¹ Landau, Martin, Political Theory and Political Science: Studies in the Methodology of Political Inquiry (New York: Macmillan, 1972)Google Scholar.

² Lubnicki, Narcyz, “Epistemological Problems of Dialectical Materialism,” Synthèse, 7 (1948), 292Google Scholar. “Objective” in the Leninist (materialist) sense.

³ See: Husserl, Edmund, Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: Nijoff, 1960), pp. 153–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Cairns, Dorion (translator of Cartesian Meditations), “An Approach to Phenomenology,” in Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, ed. Farber, Marvin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940)Google Scholar. For an interesting discussion of similarities between phenomenology and empiricism see also Zaner, Richard, The Way of Phenomenology (New York: Pegasus, 1970), pp. 37–40Google Scholar.

⁴ Mannheim, Karl, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Harvest edition), pp. 28, 79Google Scholar. This discussion of objectivity and relativism is drawn from Landau, Political Theory and Political Science.

⁵ Morgenthau, Hans, “Reflections on the State of Political Science,” Review of Politics, 17 (10, 1955), 446. Morgenthau writesCrossRefGoogle Scholar,

⁶ See LaPalombara, Joseph, “Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation,” American Political Science Review, 60 (03, 1966)Google Scholar; Euben, J. Peter, “Political Science and Political Science” in Power and Community, ed. Green, Philip and Levinson, Sanford (New York: Vintage, 1969)Google Scholar; McCoy, Charles A. and Playford, John, eds., Apolitical Politics (New York: Crowell, 1967)Google Scholar, Introduction; and Surkin, Marvin and Wolfe, Alan, eds., An End to Political Science (New York: Basic Books, 1970)Google Scholar. These three volumes contain numerous references to Mannheim's Paradox.

⁷ Merton, Robert, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), p. 503Google Scholar. The original essay appears in the 1949 edition. Emphasis added.

⁸ See Hinshaw, Virgil Jr., “The Objectivity of History,” Philosophy of Science, 25 (01, 1958), 53, emphasis addedCrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Hinshaw, , “The Epistemological Relevance of Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy, 40 (02, 1943), 57–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “Epistemological Relativism and the Sociology of Knowledge,” Philosophy of Science, 15 (01, 1948), 4–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bergmann, Gustav, “Ideology,” Ethics, 61 (04, 1951), 205–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nagel, Ernest, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), p. 500Google Scholar.

⁹ Louch, A. R., Explanation and Human Action (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), p. 205Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Walter, Benjamin, “The Sociology of Knowledge and the Problem of Objectivity,” in Sociological Theory: Inquiries and Paradigms, ed. Gross, Llewellyn (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 349Google Scholar.

¹¹ Popper, Karl R., The Open Society and its Enemies (London: Routledge and Sons, 1945), Vol. II, p. 217Google Scholar. And see his statement on the “paradox of the liar,” pp. 353–4, footnote 7.

¹² Mannheim, , Ideology and Utopia, pp. 266–69Google Scholar. Quote on p. 267.

¹³ Carnap, Rudolf in Logical Positivism, ed. Ayer, A. J. (New York: Free Press, 1959), pp. 60–80Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Feigl, Herbert, “Logical Empiricism,” in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Feigl, Herbert and Sellars, Wilfred (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1949), p. 7Google Scholar. This essay was originally published in 1943.

¹⁵ Ayer, p. 22.

¹⁶ For the use of the concept “metaphysical pathos” see Lovejoy, Arthur, The Great Chain of Being (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1960)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Ayer, pp. 10–11, emphasis added.

¹⁸ Cited by Carnap in Ayer, p. 69. Carnap states that “The thesis that the sentences of metaphysics are meaningless, is to be understood in the sense that they have no cognitive meaning, no assertive content.” And he adds, “The obvious psychological fact that they have expressive meaning is thereby not denied” (p. 81). In section 7 of the essay on the “Elimination of Metaphysics,” he says: “The (pseudo) statements of metaphysics do not serve for the description of states of affairs, neither existing ones (in that case they would be true statements) nor non-existing ones (in that case they would be at least false statements). They serve for the expression of the general attitude of a person towards life” (p. 78, emphasis in the original).

¹⁹ John Locke once wrote:

Or as W. S. Gilbert might have said it:

“If you're anxious for to shine in the high philosophical line as a man of learning rare,

You must get up all the germs of the transcendental terms, and plant them everywhere.

