1 “[A] body of associates living under a common law and represented by the same legislature.” Sieyès, E., Qu'est-ce que le Tiers état, critical edition with an introduction and notes by Zapperi, R. (Genève: Droz 1970), 126Google Scholar

2 Renaut, A., “Les deux logiques de l'idée de Nation,” in Cahiers de philosophie politique et juridique, 1988, nr. 14, 7ffGoogle Scholar

3 Acton, J.E., “Nationality” [1862], in his Essays in the Liberal Interpretation of History: Selected Papers, ed. and with an introduction by McNeill, W.H. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1967), 140Google Scholar

4 Meinecke, Fr., Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat [1908] (München: Oldenbourg 1969), 10ffGoogle Scholar. Meinecke admits that he does not intend this distinction to be absolute. Pure cultural nations with no contribution by political factors are as rare as state nations with no cultural element.

5 “A state becomes a nation when instead of its members being primarily divided between sovereign and subject, government and citizenship become a common task, demanding not passive citizenship but active cooperation from all.” Lindsay, A.D., The Modern Democratic State (London: Oxford University Press 1943), I, 151Google Scholar, quoted in Nisbet, R.A., “Citizenship: Two Traditions,” in Social Research 41 (1974) 614-15.Google Scholar

6 The fact that states are often called nations, as in the expression “United Nations Organization,” does not contradict this but is a result of the modem principle of legitimacy which accepts only the nation-state as a legitimate state, i.e., the state which has become a state of some nation. Cf. Meinecke, Weltbürgertum, 286; Schieder, Th., Nationalismus und Nationalstaat. Studien zum nationalen Problem im modernen Europa, Dann, O. and Wehler, H.-U., eds. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht 1991), 17Google Scholar.

7 “Sense for autonomous political conviction and free political activity“

8 Meinecke, , Weltbürgertum, 17, 31, 37Google Scholar; Mommsen, W.J., “The Varieties of the Nation State in Modem History: Liberal, Imperialist, Fascist and Contemporary Notions of Nation and Nationality,” in Mann, M., ed., The Rise and Decline of the Nation State (London: Basil Blackwell 1990), 210-11Google Scholar

9 “What the civic sense more than anything else seems to involve is a definite concept of the public as a separate and distinct body and an attendant notion of a genuine public interest, which though not necessarily superior to, is independent of and at times even in conflict with both private and other sorts of collective interest.” C. Geertz in Geertz, C., ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: The Free Press 1963), 156Google Scholar.

10 Although this process of emancipation was carried out in the name of universal claims, the natural rights of individuals, and the sovereignty of the people, in reality it was from the outset the emancipation of a particular group which identified itself with the nation. As already mentioned, the nation was originally seen as equivalent to the third estate, even to the extent of excluding the nobility and clergy insofar as they refused to subscribe to the terms of the social contract and the universal principles of the revolution. There is little doubt that this identification of the nation with the bourgeoisie influenced the attitude of socialists and Marxists toward nationalism. In 1848-9, the workers still supported the national struggle. They believed a solution to the national question was a precondition for solving the social question. However, when the bourgeoisie rejected the notion that national emancipation also entailed the emancipation of the fourth estate, the workers turned against national movements. But 1914 demonstrated once more that this was more an appearance than a reality.

11 Rawls, J., Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press 1993), 29ff., 48ff., 79Google Scholar

12 Renan, E., Qu'est qu'une nation (Paris: Calmann Lévy 1882), 27Google Scholar. In the words of Meinecke, Weltbürgertum, 12: “Nation ist, was eine Nation sein will” [“A nation is what wants to be a nation”].

13 The abstractness of this point of view can be seen from the fact that a people must first be identified before a plebiscite can be taken (Mayall, J., Nationalism and International Society [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990], 41)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Furthermore, a plebiscite will never solve the problem of minorities. Despite the theoretical acceptance of the principle of nationality in 1919, the map of Europe was redrawn according to pragmatic strategies and political criteria. Even in those states which were decolonized after World War II, borders were frozen without a plebiscite. Cf. Mayall, 56.

13 Meinecke, , Weltbürgertum, 71Google Scholar. According to Meinecke, this “formalistically” conceived idea of national sovereignty is blind to the nation in a historical, “substantial” sense.

