¹ This definition follows that given in Gurr, Ted Robert, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 3–4Google Scholar.

² See Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold, “Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns”; Sheldon G. Levy, “A 150-Year Study of Political Violence in the United States”; and Taft, Philip and Ross, Philip, “American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character, and Outcome”; in Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Graham, Hugh Davis and Gurr, Ted R. (New York: Signet Books, 1969)Google Scholar.

³ Cf. Bowen, Don R., Bowen, Elinor, Gawiser, Sheldon, and Masotti, Louis H., “Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation Toward Protest of the Urban Poor,” in Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community, ed. Masotti, Louis H. and Bowen, Don R. (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1968)Google Scholar; Crawford, Thomas J. and Naditch, Murray, “Relative Deprivation, Powerlessness, and Militancy: The Psychology of Social Protest,” Psychiatry, 33 (05, 1970), 208–223CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Davies, James C., “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” American Sociological Review, 27 (02, 1962), 5–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Feierabend, Ivo K. and Feierabend, Rosalind L., “Aggressive Behaviors Within Politics, 1948–1962: A Cross-National Study,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (09, 1966), 249–271CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ivo K. Feierabend et al., “Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns,” and Davies, James C., “The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfaction as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion,” in Violence in America, ed. Graham, and Gurr, Google Scholar; the work of Ted Gurr cited in footnote 5 below; Morrison, Denton E., “Some Notes Toward Theory on Relative Deprivation, Social Movements, and Social Change,” American Behavioral Scientist, 14 (May, 06, 1971), 675–690CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and a study which does not bear on political violence directly, but rather, on support for political institutions, Patterson, Samuel C., Boynton, G. R., and Hedlund, Ronald D., “Perceptions and Expectations of the Legislature and Support for it,” American Journal of Sociology, 75 (07, 1969), 62–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ As will be discussed at length in a subsequent report, this explanation actually comprises a number of separate theories, distinguished by different definitions of an individual's achievement optimum, i.e., the standard which defines his desirable achievement level. See Grofman, Bernard N. and Muller, Edward N., “The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence: The V-Curve Hypothesis,” Department of Political Science, State University of New York at Stony Brook, ditto, 1972Google Scholar.

⁵ The works central to the development and testing of his theory are: “Psychological Factors in Civil Violence,” World Politics, 20 (01, 1968), 245–278CrossRefGoogle Scholar, “A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices,” American Political Science Review, 62 (12, 1968), 1104–1124CrossRefGoogle Scholar, “A Comparative Study of Civil Strife,” and Why Men Rebel.

⁶ See the discussion in Gurr, , Why Men Rebel, pp. 24–30Google Scholar.

⁷ Gurr, p. 24; also see Aberle, David F., “A Note on Relative Deprivation Theory as Applied to Millenarium and Other Cult Movements,” in Millennial Dreams in Action: Essays in Comparative Study, ed. Thrupp, Sylvia L. (The Hague: Mouton, 1962)Google Scholar.

⁸ The quotations are from Gurr, , Why Men Rebel, p. 25Google Scholar. Gurr also identifies an additional category, “interpersonal values,” but some of these values overlap with the self-realization component of welfare values.

⁹ The quotations are from Gurr, , Why Men Rebel, p. 10Google Scholar. Political violence comprises most of the events which make up civil strife and the variables used to explain civil strife appear in one form or another as antecedents of political violence in Why Men Rebel.

¹⁰ Gurr, , “A Causal Model of Civil Strife …,” p. 1104Google Scholar.

¹¹ A detailed discussion is presented in Gurr, , “Psychological Factors in Civil Violence,” pp. 247–257Google Scholar; also see Why Men Rebel, pp. 30–37.

¹² See Berkowitz, Leonard, “The Concept of Aggressive Drive: Some Additional Considerations,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. II, ed. Berkowitz, Leonard (New York: Academic Press, 1965)Google Scholar. However, Berkowitz is careful to point out, at page 308, that frustration “creates only a readiness for aggressive acts. Previously acquired aggressiveness habits can also establish this readiness.”