You must lie upon the daisies and discourse in novel phrases of your complicated state of mind,

The meaning doesn't matter if it's only idle chatter of a metaphysical kind.”

Patience (no pun intended), Act. I.

²⁰ Frohock, Fred M., The Nature of Political Inquiry (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 165Google Scholar.

²¹ Scheffler, Israel, Science and Subjectivity (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), p. 2Google Scholar. I am much indebted to this brilliant book.

²² Popper, Karl, Open Society, p. 217Google Scholar. And see also Popper, , The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Science Editions, 1961), pp. 44–8Google Scholar.

²³ For an analysis of the theory of redundancy as a theory of error suppression see Landau, Martin, “Redundancy, Rationality and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap,” Public Administration Review, 29 (07, 1969), 346–358CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁴ Popper has written: … I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it is capable of being tested by experience. These considerations suggest not that the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation. In other words, I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience.

(Popper, , Logic of Scientific Discovery [pp. 40–41Google Scholar, emphasis in the original]).

²⁵ Scheffler, , Science and Subjectivity, p. 13Google Scholar.

²⁶ It is rather extraordinary that discussions of “objective reality” almost invariably ignore the artifacts of technology and the epistemological implications thereof. Somehow the movement from theory to model to prototype to product does not figure in our discussion—even in the philosophy of science. What happens to the concept of the relativity of knowledge, to the denial of symmetry between thought and thing when Gell-Mann predicts, in all of its characteristics, the omega-minus particle which is then found by means of the Big Machine at Brookhaven? And how in relativism's name did we ever get a proton synchrotron, an airplane, and the paper I write on? It is, alas, a rather unequivocal reality that the atomic bomb destroys.

²⁷ Science and Subjectivity, chapters 2, 3.

²⁸ See Feyerabend, Paul, “Discussion,” in Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology, ed. Radner, Michael and Winokur, Stephen, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 4 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), pp. 237–41Google Scholar. See also Feyerabend's “Against Method.”

²⁹ See Feyerabend, Paul, “Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism,” in Scientific Explanation, Space and Time, ed. Feigl, Herbert and Maxwell, Grover, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962Google Scholar); Feyerabend, , “The Problems of Empiricism” in Beyond the Edge of Certainty, Colodny, Robert, ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965)Google Scholar; Feyerabend, , “Reply to Criticism” in Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Cohen, Robert S. and Wartofsky, Marx W., Vol. 2 (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), pp. 223–262Google Scholar.

Benjamin Lee Whorf does not think that ordinary language is a necessarily false theory but he has observed many times that the user of a natural language generally assumes that it reflects reality more accurately than in fact it does. “Western culture has made, through language, a provisional analysis of reality and, without correctives, holds resolutely to that analysis as final.” See Whorf, , Collected Papers on Metalinguistics (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, 1952)Google Scholar and Carroll, J. B., ed., Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf (New York: John Wiley, 1956), p. 244Google Scholar.

³⁰ With the exception of Shapere, all of these statements can be found in Lakatos, Imre and Musgrave, Alan, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Shapere's, Dudley statement is in “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,” Philosophical Review, 73 (1964), 383–394CrossRefGoogle Scholar. And see also Toulmin, Stephen, “Conceptual Revolutions in Science” in Cohen, and Wartofsky, , Vol. 3, pp. 331–347Google Scholar.

³¹ Landau, Political Science and Political Theory.

³² Popper, Karl R., Conjectures and Refutations (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1968)Google Scholar; see chapter 10.

³³ Feyerabend, Paul K., “How to Be a Good Empiricist,” in Philosophy of Science, ed. Baumrin, Bernard, The Delaware Seminar, Vol. II (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963)Google Scholar. See also Feyerabend, “Problems of Empiricism”; “Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism,” and “Against Method.”

³⁴ Boston Studies, Vol. 2, p. 223.

³⁵ For an extended analysis of Kuhn, see Political Theory and Political Science, chapter 2.

³⁶ See Lakatos and Musgrave. The entire volume is devoted to Kuhn's book and contains Kuhn's response. And see the essay by Toulmin and discussion by Mink in Cohen and Wartofsky, Vol. 3, pp. 331–355.

³⁷ Lakatos and Musgrave, p. 234.

³⁸ Lakatos and Musgrave, p. 264.

³⁹ Lakatos and Musgrave, p. 261.