, human rights organizations, lawyers, and relatives of the detainees.

This Element categorizes the act of detention and violence against participants during the contentious event as reactive repression. Meanwhile, any actions taken post-detention are considered proactive, aiming to deter future participation by specific individuals or groups in contentious events.

3.3.3 Political Persecution

The definition of political persecution encompasses the deprivation of personal liberty and detention that violates international human rights conventions, such as the European Convention on Human Rights. This includes detentions for political reasons without evidence, or where evidence is fabricated, discriminatory detentions, and detentions that breach legal proceedings (Parliamentary Assembly, 2012). Typically, reports on these issues are compiled by human rights organizations, such as OVD-Info (2023a), Sova (2022), and Reference CentreCentre (2013). This Element uses the database of political persecution cases from OVD-Info, which combines data from multiple sources, including their direct work with political prisoners and reports from other organizations and experts.Footnote ¹⁶

Based on these data, reports of contentious events generated by users, changes in legislation, politically motivated persecutions, detainees, and violence, I proceed further by tracing how repression and innovative responses changed contention within the time frame of 2011–2023.

4.2.1 2012: the Presidential Election and the Bolotnaya Case

The events persisted into early 2012, especially in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. One of the most notable ones in terms of the number of participants took place on Vorobyovy Gory; there was an anti-fascist event on the January 19th and a rally for fair elections on the January 21st. Simultaneously, some environmental (e.g., in defense of the Bitsevsky forest) and commemorative (e.g., in memory of Stanislav Markelov and Anastasia Baburova) events took place.Footnote ²⁰ Opposition media outlets extensively covered these rallies. Organizers, as well as participants, were detained mostly during unauthorized gatherings, such as Strategy-31 rallies.Footnote ²¹

Events peaked in February and began to decline thereafter. One of the most significant anti-government protests occurred on February 4 at Bolotnaya Square, where people rallied against electoral manipulation. This event had participants from over 100 cities. At the same time, a pro-Putin rally took place in another location at Poklonnaya Gora. This rally, believed to be backed by the regime, also drew tens of thousands of attendees. However, there were allegations that some participants were coerced or paid to attend.

Leading up to the presidential election on March 4, pro-government rallies, which were suspected to be orchestrated by the regime – given numerous reports of pressure on public sector workers and students – also took place.Footnote ²² While pro-government demonstrations are not new to Russian contentious action, their frequency significantly increased during this period, as illustrated in Figure 6. This suggests the regime’s attempts to use these events to demonstrate its support during heightened contention.

Figure 6 The trends of opposition and pro-government events in 2012.

Note: Pro-government events support Putin, United Russia, and state politics or oppose claims made against the state (e.g., rallies against electoral manipulation rallies).

In the wake of the presidential election in March 2012, the focus of the claims shifted toward Vladimir Putin and alleged electoral manipulation. Simultaneously, the regime altered its response to opposition movements. Detentions intensified, especially during larger unauthorized events. The Pushkinskaya Square event on March 5 was particularly notable due to the extensive detentions and confrontations between law enforcement and rally participants.

As police actions became more restrictive, contentious events diminished in April. Significant incidents, such as a Red Square rally and a demonstration against Arctic drilling, concluded with multiple detentions. There were also pro-government rallies against opposition rallies in Moscow, reportedly organized by families of OMON officers. Prominent opposition figures and organizers, including Ilya Yashin, Sergey Udaltsov, and Alexey Navalny, were frequently detained and fined. As detentions increased and event authorizations declined, political persecution continued, while events directly challenging the regime saw a drop in frequency. Pro-government events decreased rapidly after the presidential election, mirroring a similar decline in contentious events organized by the opposition.

May 2012 became the next milestone for the opposition. Contentious actions saw a heightened regime response, culminating in the Bolotnaya Square event on May 6, titled the “March of Millions.” It took place a day before Putin’s inauguration. Although initially authorized, the march was marred by barriers, clashes, and over 400 detentions when organizers refused to alter the route of their march following police intervention. This event signified a major change in the regime’s response, especially compared to previous events from 2011–2012. Organizers and opposition activists were detained, including Alexey Navalny, Boris Nemtsov, and Sergey Udaltsov. Participants, who wore white ribbons, a symbol of the opposition movement, faced intensified police actions and sustained injuries. The regime also reported injuries among the law enforcement officers. Later, the Moscow mayor publicly rewarded the injured officers for their service by gifting them apartments.

In the days after the dispersal of the event, small-scale rallies, termed “festive walks,” took place, resulting in more detentions and action from law enforcement officers. An indefinite sit-in, Occupy Abai, began on May 10 at Chisty Prudy Boulevard and extended to Saint Petersburg. This sit-in and subsequent rallies in Arbat, Kudrinskaya, and Barrikadnaya faced dispersals and detentions throughout May. At the same time, event organizers were repeatedly denied authorization to hold some of their proposed events, resulting in a rapid decline in their number in the forthcoming months.

Simultaneously, with the rise in repression, political persecution, and the number of detainees, the regime began implementing repressive legislation. It aimed to constrain citizens’ participation in contentious events and limit general criticism of the government. These laws became the basis for detentions and investigations in the forthcoming years, targeting the limitation of expression and involvement in contentious events against the regime or specific social groups. Instead of outright banning certain activities, the federal government incrementally introduced restrictions that heightened the cost of participation and deterred certain forms of claim-making, with punishments becoming progressively more severe.

Several laws directly related to contentious events were passed, amending their procedural provisions. These amendments introduced new event authorization applications, accountability for multiple law violations, increased fines, and new items such as “a simultaneous presence of multiple individuals at a specific location.” Another significant change was the introduction of the term “foreign agent,” which would later become one of the main tools of repression and undergo numerous amendments and extensions over the following decade, primarily targeting the opposition.Footnote ²³ The regime also introduced website blocklists and the term “intentional distribution of false information.”Footnote ²⁴

Contention diminished over the following months with some claims against police violence. A March of Millions on June 12 transpired without incident, despite police raids on opposition leaders’ homes the day before. Another March of Millions was also held in September, attracting thousands of participants. In October, elections to the opposition’s coordination council took place. A support rally with around 1,000 participants was led by Sergey Udaltsov, who was detained later that month. He was interrogated regarding his alleged intentions to organize mass riots in collaboration with Leonid Razvozhaev and Konstantin Lebedev.

Over this post-Bolotnaya period, the authorities increasingly denied event authorization to arrange events in historically contentious areas, especially in Moscow. The difficulty of securing event permits became the primary concern for the opposition, with leaders opting for compliance to avoid detainments and preferring not to hold rallies and demonstrations without authorization. Continuing with the repressive legislation, the regime introduced revisions to the terms “state treason,” “state secret,” and “espionage.” These changes broadened and generalized the definition of “state security” and its related terms in the Federal Law N190-FZ.

The year’s final significant rally took place on December 15 in Lubyanka Square, drawing thousands of participants. This event led to the detentions of key opposition figures. Heightened security measures were noticeable in Moscow leading up to the event, indicating readiness to interfere.

4.2.2 2013: New Repressive Legislation and More Persecution

In January 2013, the frequency of contentious events and the number of detentions continued to decrease, as shown in Figure 7. One of the most notable events was a rally against the Dima Yakovlev Law, which prohibited US citizens from adopting Russian children.Footnote ²⁵ Other events during this period included commemorative rallies, LGBTQ+ support against upcoming restrictive laws, and worker movements.Footnote ²⁶ The Strategy-31 event resulted in approximately thirty detentions, one of which was of their leader, Eduard Limonov.

Figure 7 The number of new instances of reactive repression and political persecution in 2011–2015 compared to the general trend of contentious events.

The opposition criticized the authorities for increasingly denying permission for mass events. Meanwhile, Moscow designated specific areas for gatherings, prohibiting mass events outside these zones. OMON maintained a strong presence at subsequent Strategy-31 events and other rallies. The state authorized events by LDPR, CPRF, and environmental groups while also organizing rallies in support of the army, Vladimir Putin, and Dmitry Medvedev.