¹³ See Gurr, , “A Causal Model of Civil Strife …,” pp. 1104–1106Google Scholar.

¹⁴ See Figure 5 in Gurr, , “A Causal Model of Civil Strife …,” p. 1121Google Scholar.

¹⁵ These are Persisting Deprivation, Short-Term Deprivation, Legitimacy, the Communist Party Status component of Facilitation (a scale “based on the premise that illegal parties are more facilitative of strife because their membership is likely, because of the exigencies of repression, to be more dedicated, better organized, and committed to the more violent forms of conflict”), and the Past Strife Levels aspect of Facilitation (a scale predicated on the assumption that “populations in which strife is chronic tend to develop, by an interaction process, a set of beliefs justifying violent responses to deprivation”); the quotations are from “A Causal Model of Civil Strife …,” pp. 1114 and 1106, respectively.

¹⁶ Micro-level tests are reported in Crawford and Naditch, and Bowen et al. In the Crawford and Naditch study, relative deprivation with respect to the present appears to be associated to a moderate degree with a measure of belief in the efficacy of past violence (Do you think that riots help or hurt the Negro cause?). The relative deprivation measure, however, shows what appears to be a weak association with a measure that one might assume would be related to potential for political violence (Will force or persuasion be necessary to change white attitudes?). In the Bowen et al. study, relative deprivation with respect to the present shows weak association with Protest Orientation. This team also finds that estimates of future deprivation, present-future upward mobility (decreasing discrepancy), and present-future downward mobility (increasing discrepancy) are all unrelated to Protest Orientation. Finally, upward and downward mobility types are lumped together as one category and individuals reporting no mobility are lumped together as another; this mobility dichotomy does show what appears to be a weak-to-moderate association with Protest Orientation, but the correspondence between the mobility variable and the context of meaning of the deprivation concept is not spelled out clearly.

¹⁷ See Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 267–340Google Scholar; for empirical findings pertaining to the development of diffuse support see Easton, David and Dennis, Jack, Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969)Google Scholar. Also see Gamson, William A., Power and Discontent (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1968), esp. pp. 39–52Google Scholar.

¹⁸ See Easton, pp. 278–340; also see the discussion in Muller, Edward N., “Correlates and Consequences of Beliefs in the Legitimacy of Regime Structures,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 14 (08, 1970), 392–412CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ Easton, , “A Systems Analysis …,” p. 287Google Scholar.

²⁰ At page 45 of Power and Discontent, Gamson equates “political trust” with Easton's definition of “diffuse support.”

²¹ See the discussion of learning theory in Merelman, Richard M., “The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization,” American Political Science Review, 63 (09, 1969), 750–767CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² See Easton and Dennis, pp. 73–313.

²³ Muller, , “Correlates and Consequences …,” pp. 408–409Google Scholar.

²⁴ See Table 8 at page 1213 in Aberbach, Joel L. and Walker, Jack L., “Political Trust and Racial Ideology,” American Political Science Review, 64 (12, 1970), 1199–1219CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ Bandura, Albert and Walters, Richard H., Social Learning and Personality Development (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), esp. ch. 3Google Scholar.

²⁶ Gurr, , Why Men Rebel, p. 193Google Scholar.

²⁷ Bandura and Walters, p. 159.

²⁸ Powerlessness and isolation, along with racial dissatisfaction, have been shown to correlate with willingness to use violent methods for goal attainment, among blacks, in Ransford, H. Edward, “Isolation, Powerlessness, and Violence: A Study of Attitudes and Participation in the Watts Riot,” American Journal of Sociology, 73 (03, 1968), 581–591CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

²⁹ In Sources of Potential for Political Violence: A Test of a Partial Theory (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1971)Google Scholar, from which portions of this report derive, I proposed a hierarchical multistage model. This report focusses on a single-stage model which avoids debatable assumptions about the sequential ordering of terms.

