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The evolution of imagination and the adaptive value of imaginary worlds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 November 2022

Richard Moore
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Social Sciences Building, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UKRichard.Moore@warwick.ac.uk; https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/people/summaries/moore/
Thomas Hills
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK T.T.Hills@warwick.ac.uk; https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/sci/psych/people/thills/

Abstract

Characterizing the cultural evolution of imaginary worlds as a hedonic but non-adaptive exaptation from evolved exploratory tendencies, Dubourg and Baumard defend too narrow a conception of the adaptive evolution of imaginary worlds. Imagination and its imaginary worlds are ancient and adaptive, allowing deliberation over actions, consequences, and futures worth aspiring to, often engendering the world we see around us.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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