The first four months of 2013 saw multiple environmental rallies and smaller protests led by the opposition in support of political prisoners. Detentions occurred at Red Square for individuals carrying banners reading, “Down with Tsar Putin.” Large rallies in May and June supported the Bolotnaya prisoners, drawing 30,000 participants on May 6 and June 12.

Law enforcement used force against contentious events opposing Putin’s Plan Mosque and unauthorized rallies at Triumph Square. Moscow’s Gay Pride was banned, and the regime declined permissions for other LGBTQ+ events. This prohibition preceded the introduction of new laws, N135-FZ and N136-FZ, banning “the propaganda of non-traditional sexual relationships.” Additional provisions were added against “insulting believers’ feelings” and “violations aimed at disrupting religious ceremonies.” The opposition faced restrictions on rallies and refusals of event authorization. Detentions continued throughout the year during various unauthorized events.Footnote ²⁷

In December, the court was granted the authority to block websites deemed extremist based on a new definition, which includes calls for mass riots and a new concept of “extremist claims.” Another law redefined the notion of “calls for violating territorial integrity.” It limited citizens’ freedom to express their opinions on specific political issues, including the events in Ukraine a few months later.Footnote ²⁸

4.2.3 2014: The Crimea Invasion

Throughout 2014, the dynamics of contentious events shifted. The period surrounding Russia’s invasion of Crimea was characterized by numerous pro-government rallies that frequently overshadowed events organized by the opposition. The slight increase in large-scale events led to a marginal rise in detentions and reactive repression. However, even though there were more detainees in 2014 than in 2013, most contentious events unfolded peacefully.

On February 21, some opposition activists attempted to hold a rally in support of the Bolotnaya Case prisoners. However, the police restricted access to Manezhnaya Square, where the event was planned, preventing participants from taking any action. During the final court hearings related to the case, some activists gathered around the Zamoskvoretsky court, resulting in random detentions. After the 2012 Bolotnaya participants’ conviction and the court’s concluding statement, additional detentions took place on Tverskaya Street against people gathered to rally against the court’s decision.

After the invasion of Crimea in March, localized anti-invasion demonstrations emerged throughout Russia, primarily in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Significant events also took place in other major cities, such as Yekaterinburg and Samara. On March 8, left-wing affiliates gathered at Mars Field in Saint Petersburg for an authorized rally. March 15 saw the nationwide “March of Peace,” which coincided with even larger pro-government events.

The regime responded to protesters by making over 1,500 detentions over two months, predominantly in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. The occurrence of contentious events dipped between April and July 2014, replaced by demonstrations supporting media freedom, opposing construction projects like the Moscow–Kazan railway, advocating for environmental concerns like deforestation, and commemorating events like the deportation of Crimean Tatars’ seventieth anniversary.

Repression heightened following the Crimea invasion, and cases of intimidation for making inappropriate remarks surged. Most of the political persecution cases in 2014 related to Ukraine and expressions of public support for it (OVD-Info, 2014). For instance, a Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) professor was dismissed for refusing to recognize Crimea as part of Russia.

The regime continued to introduce repressive legislation throughout the year. In May, it outlawed denying or distorting the USSR’s role in World War II. It also mandated owners of websites receiving more than 3,000 visitors to register with the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor). Additionally, the regime amended its constitution to include Crimea within the country’s territory. In June, the Ministry of Justice was empowered to designate entities as foreign agents based on its discretion if any evidence of external funding was discovered. Additionally, media organizations were prohibited from being entirely owned by foreign entities, and the permissible portion of foreign investment was reduced.Footnote ²⁹

Penalties, as well as the potential for subsequent detention for repeated violations of Article 20.2, were escalated, enabling the regime to levy higher fines and arrest or prosecute individuals for consistent participation in contentious events under Article 212.1 with penalties of up to five years in prison. Until 2014, participants in mass events could be arrested only if the protest occurred near a nuclear plant. However, with the new legislation’s introduction (N258-FZ), law enforcement officers were permitted to detain participants for recurring violations, accompanied by the potential for criminal prosecution for subsequent infractions.

In December, unauthorized rallies supporting Alexey Navalny ahead of his court hearing faced detentions. The police utilized crowd separation techniques and preemptively blocked the event’s official Facebook page, which marked another new development in the regime’s repertoire of repression.Footnote ³⁰

4.2.4 2015: Nemtsov’s Assassination

In 2015, contentious events relating to the Yves Rocher case persisted with some major rallies on January 15. Authorized events took place in Moscow and Saint Petersburg, opposing the court’s decision to imprison Oleg Navalny and subject Alexey Navalny to a suspended sentence. January also witnessed a significant pro-government event: a large rally in Grozny against Charlie Hebdo’s Muhammad caricatures. It was endorsed by the republic’s president, Ramzan Kadyrov, who gathered hundreds of thousands of participants.

Overall, there were fewer contentious events in 2015. Issues addressed included environmental concerns like preserving the Troitsky forest, pro-government anti-Maidan rallies, and housing concerns, notably rallies held by currency mortgage borrowers. As indicated in Figure 7, the number of detentions during mass events and the number of events remained lower during this period.

After the assassination of Boris Nemtsov on February 27, commemorative marches were held nationwide.Footnote ³¹ Large peaceful marches on May 1 featured participants carrying portraits of Nemtsov, but state-controlled media largely ignored these. Tributes, such as floral offerings at the site of Nemtsov’s murder, continued in the following months.

The number of new cases of political persecution continued to rise. Various laws were applied for political reasons, and there was an uptick in cases tied to support for Ukraine. Judicial persecution was also initiated for violating “state territorial integrity” through online posts and images. One example is the Daria Polyudova case, where she, one of the organizers of the Kuban federalization rally, was prosecuted on three counts of public calls for extremism, including the use of the internet as a tool to make extremist calls. Other cases were based on public displays of disrespect toward specific groups (under Article 148), overt public disrespect, participation in terrorist or extremist groups, and involvement in mass riots (under Article 212).

In May 2015, the concept of “undesired organizations” was introduced, defining such entities as threatening the state’s safety and constitutional order. By July 2015, provisions were established for search engines to exclude false, outdated, or misleading information upon requests from law enforcement agencies.Footnote ³²

A large opposition rally named “Power Turnover” occurred in the Maryino residential area on September 20. This marked the first large-scale event held in a residential area of the capital. The organizers selected this location as the Moscow officials were reportedly unwilling to negotiate or approve any other sites in the city.

4.2.5 Regional Contention In 2011–2015

As illustrated in Figure 8, most Russian regions exhibited similar contentious trends in six out of eight regional clusters. The number of contentious events remained consistent, with some noticeable spikes occurring during significant political events. This suggests that many of the major events were organized countrywide. A decline in contentious events was observed after 2012 in the first four clusters, which is attributed to the observation that major contentious events are often organized by the same organizations with a regional presence across the country and are usually centered around specific issues or events.

Figure 8 A comparison of contentious trends distributed among the eight clusters.

The regions with the most contention, with more than 1,000 reports on contentious events, are Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Moscow Oblast, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, and Krasnodar Krai. These regions fall into Clusters 1, 3, and 4. They exhibit significant similarities in trends of contention, particularly during periods when major opposition and pro-government events are held. Being relatively populous areas, the regions serve as the epicenters where most contentious events occur.

Clusters 5, 6, 7, and 8 exhibit fewer similarities to the first four clusters. Notably, Cluster 8 has only a few reports on events. This cluster comprises the national republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Tyva, all of which have a long history of human rights violations, safety concerns, and distinct societal structures with significant national, religious, and cultural aspects (Amnesty International, 2012; Reference KhovalygKhovalyg, 2023; Reference MartyMarty, 2009). It sets them apart from other regions in Russia.