³⁰ Cf. Davies, “The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfaction …,” Feierabend et al., “Social Change and Political Violence …,” Gurr, “A Causal Model of Civil Strife …,” Spilerman, Seymour, “The Causes of Racial Disturbances: A Comparison of Alternative Explanations,” American Sociological Review, 35 (08, 1970), 627–649CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³¹ Flanagan, William and Fogelman, Edwin, review of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Graham, and Gurr, in the American Political Science Review, 64 (03, 1970), 192Google Scholar.

³² One exception is the report by Aberbach and Walker, “Political Trust and Racial Ideology,” in which a general explanation of Political Trust is tested across both blacks and whites and the relationship between Political Trust and extreme political behavior is also tested across both races. Also, an interesting report by Milbrath, Lester, “People and Government,” Department of Political Science, State University of New York at Buffalo, mimeo, 1971Google Scholar, received too late to be mentioned in this paper, tests a number of general hypotheses about correlates of protest behavior across both races.

³³ Waterloo also was ranked at level 2 on Wanderer's Guttman scale of riot severity which ranges from a low of “8” to a high of “1”; reported in Wanderer, Jules J., “An Index of Riot Severity and Some Correlates,” American Journal of Sociology, 74 (03, 1969), 500–505CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁴ “Waterloo: Study of a Social Crisis,” supplement to The Daily Iowan, May 23, 1969, p. 1Google Scholar.

³⁵ Nossiter, Bernard D., “An Outsider Takes a Look at Waterloo,” Des Moines Sunday Register, May 24, 1970 (copyright, The Washington Post), p. 4–GGoogle Scholar.

³⁶ Within Waterloo, segments (size 3 housing units) of city blocks were selected; dwelling units were then randomly selected within each segment and designated respondents within the dwelling units were interviewed. No substitution was allowed.

³⁷ On scope sampling see Wilier, David, Scientific Sociology (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 97–115Google Scholar.

³⁸ On the basis of a report entitled “Neighborhood Analysis” (an update of the 1960 census) conducted by the Waterloo City Planning Commission in 1967, the area of the city containing almost all the black residents was identified and sampled at a higher rate than the area containing almost all the white residents. Within each area, male-female response rates differed slightly. The response rates were, by type of area and sex: “Black,” male = .79; “Black,” female = .83; “White,” male = .75; “White,” female = .84.

³⁹ Where “norms” are rules specifying the way members of a political system are expected to participate in the political process; “legal norms” are formal prescriptions, binding upon all members, whose violation may be met with official sanction or punishment; “customary norms” are widely held beliefs about right and wrong ways of participating in the political process. For a more extensive discussion of these terms see Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, pp. 190–211Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ See Figure 3 in Milbrath, Lester, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 18Google Scholar.

⁴¹ For the Community Leaders sample, CR is .95 and .94, respectively. See Muller, Edward N., “Measurement of Readiness for Unconventional Political Participation,” Department of Political Science, State University of New York at Stony Brook, ditto, 1972Google Scholar.

⁴² By “strong degree of fit” I mean at least 20 per cent of the variance accounted for. Throughout this paper, then, a “strong” correlation refers to r ≥ .45.

⁴³ For the original data see Cantril, Hadley, The Pattern of Human Concerns (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965)Google Scholar. This estimate is based on Table 3 in Gurr, , Why Men Rebel, p. 70Google Scholar. I have included the 16 per cent of the interpersonal concerns which relate to the family as part of the Self-Actualization component of Welfare values.

⁴⁴ See Davies, , “The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions …,” pp. 700–702Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ See Table 1 in Cataldo, Everett F., Johnson, Richard M., and Kellstadt, Lyman A., “Social Strain and Urban Violence,” in Riots and Rebellion …, ed. Masotti, and Bowen, , p. 287Google Scholar; also see footnote 50 in Aberbach, and Walker, , “Political Trust and Racial Ideology,” p. 1208Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ The legitimating ideology items were designed to measure five values which Robert A. Dahl has identified as important components of the American legitimating ideology. See the discussion in “Correlates and Consequences …,” p. 398 and Dahl, Robert A., ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 35–43 and p. 63Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Cf. Prothro, James W. and Grigg, Charles M., “Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement,” Journal of Politics, 22 (05, 1960), pp. 276–294CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McClosky, Herbert, “Consensus and Ideology in American Politics,” American Political Science Review, 58 (06, 1964), 361–382CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁸ On the acquisition of affect for the norms of the regime see pages 238 to 245, Easton, David and Hess, Robert L., “The Child's Political World,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 6 (08, 1962), 229–246CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁹ For the student sample the correlation between Legitimating Ideology and Avoid Protest Action was .348; see Table 2 in “Correlates and Consequences …,” p. 402.

⁵⁰ On a question which inspired the measures of structural legitimacy used here, Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus found that 34.7 per cent of a 1966 national sample of Americans had no idea what the main job of the Court is: see Walter F. Murphy and Tanenhaus, Joseph, “Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court: A Preliminary Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime Changes,” in Frontiers of Judicial Research, ed. Grossman, Joel B. and Tanenhaus, Joseph (New York: Wiley, 1969), p. 282Google Scholar. If the proportion across the total sample here (weighted by race) for whom the Court is not visible were computed it would look about the same as that in the national sample.

⁵¹ Cf. Easton, David and Dennis, Jack, “The Child's Image of Government,” The Annals, 361 (09, 1965), pp. 40–57Google Scholar; Greenstein, Fred I., Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965)Google Scholar; Hess, Robert D. and Torney, Judith V., The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine, 1967)Google Scholar; Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political System.

⁵² See Table 1 in Muller, , “Correlates and Consequences …,” p. 396Google Scholar.

⁵³ The importance, however, of formal “civics training” itself may be slight. See pages 865–867 of Kenneth P. Langton and M. Jennings, Kent, “Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States,” American Political Science Review, 62 (09, 1968), 852–867Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ See page 170 in Boynton, G. R., Patterson, Samuel C., and Hedlund, Ronald D., “The Structure of Public Support for Legislative Institutions,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 12 (05, 1968), 163–180CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Their measure of diffuse support is a scale built from the loadings of seven items on the first component of a principal components solution.

⁵⁵ This finding parallels that observed by Murphy and Tanenhaus for their 1966 national sample. Among subsamples of blacks and southern whites they found that, for the blacks, a unit change in Court Knowledge was associated with a +.45 change in Diffuse Support for the Court, whereas, for the whites, a unit change in the Court Knowledge was associated with a −.38 change in Diffuse Support for the Court. See Murphy, Walter F. and Tanenhaus, Joseph, The Study of Public Law (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 203Google Scholar. Court Knowledge is strongly correlated with level of education. This contrast holds up for blacks as opposed to whites generally in their sample, although for whites as a whole the negative slope is not so steep (personal communication from Joseph Tanenhaus).

⁵⁶ The Political Trust scale developed at the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, has been found to be homogeneous, among adults, in a number of studies. This scale measures the degree to which government officials in general are believed to wield power justly, honestly, and benevolently. Some of the items from it have been included in the Trust Political Authorities scale constructed here.

⁵⁷ M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi have reported data which indicate that adults (and high school seniors) have much greater trust in national government than in state and local government. This finding, however, is based on a fixed-choice question which forced respondents to choose the level in which they had the most “faith and confidence.” If respondents are forced to rank the levels, such rankings could be somewhat arbitrary, reflecting, in part, the low salience of state and local government for most people. See Jennings, M. Kent and Niemi, Richard G., “Patterns of Political Learning,” Harvard Educational Review, 38 (Summer, 1968), 443–467CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁸ The initial item in the series defined a separate component all by itself when subjected to a principal components solution. This item read: “The people running the national government waste a great deal of the money we pay in taxes.” There is little variance to it, as only 17 per cent of the sample expressed disagreement. That it is completely uncorrelated with the other 23 items in the series suggests that people may accept the idea that the national government wastes tax money as an unavoidable “fact of life.”