Opposition organizations are mainly absent in these republics, while activists and human rights organizations have a minimal presence and often face violence, including murder, disappearance, and torture. Due to the weak presence of human rights organizations and the ongoing threats from local authorities, as well as the social organization based on kinship systems, teips, and clans, instances of extrajudicial persecution often go unreported (Reference SokirianskaiaSokirianskaia, 2005, Reference Sokirianskaia2023). Such issues may be addressed through extrajudicial means and other extra-institutional bodies integrated within society. This makes the repression in these regions distinct from the rest of the country, reflecting the regions’ contentious politics.

The data do not indicate significant contentious action in certain regions, including Mordovia, Amur Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Bryansk Oblast, and Smolensk Oblast. These regions, grouped in Cluster 6, exhibit irregular contentious patterns with missing reports for many dates. The data do not reveal a similar pattern of contention across these regions compared to the more populous clusters. For instance, despite its proximity to more contentious regions, Mordovia does not show comparable levels of contention, while Amur Oblast exhibits similar contentious patterns to Mordovia despite its geographic remoteness. This observation emphasizes the importance of organizational structures supporting contention, which tends to be absent in some regions.

Cluster 7 comprises Kalmykia, Nenets Autonomous Region, Magadan, and North Ossetia. While displaying slightly different trends, these regions share similarities with the least contentious regions from the other clusters. Most of these regions are geographically remote from Moscow and the other primary regions of the first four clusters. The impact of geographic remoteness on contentious action in Russia remains unclear. However, it should be noted that the least contentious regions during 2011–2015 also tend to be among the least populous. An additional observation is that these regions exhibit a higher number of pro-government events. In contrast, opposition events are seldom held.

Notable outliers exhibiting slightly different patterns of contentious events include Astrakhan Oblast. This region experienced a spike in such events in April when most other regions witnessed a decline. These events rallied around calls for free and fair elections and supporting Oleg Shein. Having lost the Astrakhan mayoral election, Shein announced a hunger strike, alleging that electoral manipulations denied him victory. Backed by the opposition and his party, Just Russia, several events were organized in his favor, subsequently dispersed by the police.

Thus, a majority of contentious events were concentrated within the first four clusters of regions. They displayed consistent patterns of contention, echoing significant political developments countrywide. The example of Astrakhan Oblast underlines that specific regional circumstances, such as mayoral elections, can be conducive to contention. Therefore, the influence of local politics and societal structures and their variations visibly impacted contentious action in Russian regions despite the overall uniform narrative.

4.2.6 Authoritarian Innovation and Contention in 2011–2015: Some Conclusions

The rise in contention during the State Duma and presidential elections prompted changes in the regime’s response and its attempts to structure these reactions, as shown in Table 5. The regime’s repressive strategies evolved through legislation that introduced new provisions and increased penalties for violating existing ones, focusing on deterrence and enhancing the capacity to repress future events. In terms of persecution, the regime targeted specific individuals and organizations that could potentially draw more participants and challenge it. Such individuals and organizations included political and religious movements and organizations classified as foreign agents. This shift signified a decreasing tolerance toward political claims against the regime.

The regime generally refrained from employing violence. The number of detentions fluctuated in correlation with the changes in contentious events, increasing and decreasing over time. Instead of violently dispersing rallies, the regime ensured its visible presence during all significant events by deploying substantial numbers of OMON and police troops, installing barriers, and restricting access to specific locations, a scenario primarily observed in Moscow.

Authorization for participation served as the regime’s instrument to deter undesired events. While authorized contention witnessed minimal police intervention, most detentions occurred during unauthorized rallies, thereby increasing participation costs and discouraging the opposition from organizing them. Although some events proceeded without authorization, others were canceled due to the failure to secure an agreement with the officials, coupled with a desire to avoid endangering participants, consequently reducing contentious action. The authorities categorized detentions during unauthorized rallies as lawful, justifying the heavy presence of law enforcement officers, repressive actions, and portraying detainees as violators of legislation related to participation in mass gatherings.

Used in conjunction with the state-controlled media, the pro-government rallies demonstrated support for the regime during two of the significant political events of the period: the presidential election and the annexation of Crimea. By drawing more attention from the general public and its supporters, the regime ensured that these demonstrations were visible and their scope was emphasized. Meanwhile, using media blackouts and not reporting on events arranged by the opposition favored the pro-government events.

Another innovative attribute is the legislation introduced in response to specific events. For instance, laws concerning the violation of territorial integrity and undermining the role of the USSR in World War II were enacted during the annexation of Crimea, effectively preventing any criticism against this particular instance of authoritarian politics. These laws introduced severe punishments and were later used to prosecute activists. As Table 6 suggests, in most cases, the regime continued to employ extremist and terrorist legislation to persecute. The law against the propagation of nontraditional relationships significantly restricted the range of events the LGBTQ+ community could organize, while other laws limited what could be expressed and who could be criticized during contentious events. The regime also took initial steps toward controlling the nature of information being expressed online, outlining specific topics that could potentially cause repercussions.

The regime’s innovative responses were often triggered by specific events occurring immediately after particular instances of contentious action. New amendments to the legislation, an increase in fines, and the expansion of grounds for arrests, as well as heightened punishments for individuals detained repeatedly, were introduced following major contentious events. The Bolotnaya case marked the first mass persecution of participants, demonstrating the regime’s willingness to employ more repressive strategies and increase the participation costs for activists at its discretion whenever regime-imposed orders are disregarded. By placing restrictions on the most visible activists, introducing and showcasing the enforcement of new legislation, and preliminary detentions of prominent activists and their subsequent political persecution, the regime aimed to prevent and reduce their ability to organize further events.

Detentions, increased requirements for event authorizations, political persecutions of Bolotnaya participants, and new legislation significantly impacted the frequency and continuity of events held by the opposition. The continuous streak of rallies that commenced toward the end of 2011 and extended until April–May 2012 transitioned into less continuous and less frequent sudden spikes in contention during 2013–2015. No reports indicated any backlash and events dispersed by law enforcement officers did not resume later. The increased detentions were not met with violence, as no reports were suggesting the use of violence against law enforcement officers in general.

The repertoire of contention included rallies, marches, demonstrations, individual pickets, sit-ins, and strikes. Due to the regulatory nature of participation, events were typically held within specific time frames and at particular locations agreed upon with the officials, rarely deviating from the repertoire. The most significant events were organized by the noninstitutional opposition and the most prominent actors, who lawfully submitted authorization applications beforehand. It remains unclear whether a refusal to authorize an event would diminish the number of participants in 2011–2015. However, the decision to hold or cancel the event rested with the organizers, with participants generally adhering to the organizers’ decisions and refraining from showing up if the event was canceled.

4.3.1 2016: Rosgvardia and the Yarovaya Law

In January 2016, several hundred participants attended an authorized event against repression in support of Ildar Dadin. He had been detained and convicted under Article 212.2 for repeatedly participating in unauthorized events, even though he was engaged in solo picketing at the time of his detention. He was sentenced to three years in prison and became one of the most famous individuals persecuted for this reason.Footnote ³³

Overall, contentious actions of that period showed a heightened focus on specific issues rather than the broader political situation. Minor rallies against the bankruptcy of Transaero, issues faced by currency mortgage holders, paid parking, church construction, and other developmental projects around the country took place, similar to the repertoires of the previous years. There were gatherings in support of Crimea and environmental concerns, such as a rally in Dubki Park in Moscow or the “We Are Together” pro-government concert. Demonstrations against paid parking resulted in clashes and arrests. Contentious events erupted across Russia in response to the introduction of the Platon system. This system imposed additional taxes on trucks weighing more than twelve tonnes, leading to strikes by business owners and drivers. These confrontations eventually led to multiple detentions. During a rally marking the fourth anniversary of the Bolotnaya events, the participants were detained for holding signs that read, “Fabrication of the Bolotnaya case is a state crime” and “Free the heroes of May 6th.”