⁵⁹ See Table 2 in Muller, , “Correlates and Consequences …,” p. 402Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ For a discussion of the effect of missing data on regression analysis see Mackleprang, A. J., “Missing Data in Factor Analysis and Regression,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 14 (08, 1970), pp. 493–505CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶¹ Among the students, Legitimating Ideology seems to be a more consequential legitimacy dimension. It is directly related to Avoid Protest Action, even when the other legitimacy measures are controlled. See Table 5 in Muller, , “Correlates and Consequences …,” p. 408Google Scholar. The ethical principles on which the legitimating ideology is based are perhaps more meaningful to the students than to the average citizen.

⁶² A comprehensive analysis of the Muslim ideology appears in Essien-Udom, E. U., Black Nationalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)Google Scholar; the Panther ideology has been articulated by their founder, Newton, Huey P., in “The Black Panthers,” Ebony, 23 (08, 1969), 106–112Google Scholar.

⁶³ Data are missing on the other variables as follows: SWG, 3 per cent; TPA, 1.6 per cent; EPV, 3.4 per cent; PPV, 0.8 per cent.

⁶⁴ See Mackleprang, pp. 499–503.

⁶⁵ A good discussion appears in Draper, Norman and Smith, Harry, Applied Regression Analysis (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 134–141Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ My definition of a “zero” correlation will be a value which is not statistically significant at the .01 level.

⁶⁷ See Easton, and Dennis, , Children in the Political System …, pp. 287–313Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ If the nadir of diffuse support for the political authorities occurred during respondents' early twenties, a quadratic function rule would provide the best fit, since any decrease from age 18 to the early twenties would be rather negligible; of course, if the nadir of diffuse support occurred during the late twenties and early thirties, then a cubic rule would provide an even better fit than a quadratic rule.

⁶⁹ In two northern cities (Toledo, Ohio and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) it has been shown that black children score lower than white children on various measures of diffuse support for the political authority structure. Findings from the Toledo study are reported on pages 293 to 301 of Lyons, Schley R., “The Political Socialization of Ghetto Children: Efficacy and Cynicism,” Journal of Politics, 32 (05, 1970), 288–304CrossRefGoogle Scholar; findings from the Philadelphia study are reported at pages 255–267 of Greenberg, Edward S., “Children and Government: A Comparison Across Racial Lines,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 14 (05, 1970), 249–275CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and at pp. 338–340 of Greenberg, Edward S., “Black Children and the Political System,” Public Opinion Quarterly (Fall, 1970), 333–345Google Scholar. In a southern urban area black children were found to have more negative attitudes toward the police than white children; however, although blacks did score somewhat lower on the SRC Political Trust scale than whites, the difference was not statistically significant. Also, a national sample, which contained a disproportionate number of black students from the South, found that black high school students were not less trusting (on the SRC Political Trust scale) of political authorities than white high school students. Findings from the southern urban area study are reported at pages 80 to 82 of Rodgers, Harrell R. Jr. and Taylor, George, “The Policeman as an Agent of Regime Legitimation,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 15 (02, 1971), 72–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar; findings from the national sample are reported at page 861 of Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, “Political Socialization ….” These studies suggest that black-white differentials in the acquisition of positive diffuse affect may be primarily a non-Southern phenomenon, at least in the recent past.

⁷⁰ See Table 2 in Aberbach, and Walker, , “Political Trust and Racial Ideology,” p. 1204Google Scholar.

⁷¹ Gamma for blacks is .31; for whites it is .20. See Table 4 in Aberbach and Walker, p. 1209.

⁷² Althauser, Robert P., “Multicollinearity and Non-Additive Regression Models,” in Causal Models in the Social Sciences, ed. Blalock, H. M. (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), p. 454Google Scholar.

⁷³ See, for example, Draper and Smith, Applied Regression Analysis, ch. 5.

⁷⁴ Cantril, , The Pattern of Human Concerns, p. 22Google Scholar.