A significant development in the contentious politics of the regime in that period was the restructuring of the Ministry of Internal Affairs internal army, leading to the introduction of the National Guard (Rosgvardia). This new entity incorporated OMON and several other existing structures within the Ministry’s internal army. Rosgvardia became an autonomous organization reporting directly to the president. It played a role during rallies, particularly in crowd dispersal, detentions, and the use of force (Reference GaleottiGaleotti, 2021).

The Yarovaya Laws became another milestone in the evolution of authoritarian repression.Footnote ³⁴ Initially introduced as anti-terrorist laws, these regulations increased law enforcement officers’ authority to access users’ personal data. They also mandated internet providers to store traffic to identify extremist and terrorist organizations and communications to prevent potential terrorist acts. The laws decreased the age of criminal responsibility for crimes classified as terrorist acts and lowered the age of criminal responsibility regarding participation in mass riots. Messages on social networks that condoned terrorism were categorized as media publications and punished accordingly. Furthermore, religious organizations were stripped of their right to conduct missionary work unless they were officially registered and authorized to perform such activities.

The Society of Internet Defenders tried to organize a contentious event against the Yarovaya laws but was ultimately denied permission despite an initial authorization. Various related events occurred throughout Russia, with attendance ranging from tens to hundreds of participants.

4.3.2 2017: He Is Not Dimon to You

In 2017, there was a surge in large-scale contentious events, with reactive repression and detentions increasing even faster, as depicted in Figure 10. The overall number of contentious events remained limited while the opposition focused on organizing large-scale events. While some sought government authorization, there were instances, especially following criticism, where they attempted to hold these events without official approval. These unauthorized rallies led to heightened detentions and intensified confrontations with the regime.

Figure 10 The number of new instances of reactive repression and political persecution in 2016–2019.

In January and February 2017, issue-specific protests arose surrounding developmental and environmental concerns. Minor instances of contention occasionally led to detentions, such as during the January 14 rally in support of political prisoners. Several protests in Saint Petersburg, with 1,000–2,000 participants each, emerged against the transfer of Isaac’s Cathedral to the ownership of the Russian Orthodox Church. Other parts of the country hosted commemorative events, as well as protests against infrastructure development and the decriminalization of domestic violence. In March 2017, major pro-government rallies took place nationwide, celebrating the annexation of Crimea, attracting tens of thousands of participants in total.

By 2017, many pro-government events had evolved into a more regular repertoire. Notably, from 2011 to 2015, such events typically coincided with periods of heightened contention. However, instead of being a response to heightened contention periods, pro-government rallies became regularly scheduled events annually commemorating specific dates, as shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11 The trends of opposition and pro-government events in 2011–2019.

On March 26, riot police were deployed at unauthorized rallies in Moscow and several other cities. Despite tens of thousands of participants nationwide, the lack of event authorization in most cities led to nearly 2,000 detentions. These rallies were organized in response to a video released by Alexey Navalny’s Anticorruption Foundation, a national opposition organization dedicated to combating corruption in Russia. The video “He Is Not Dimon to You” exposed alleged wealth and corrupt ties among top state officials, including ex-president and the then prime minister Dmitry Medvedev. The creators of the video anticipated a reaction from the regime, but when none came, they organized the events. Concurrently, several employees from the Anticorruption Foundation were arrested.

Smaller-scale anticorruption rallies were held after these events early in April across the country by various organizations, including Yabloko, CPRF, Russian National Front, and Citizen’s Initiative. Some participants reported state-initiated internet access blocks. Open Russia organized unsanctioned contention in several cities, some of which ended with dispersals and additional detentions. In June, anticorruption rallies continued with increased participation and a rise in detentions, especially during some unauthorized events in many of Russia’s largest cities, drawing tens of thousands of participants. Authorities used gas and force against participants at the Tverskaya Street rally. Before the event, Alexey Navalny, the organizer, was detained and jailed for thirty days for not adhering to the approved mass gatherings process; he attempted to shift the venue from Sakharov Prospect to Tverskaya Street earlier during another rally.

Overall, 1,800 people were detained nationwide. There was a significant rise in detentions in Saint Petersburg, with around 700 arrests during a smaller, unauthorized rally. Additionally, in June 2017, any gatherings organized by political parties to engage with their electorate were classified as rallies and pickets. These required prior approval to avoid being labeled as unsanctioned mass events.

Following thousands of detentions, a rise in persecution, and increasingly violent reactions from the regime, opposition rallies subsided. July and August saw a sharp drop in the number of contentious events. There were smaller-scale protests in support of Alexey Navalny across Russia, with gatherings in cities like Novosibirsk, Omsk, Kazan, and Yekaterinburg, among others.

In October 2017, more anticorruption action was scheduled in various cities across Russia. These events witnessed around 320 detentions during unauthorized and authorized rallies, with the total number of participants ranging from 10,000 to 20,000. Even though the event had not been officially authorized in Saint Petersburg, the police initially did not intervene. However, they later began dispersing the crowd, detaining approximately seventy participants. Several smaller events followed these incidents, eventually decreasing over the next weeks.

In November, several reports related to an alleged organization of mass nationalist events supporting Vyacheslav Maltsev, a rightist politician. Becoming a famous opposition activist, he advocated for a revolution in Russia. After multiple detentions and persecution as an extremist, he fled the country and announced a revolution on November 5, followed by Putin’s impeachment. His supporters were detained and prosecuted as members of extremist organizations all over the country prior to, during, and after rallies that took place on November 5, with a reported number of 448 detainees around the country.

A distinctive feature of 2017 was the rise in cases related to Article 318, violence against a law enforcement officer. Most of these cases emerged following the anticorruption events in March. For example, seventeen-year-old Mikhail Galyashkin was accused of using pepper spray against an OMON officer. Yuri Kuliy was arrested and later found guilty, receiving an eight-month prison sentence for allegedly causing significant pain and physical harm by grabbing a police officer’s arm.

4.3.3 2018: He Is Not a Tsar to Us and the Pension Reform

In 2018, the frequency and scale of contentious events marked it as one of the most eventful years, with Alexey Navalny and his Anticorruption Foundation leading the charge. In late January 2018, the Anticorruption Foundation organized demonstrations in some of the largest cities. These events followed the Central Electoral Commission’s decision not to register Navalny for the upcoming presidential election, leading to a series of rallies dubbed the “Strikes of the Electorate.” While many were authorized, contentious action in Moscow and Saint Petersburg was not due to disagreements over the location, which led to detentions. Before the rallies, several of Navalny’s offices faced police raids.

In March, the regime organized a rally in support of Putin, attracting tens of thousands of attendees. Reports indicated that students, state workers, and pensioners were pressured or incentivized to attend. After the presidential election, minor political rallies were held around the country, claiming the results were falsified.

At the end of March, Kemerovo witnessed rallies following a fire at a local shopping mall. Claim-makers demanded a thorough investigation and accountability. Law enforcement officers were present but did not intervene. In solidarity, several rallies were organized nationwide, including in Moscow. A peaceful gathering with candles and flowers commemorated the fire’s victims, explicitly stating there would be no political statements in the process.

On April 30, in response to the government’s announcement to block Telegram, thousands took to the streets in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and several other major cities, with the majority gathering in Moscow. The demonstrations, heavily promoted on Telegram and other social networks, were organized by the Libertarian Party and the Society for Internet Protection. The main rally was sanctioned by the officials and proceeded without detentions.

Contentious action continued in May with a series of large-scale contentious events named “He is not a Tsar to you” and organized by Alexey Navalny and his Anticorruption Foundation. In some regions, the organizers failed to obtain authorization from the officials but held gatherings nevertheless. Around 1,600 detentions occurred nationwide, with half coming from Moscow alone. Twenty-three journalists were arrested in the process.

The protests drew tens of thousands of participants. Some participants faced prosecution for violence against law enforcement officers. Both media and participants noted the presence of individuals dressed in Cossack attire at some events, who reportedly attacked and dispersed protesters.Footnote ³⁵ Violence and multiple attacks on demonstrators were reported in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Additionally, there was an increase in pro-government commemorative rallies in the Moscow Oblast related to Victory Day on May 9, indicating the regime’s effort to draw more attention to the celebrations.

The next surge of contention happened against the pension reform throughout the country in July. The reform sought to raise the retirement age. These events were organized by various organizations and figures, including the CPRF, Just Russia, LDPR, Confederation of Independent Labor Unions of Russia, Anticorruption Foundation, Yabloko, and various leftist movements. A notable feature of the rallies was their widespread occurrence across Russia, with many occurring in regional areas. The announcement of the forthcoming pension reform coincided with the 2018 World Football Cup, which imposed restrictions on where contentious events could be held.

Among the largest rallies against this reform were those organized by the CPRF across the country; the most significant gathering attracted around 10,000 participants in Moscow, concluding without any detentions. However, a few arrests occurred during a rally organized by the Libertarian Party. Smaller events occurred from 2018 to 2019, with a noticeable decrease in participation numbers. The regime proceeded to approve the reform in October. Scattered detentions were documented in cities like Krasnodar, Moscow, and Saint Petersburg during nationwide rallies.

October to December saw events supporting political prisoners, particularly those involved in the “Network” and “New Greatness” cases. Both cases emerged as instances of political persecution against groups that made claims against the state. “Network” represented anti-fascist and anarchist factions from Penza. Its members were convicted based on alleged plans to execute acts of terrorism against the state. Meanwhile, participants of the “New Greatness” organization were labeled as extremists and were accused of plotting to overthrow the government. Both trials were marred with procedural violations and claims that existing evidence was fabricated. Some detainees alleged torture, but the regime rejected such accusations (OVD-Info, 2019, 2018).

4.3.4 2019: The Moscow Duma Election

In February, several rallies were held supporting political prisoners, commemorating Nemtsov, and democracy. Some events revolved around healthcare, housing, and environmental issues, including action against waste management policies, landfill sites, and construction on Lake Baikal, fueled by the 2019 garbage reform. The disputes related to the garbage reform persisted, especially in Archangelsk and the Moscow Oblast. Contention also arose from the ongoing closure of hospitals due to healthcare optimization reforms. Several people were detained on May 1 during labor demonstrations in Saint Petersburg and other cities. The regime labeled these events as “unauthorized activities within authorized ones,” leading to over 100 detentions. This included activists from organizations like “Indefinite Protest,” “Vesna,” and “Open Russia” making political claims.

In the lead-up to the Moscow Duma elections and registration process, contention increased after opposition candidates faced difficulties when trying to register to participate in the election. Despite the officials’ refusal to authorize, a rally was held on July 27. The organizers and opposition leaders, including Alexey Navalny, Ivan Zhdanov, and Ilya Yashin, were detained in advance and/or on the day of the event. In anticipation, the regime mobilized thousands of law enforcement personnel, including riot police. They restricted access to Tverskaya Street and managed crowds by separating groups of participants. It is estimated that at least 10,000 people participated. Throughout the day, 1,388 individuals were detained, with law enforcement using batons and force in some instances, which resulted in injuries. The authorities categorized the rally as a mass riot and subsequently prosecuted several attendees from among the detainees. In total, twenty-three individuals were charged with participating in mass riots and using violence against law enforcement officers. Despite the number of detentions and the officials’ refusal to issue authorization, another unauthorized rally occurred on August 3. It saw over 1,000 detentions while participants intended to spread out across multiple locations to complicate detention efforts by law enforcement. Several reports emerged detailing injuries caused by law enforcement actions, with one injury reported from the police side.

On August 10, another major rally took place on Sakharova Avenue. It was an authorized event with an estimated 20,000–50,000 participants. However, after the rally concluded, 200 individuals were detained. This group had chosen to proceed toward the presidential administration building, which was not on the list of authorized locations on the application form. Some participants reported difficulties accessing the internet. Meanwhile, an unauthorized rally in Saint Petersburg attracted 200 attendees, of which 79 were detained.

On August 31, unauthorized gatherings occurred in Moscow and Saint Petersburg, yet no detentions were made. In September, another elections-related event was held in Moscow, which the officials authorized. This gathering saw around 20,000 participants, including many opposition leaders who could not attend some of the previous events.

4.3.5 Regional Contention in 2016–2019

As in 2011–2015, most clusters repeated the trends of contention, indicating the presence of countrywide rallies organized by the regime and major political parties, the Anticorruption Foundation, and other opposition organizations. However, compared to the previous period, 2016–2019 saw slightly more diversity and regional variation in contention. While the monthly median of reports on contention declined in some of the clusters, other regions showed slightly different patterns of contention and even increases in such instances, as shown in Figure 12.

Figure 12 A comparison of contentious trends distributed among the eight clusters in 2016–2019.

The regions with the most contention included Moscow, Moscow Oblast, Saint Petersburg, Novosibirsk Oblast, Sverdlovsk Oblast, and Krasnodar Krai from Clusters 1, 3, and 4. The differences among the clusters are notable during 2016 when the incidence of countrywide contention was relatively lower in general, but issue-specific contention persisted, for example, rallies related to labor and environmental issues in Samarskaya Oblast and notably in Tolyatti, as well as environmental and commemorative rallies in Moscow Oblast.

Clusters 5, 6, 7, and 8, mainly comprising less populous regions and republics, were dominated by pro-government actors. On the other hand, despite having a low number of reports in general, Khabarovsk Krai showed several events related to local issues, such as hot water supply problems, increasing costs of utilities, and threats to the region’s biodiversity and living conditions. A similar trend can be observed in Astrakhan Oblast from the same cluster. Tula Oblast, one of the more contentious regions in Cluster 7, saw several commemorative rallies and state-sponsored demonstrations related to history. Chechnya hosted state-sponsored rallies in support of Muslims in Myanmar and on National Unity Day.

Contentious action erupted in Ingushetia in 2018–2019 after Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and Ingush president Yunus-bek Evkurov signed an agreement to demarcate the borders between the two republics. These rallies gathered tens of thousands of people and were authorized by the officials. The claim-makers criticized the regime for the secrecy and lack of communication with the republic’s populace when deciding to cede some of the republic’s territory to Chechnya. After several rallies in October and November 2018, new demonstrations emerged on March 26, 2019. This resurgence followed the regional government’s amendment to the legislation, which removed the requirement to hold a referendum when demarcating territories, and the failure to make any progress using appeals to the court and federal government.

A new phase began on March 27 after the participants refused to vacate the square following the authorized rally the day before. Rosgvardia officers, brought in from neighboring federal subjects, initiated the dispersal of the event and detained some participants. This action met with resistance; some officers refused to follow orders and detain individuals. In the aftermath, numerous organizers and participants were raided and politically persecuted in a series of cases named “The Ingush Case,” resulting in prison sentences on charges of extremism, participation in mass riots, and violence against law enforcement officers (Reference NovayaNovaya Gazeta, 2021).

In response, the government outlawed traditional organizations organizing the rallies, such as the Council of Teips. Hearings were conducted outside the republic in other Russian regions like Stavropolye and Kabardino-Balkaria to mitigate potential interference in the prosecution by local teips and connections. These events exemplify how instances of contention are suppressed with federal government involvement when regional authorities cannot do so themselves.

In 2016–2019, contentious action in Russia remained concentrated in specific regions. While local political developments and issues were conducive to contention in regions like Ingushetia and Moscow, the contentious trends in most regions mirrored the events observed in more populous clusters. This suggests a dependency on specific countrywide organizations when organizing contentious events. Regions traditionally experiencing more rallies shaped the countrywide dynamics, highlighting the centralized nature of such actions and the influential role of the federal center in conjunction with countrywide repression. In contrast, local organizational structures, if present, did not appear to contribute to contention significantly. Local bodies like the Council of Teips played their roles in regional rallies. However, members of such organizations face persecution while the regime demonstrates a willingness to intervene whenever local governments fail to control contentious action.

4.3.6 Authoritarian Innovation and Contention in 2016–2019: Some Conclusions

While the number of events did not change significantly compared to the 2011–2015 period, the regime resorted to repression more frequently during 2016–2019, targeting political organizations, individuals, and activists during unauthorized contention. By employing a wider range of legal instruments to persecute those who engaged in contentious action, the regime aimed to prevent their further involvement. This strategy narrowed the gap between the event incidence and the average number of detentions per event, as it was shown in Figure 10.

Organizers of contentious events encountered an increasing number of refusals when seeking authorization for particular events, while the regime increased the presence of law enforcement with full riot ammunition at all major contentious gatherings. Although the officials still permitted certain events, they became less willing to do so while introducing more stringent event authorization requirements. Faced with numerous refusals, the opposition opted to hold unauthorized events. This shift led to an increase in detentions and more frequent episodes of violence, actions which the authorities justified as lawful measures to prevent dissent. Detainees and political prisoners reported numerous instances of violence and torture during persecution, a particularly pronounced trend in 2018–2019.

Besides the increase in detentions and violence, the regime marked further steps toward tighter control over civil liberties by introducing the Yarovaya Law. Other notable developments included more frequent police raids and the utilization of extra-institutional actors to disperse participants. Within this period, the first cases occurred that classified participation in contentious events as a criminal offense. Much like before, the regime reacted with innovation to contention. It also resorted to persecution whenever significant rallies occurred. The regime took steps to heighten fines and modify legislation, attempting to deter both participants and organizers from contentious action. By targeting particular individuals and organizations, authorities sought to reduce the number of claim-makers and impede their capacity to hold larger events.

The regime employed newer techniques such as blocking internet access during major contentious events, executing preliminary detentions of activists, and conducting raids on their homes and offices. It also targeted organizations engaged in political activism. The regime shifted away from organizing pro-government rallies as a countermeasure to the opposition, instead focusing on deploying mechanisms that would undermine organizational structures and persecute more prominent opposition leaders. As depicted in Table 7, the regime escalated the degree of repressive tools previously used, introducing additional components to the existing strategies, such as using tear gas and force against nonviolent events and the criminal conviction of repeatedly detained activists.

The total number of persecutions markedly increased, with a two- or threefold rise in the charges related to extremism and participation in terrorist organizations, as illustrated in Table 8. The regime sharpened its focus on employing extremist and terrorist legislation to politically persecute individuals. Additionally, there was a substantial increase in cases initiated based on violence against a public official.

The repertoires of contentious action remained consistent, with most larger events being organized nationwide, primarily by the Anticorruption Foundation and other organizations. Protesters did not engage in violent action, and organizers continually emphasized the importance of adhering to the democratic process, drawing a parallel to the repressive stance of the regime. Although the frequency of events declined, no significant change in their repertoires was observed. Attempts to organize more continuous events either lacked support from the participants or were dispersed by law enforcement officers. Organizers often chose specific dates for their actions and rarely acted without planning ahead. The officials allowed certain events but ensured they were of limited duration. Participants generally complied with legal requirements and procedures. They avoided engaging in specific acts that could incriminate them or draw undue attention from the regime. The decline in the number of events in 2019 was accompanied by an increase in detentions and repression, contrasting with the simultaneous decrease in both participation and detentions observed during the 2015–2016 period.

4.4.1 2020: COVID Restrictions on Participation

As illustrated in Figure 14, contention declined in 2020 due to the introduction of anti-COVID measures and restrictions on public gatherings. Individual pickets emerged as the dominant form of claim-making because they allowed participants to comply with the social distancing requirements. Generally, the regime did not authorize rallies and gatherings and imposed strict repression whenever an unauthorized event took place. Participants in single-person pickets were often detained irrespective of their actions.

Figure 14 The state-wide number of reports on contentious events in 2020–2023.

In 2020, a significant decrease in new political persecution cases occurred alongside a general decline in contentious actions and detentions. Article 212.2 on violating the procedure for organizing or holding public gatherings was applied against participants of contentious events in North Ossetia, who took it to the streets despite COVID restrictions and were violently suppressed. Several instances of 282.2 were initiated in February in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Khakassia, Primosky Krai, and Moscow.

In March, multiple pickets around the country opposed the announced reset of Putin’s presidential term and constitutional amendments. The president redefined his presidential term, enabling him to participate in the upcoming presidential election. Additionally, the president retained the right to hold a lifelong senator position in the parliament, ensuring legal immunity and protection from prosecution. He also gained the authority to dismiss both prime and federal ministers.Footnote ³⁶ Although some groups applied for rally permits to oppose the amendments, the officials declined these requests, citing the onset of the COVID pandemic. Despite these restrictions, smaller events persisted with numerous detentions. In addition to the regular enforcement of Article 20.2, Articles 20.6.1 and 6.3 were invoked against detainees for violating quarantine measures.

The regime also introduced a new N100-FZ law that penalizes the public dissemination of intentionally false information about circumstances that pose a threat to citizens’ lives and safety, specifically in the context of the emergence of COVID-19. The law also enhances the consequences for actions that create a “threat of mass illness,” such as organizing a rally during an epidemic.

One of the most notable events occurred in Vladikavkaz, attracting several thousand participants. Arranged in April, this event led to numerous detentions and some injuries to Rosgvardia officers. Around 200 arrests were made both before and after the event, resulting in multiple cases filed under Article 318 for violence against law enforcement officers. Another series of prolonged environmental rallies aimed at protecting Shies unfolded in Archangelsk, concluding in June when a decision was made to halt the construction.

On July 1, the day the constitutional amendments were signed, several hundred people gathered at Pushkinskaya without any subsequent detentions. Two weeks later, over 100 individuals were detained in Moscow for participating in an unauthorized protest regarding the same matter while also showing support for protesters in Khabarovsk and Belarus. From September to December, some detentions occurred at Moscow rallies, with attendance ranging from tens to hundreds of individuals. In 2020, about 800 protesters and individuals picketing alone were detained nationwide, leading to over 2,400 convictions under Article 20.2.

In July, contentious action began in Khabarovsk to support the detained governor Sergey Furgal and persisted throughout the year. Tens of thousands took to the streets in response. Despite many of these rallies and marches being unauthorized, law enforcement officers largely refrained from intervening during their peak. However, detentions started increasing in August as the number of participants declined and the issues highlighted by the claim-makers diversified, influenced by the political unrest in Belarus and the poisoning of Alexey Navalny.Footnote ³⁷ Regions neighboring Khabarovsk expressed support for the protestors and advocated on behalf of the participants. On October 10, Rosgvardia intervened, using force to disperse the crowd and detaining approximately thirty individuals. Those not detained during the incident faced persecution in the days that followed.

New regulations related to the organization of rallies were introduced through N497-FZ. This law expands the definition of a “public event” to include “mass simultaneous presence and/or movement of citizens,” necessitating approval from authorities. Furthermore, the term “public event” has been broadened to cover single pickets, previously the only form of contention that did not require approval. Another law, N541-FZ, imposes further restrictions on funding public events. It prohibits receiving funds for organizing public events from foreign governments, organizations, international entities, foreign nationals, “foreign agents,” and anonymous donors if the event’s attendance exceeds 500 people. The officials also reserve the right to reject a proposed location for an event and may suggest alternative venues. If the organizers deem these alternative locations unsatisfactory, their application to organize an event may be denied.

Further restrictions were introduced on foreign agents, including criminal charges for violations related to providing appropriate documentation. Their participation in the election process was limited; they were required to disclose their status before an election to be eligible to vote, and mandatory financial reporting requirements were imposed. The definition of foreign agents was expanded to encompass entities that gather data for a foreign source. Additionally, a new provision was introduced, mandating the referencing and description of the foreign agents’ status when citing materials they produced.Footnote ³⁸

4.4.2 2021: Alexey Navalny’s Imprisonment

Following the introduction of new repressive legislation and prohibitions in 2021, coupled with partially lifted restrictions on mass events, the year emerged as one of the most repressive of the previous decade. The largest contentious events occurred in Moscow on January 23 and again on January 31 and April 21.Footnote ³⁹

On January 23, more than 100,000 people took to the streets around the country in the majority of larger cities, with tens of thousands of participants in Moscow and Saint Petersburg and thousands of protesters in Perm, Yekaterinburg, Nizhny Novgorod, and Krasnodar, among others. Detentions began prior to the formal start of the event. It was not authorized in most regions, which resulted in multiple detentions of organizers, reports of problems with cellular networks, and access to the internet at the venues in multiple cities. The total number of detentions exceeded 4,000, with numerous injuries inflicted by law enforcement officers on participants and 70 people reporting injuries from twenty-three cities, particularly in Moscow and Saint Petersburg.Footnote ⁴⁰ Several cases were later initiated for the use of alleged violence against law enforcement officers.Footnote ⁴¹ New legislation was utilized to prosecute participants of mass events, such as creating an epidemiological threat during a pandemic and obstructing traffic flow. More than fifty journalists were detained, and several were reportedly beaten.

Detentions continued during the subsequent event on January 31. Arrests and searches preceded the planned rallies. Journalists and activists were targeted ahead of the demonstrations. Sergey Smirnov, the chief editor of “Meduza,” was detained due to alleged rally-related posts. Police issued warnings to journalists against participating in contentious events. Authorities employed strategies to block access to contention sites, leading to scattered demonstrations.

In Moscow and St. Petersburg, protesters evaded blockades through live coordination by Navalny’s associate, Leonid Volkov. Some cities lacked backup plans, resulting in confusion and clashes with the police. Participants were beaten, dragged, and detained, with journalists also being targeted. The police employed batons, electroshock weapons, and other equipment, such as fire extinguishers. The number of detainees reached 5,754, with at least 63 of them reporting injuries. On February 2, more people were detained after the court sentenced Navalny to two years and eight months in prison; 370 detainees were reported near the courthouse, and 1,512 detentions were recorded in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and other areas in total. In total, the events in support of Navalny resulted in over 11,400 detentions. There were reports that the police visited the homes of rally participants who were identified after the events using street cameras.

In February, smaller-scale events continued around the country, with a decrease in the number of participants. A large pro-government rally was held in March. Other notable issues included protests related to environmental issues, construction, and commemoration events. Commemoration rallies for Nemtsov were not authorized around the country, including Moscow, and some detentions occurred against individuals who attended these unauthorized events.

Contention on April 21 witnessed tens of thousands of people gathering around the country, with more than fifteen cities where the number of participants exceeded 1,000. Students were preliminarily notified about the possible consequences of participating in such gatherings, while preemptive detentions and police searches were conducted nationwide. The most violent and numerous detentions occurred in Saint Petersburg, with around 2,000 detainees all over the country. Notably, there was a reduction in repression in Moscow.

The forms of repression used by the regime included firing individuals (e.g., mass dismissal of Moscow metro workers), threats, closure of organizations, and designations of foreign agents or undesirable organizations. Concerns grew over Navalny’s health in prison. The Prosecutor’s Office sought to label Navalny’s organizations extremist. The activities of his Anticorruption Foundation were suspended, leading to shutdowns of the regional headquarters. Increased scrutiny and arrests affected the Anticorruption Foundation’s staff nationwide.

After the rallies, police utilized camera footage to identify participants and take legal action against them. Authorities in Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod employed facial recognition technology for identification. Prominent figures, including doctor Alexey Golovenko and writer Dmitry Bykov, were accused based solely on camera recognition results. Around thirty-five protesters from the April 21 rally were arrested using this method.

The police targeted journalists covering the rallies, utilizing strict regulations. New rules mandated the press to wear distinctive badges and vests with press markings. Despite these measures, some reporters were still confronted by police. Journalists like Anna Loyko and Alexey Korostelev were questioned or detained for alleged participation despite possessing press credentials. The regulations had been tightened earlier, requiring journalists to wear distinct identifiers provided by the officials.

Following the mass detentions, persecutions, and refusals to permit rallies, the number of contentious instances fell in the subsequent months. Some unauthorized protests, commemorative World War II activities, and environmental concerns persisted over May–June. In July, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) organized events opposing mandatory vaccination, addressing concerns about the epidemiological situation. Rallies were also conducted in support of political prisoners.

In July, the law N278-FZ prohibiting the comparison of the USSR and the Third Reich was enacted. This law forbids publicly equating the “objectives, decisions, and actions” of the USSR leadership with those of Nazi Germany and denying the “decisive role of the Soviet people in the defeat of Nazi Germany and the humanitarian mission of the USSR in liberating European countries.” Another law, N424-FZ, broadened the circumstances under which police are permitted to break into a car, such as if there are “stolen items” inside, a suspect is locked inside, or passengers are “in danger.” The authority to break into apartments has also been expanded.

In the lead-up to the State Duma elections in September, numerous events took place in August and September to protest the removal of certain candidates from the election or the refusal of their registration. Following the election, several social movement organizations and political parties attempted to organize contentious events to push back against the online voting system’s introduction and challenge the election results. Security measures were intensified, and several pro-government events were held in response to support the regime.

4.4.3 January 2022–March 2023: The Invasion of Ukraine

Immediately following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, several laws were introduced. Throughout the year, the government passed a total of 653 legislative acts, compared to 506 laws a year earlier. A distinctive characteristic of this period is the swift passage and subsequent enforcement of these laws to prosecute citizens. Concurrently, the regime continued its strategies used over the last decade, encompassing dispersion, prohibition, and persecution.

The year 2022 witnessed an unprecedented increase in detentions and heavy repression, accompanied by new laws and restrictions on public gatherings. Toward the end of February, following the invasion of Ukraine, unauthorized anti-war events and pickets emerged across the country, exhibiting a high level of participation. There were preliminary detentions targeting potential claim-makers and opposition leaders. The first war-related reports of contentious events surfaced before the invasion on February 19. On February 24, arrests occurred at pickets in major cities, including Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

The beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24 contributed to further restrictions and repression. The opposition, journalists, and activists voiced opposition to the war through open letters, protests, and social media. However, authorities countered efforts to criticize the invasion with censorship, repression, and arrests. Independent media outlets were blocked, and social platforms were restricted. Over 14,000 detentions were registered during rallies. By March 10, 712 participants faced administrative arrests, and 27 faced criminal charges. Most detentions occurred in the first month following the invasion, totaling 15,353 detainees, with more than 4,000 additional detentions in the subsequent year.

During anti-war protests, OVD-Info documented over 413 cases of police employing force, including beatings, choking, and inflicting injuries. Detainees endured various forms of violence, with incidents of fractures, dislocations, and head injuries reported. On several occasions, police denied medical assistance to the injured. Law enforcement officers arrested and detained individuals for expressing their views online, with over 2,000 cases wherein such posts were cited. With the onset of war, extrajudicial pressure associated with political beliefs intensified. Uninvestigated attacks and threats against claim-makers often remained unpunished, and other forms of pressure, such as job loss and social media bans, also went unaddressed. A substantial number of internet websites were blocked, while foreign and opposition media were compelled to either shut down or relocate overseas. Amid the war, authorities used facial recognition for preemptive arrests of activists.

In general, the anti-war protests were peaceful. People gathered in central city squares, some holding placards with calls for peace or expressions of support for Ukraine. Many attended without any promotional materials, simply showing up with small badges on their clothes or bags and still being detained. The events were not organized by a particular social movement organization, and people picketed at multiple locations simultaneously. In anticipation of protests occurring, law enforcement officers’ presence often exceeded the actual number of claim-makers as a preliminary measure.

Claim-makers gathered for rallies in the following days, such as a demonstration at Gostinny Dvor in Saint Petersburg with several hundred participants and in Novosibirsk with around 400 participants simultaneously. Initially authorized, the officials withdrew the authorization in anticipation of the events to hold rallies commemorating Boris Nemtsov. On March 18, at Luzhniki stadium, the regime arranged an event with reportedly 200,000 attendees.

Legislation known as the “Law on Fakes” or “Law on War Censorship” in N31-FZ, N62-FZ, and N260-FZ amended the Criminal Code to incorporate penalties for discreditation and public actions directed against the Russian Army. A new addition to the Administrative Code of Russia was introduced (N32-FZ), imposing fines for violating these provisions. Dissemination of false information, actions discrediting the military, and calls for introducing restrictive measures (i.e., sanctions) against Russian citizens could be potentially classified as criminal offenses and lead to incarceration. These laws have been criticized as repressive due to their overgeneralization and the lack of clarity regarding what constitutes such violations, leading to their application in instances where they may not be applicable or where evidence is not definitive. As a result, these regulations were utilized to persecute citizens who publicly expressed their opinions.

From the mass rallies and demonstrations of the previous period, events transitioned primarily to picketing as the main form of contention. A subsequent surge in contentious activity was reported in September following the announcement of partial mobilization to enlist more soldiers for participation in the Ukraine war. Areas where contentious events might occur were preemptively blocked by the police, accompanied by a substantial presence of law enforcement officers. In the lead-up to the mobilization announcement, repetitive pro-government events were observed, culminating in a large rally on September 30, arranged to support the annexation of the Ukrainian territories. Following the announcement of partial mobilization, detentions surged across various locations throughout the country, totaling 1,369 detainees. On September 24 alone, more than 833 detentions were made. Additionally, 176 organizations were designated as foreign agents.

A further reduction in contentious events was observed from October to December. Reports emerged indicating that police dispersed a contentious event opposing a construction project in Moscow, suggesting a shift toward a zero-tolerance approach toward any form of contention.

Following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and into 2023, the number of laws utilized to prosecute individuals openly participating in contentious events opposing the Russian invasion surged. The most frequently invoked law against participants across the country was the newly instituted article on public dissemination of knowingly false information regarding the military, state authorities, and affiliated actors and individuals.

In 2023, contention continued to decline. To express their disagreement with the regime, claim-makers continued to hold individual pickets and erect monuments to commemorate victims of the war and repression, often facing detainees and assault from the police. The officials refused to approve a Nemtsov rally on February 27, but some individuals brought flowers to the politician’s memorial on the bridge where he was murdered. Similar commemorative events took place around the country in other major cities.

4.4.4 Regional Contention in 2020–2023

Throughout the period, all eight clusters witnessed a significant decline in events. Most contention occurred in Moscow, Khabarovsk Krai, Saint Petersburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, and Moscow Oblast, with Moscow alone reporting more than 1,000 instances of contentious action. The prevailing trends of contention in 2020–2021 were echoed across most clusters, indicative of the number of rallies organized nationwide, primarily arranged by countrywide organizations with a regional presence (Figure 15). The median number of events showed a downward trend in most clusters, with no significant diversity in contentious events. The reduction in contention started in March 2022, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24.

Figure 15 A comparison of contentious trends distributed among the eight clusters in 2020–2023.

The most remarkable change occurred with the contentious events in Khabarovsk, where support for the Krai’s governor was demonstrated through rallies held for several months until further dispersal, thereby marking it as one of the most contentious regions during the period. Another significant outlier was North Ossetia, which experienced substantial contentious action against COVID-19 measures. This contentious action was violently suppressed, with no subsequent backlash.

Another notable development was shown in Chechnya, where mothers of mobilized soldiers and men held rallies to ask the head of the republic and the federal government not to mobilize Chechen men for the war in Ukraine. In response, Kadyrov announced that mobilization would not be held in the republic since the region had already supplied enough soldiers and had enough people willing to commit themselves and volunteer for war.

All clusters showed a decline in various types of events that had been present throughout the 2011–2015 and 2016–2019 periods, including environmental, labor, and other issue-specific demonstrations, thereby showcasing the regime’s zero tolerance toward any gatherings, especially after the invasion. Commemorative rallies and pro-government events were still held during this period, especially those in support of the war.

The average number of contentious events decreased across all clusters nationwide. Although some regions experienced developments tied to local politics, the majority mirrored the patterns of contention observed in the main clusters. It suggests a presence of countrywide activities, albeit lacking local structures for organized contentious action.

4.4.5 Authoritarian Innovation and Contention in 2020–2023: Some Conclusions

The period from 2020 to 2023 witnessed escalated repression aimed at political organizations and individuals who opposed the regime or expressed public disagreement with politics. The heightened repression manifested through increased instances of violence, reactive measures, political persecution on various pretexts, and elevated fines, arrests, and imprisonments. These tactics encompassed all the repressive strategies introduced over previous years and were amplified in terms of force and violence and supplemented by further innovative strategies, as listed in Table 9. By 2023, the landscape of contentious action had significantly changed in terms of incidence and repertoires. Environmental, labor, and other issue-specific events almost disappeared, alongside a general decline in other forms of political participation, especially following the full-scale invasion.

The regime successfully deterred individuals from engaging in contentious action, particularly following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. By demonstrating zero tolerance toward contention, the regime minimized all forms of public participation and punished those who sought to challenge its stance even in the absence of any evident activities. Notably, detentions surpassed the instances of contention, indicating a surge in repressive measures.

The inability to participate in or obtain permission for organized events led to individual picketing. However, this was classified as a mass event, leading to multiple detentions. Following the suppressive measures and detentions carried out in Russia during February and March, contentious events in general saw a decline. Individuals who made online posts criticizing the regime were also detained.

There was a noticeable decline in the average number of contentious events. The regime imposed stringent restrictions on mass gatherings and rallies and actively repressed various contentious activities nationwide. Furthermore, many repressive measures were employed: activists were imprisoned, leaders were persecuted, and concerted efforts were made to dismantle existing organizations and individuals previously engaged in organizing contentious events. One prominent target was the Anticorruption Foundation, with its leader Navalny enduring poisoning and subsequent imprisonment.

Innovative strategies included using facial recognition systems to spot and detain participants before or after unauthorized gatherings. Random detentions occurred among individuals who did not participate in the events but allegedly wore signs and colors that could be interpreted as support for Ukraine. Moreover, there was a significant increase in cases related to expressing political views online and further persecution for providing so-called fake information about the regime, its past, and current operations, including government officials. The regime utilized foreign agent legislation against individuals, thereby declaring some activists and critics as foreign agents. Preceded by an extended definition of what constitutes a foreign agent, these measures imposed limitations on activities such as participation in elections, engaging with the media, delivering public lectures, and holding particular positions. This utilization of the foreign agent legislation became a tool for persecution and limiting access to political resources, forcing individuals to either leave the country, cease public activities, or potentially face further persecution. These actions reduced the capacity of public figures and the opposition to mobilize support.

The regime introduced new legislation to politically persecute individuals, as shown in Table 10. The spectrum of laws utilized against citizens evolved significantly, reducing reliance on extremist and terrorist legislation while broadening the scope of possible violations. The most frequently used legislation charged individuals for expressing themselves or disseminating information deemed by the regime as false and undermining it in any way. This classification is suited for persecuting individuals who openly oppose state actors, especially the Armed Forces, during contentious events. Another important consideration is the explicit portrayal of the internet as a tool that, when used to express political views opposing the regime, resulted in criminal investigations, hefty fines, and possible imprisonment for repeat violations. A few provisions, such as the article on vandalism and intentional destruction of property, emerged in response to graffiti and writings on the walls of buildings, including government buildings. This reflects the increasing incidence of such violations, particularly following the onset of the war.