14 For many commentators, the absence of a “they” at this level is an argument supporting the view that belonging to humanity can never be a truly subjective, existential feeling, but only a rational construction of the mind. See, most recently, Schnapper, D., La communauté des citoyens. Sur l'idée moderne de nation (Paris: Gallimard 1994), 183Google Scholar.

16 This “realism” is also apparent in the way in which a people's right to self determination was conventionally interpreted after the Treaty of Versailles. It was reserved for the peoples of the disintegrating multinational Empires, and (later) for ex-colonies. Cf. Mayall, , Nationalism and International Society, 50ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 The term “patriot” did not originally refer to someone who professed blind allegiance to his country (“my country, right or wrong“), but rather to someone who worked to renew and reform the nation according to the principles of natural law. Americans and Dutchmen used the term in this sense, around 1780. The “patria” which is the object of a patriot's loyalty is no existential, pre-existing unity, but a nation to which its members can consent. Cf. Hobsbawm, E.J., Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990), 87Google Scholar.

18 Renan, , Qu'est qu'une nation, 26Google Scholar

19 Meinecke, Fr., Weltburgertum, 248-9Google Scholar

20 Mayall, , Nationalism and International Society, 92Google Scholar

21 Mayall, , Nationalism and International Society, 57Google Scholar

22 Rawls, , Political Liberalism, 217, 253Google Scholar

23 Schnapper, , La communauté des citoyens, 155Google Scholar

24 This problem is also I.G. Fichte's starting point in Reden an die Deutsche Nation, in Fichtes Werke (Hrsg. I.H. Fichte), Bd. VII, Zur Politik und Philosophie der Geschichte (Berlin: De Gruyter 1971), 26ff.

25 Alter, P., Nationalism (London: Edward Arnold 1990), 39Google Scholar. Later, the republic will in fact take on the task of forging this unity and determination of the will via republican education in J. Ferry's école laïque. Although in principle, this indoctrination does not refer to language and soil, but to the values of the republic, in reality the reference is to “la France” and “la République” simultaneously.

26 Alter, , Nationalism, 39Google Scholar

27 Undoubtedly, Rousseau is thought of in the first place as a promoter of republican patriotism. Nevertheless, there are already announcements of this transition in his thinking. In his Projet de Constitution pour Ia Corse (in Oeuvres Complètes, T. III, Ed. de la Pléiade [Paris: Gallimard 1970], 913) he states: “La première règie que nous avons à suivre est le caractère nationnal. Tout peuple a ou doit avoir un caractère nationnal et s'il en manquoit il faudroit commencer par le lui donner” [“The first rule to be followed is the principle of national character; for each people has, or ought to have, a national character; if it did not, we should have to start by giving it one“]. And in his Considerations sur le gouvernement de Pologne et sur sa reformation projettée (in idem, 960) we read: “La vertu de ses Citoyens, leur zèle patriotique, la forme particulière que des institutions nationales peuvent donner à leurs âmes, voila le seul rempart toujours prêt à la défendre, et qu'aucune armée ne sauroit forcer[ … ] Ce sont les institutions nationales qui forment le génie, le caractère, les goûts, et les moeurs d'un peuple, qui le font être lui et non pas un autre, qui lui inspirent cet ardent amour de la patrie fondé sur des habitudes impossibles à déraciner, qui le font mourir d’ ennui chez les autres peuples au sein des délices dont il est privé dans le sien” [The virtue of its citizens, their patriotic zeal, the distinctive form which its national institutions may give their soul, this is the only rampart that will stand ever ready to defend it, and which no army could subdue by force … It is national institutions which form the genius, the character, the tastes, and the morals of a people, which make it be itself and not another, which inspire in it that ardent love of fatherland founded on habits impossible to uproot, which cause it to die of boredom among other peoples in the midst of delights of which it is deprived in its own“]. For an examination of the ramifications of these texts within the thought of Rousseau, see R. Derathé, “Patriotisme et nationalisme au XVIIIe siècle,” in M. Albertini et al., L'idée de Nation (Annales de Philosophie Politique, 8) (Paris: PUF 1969), 69-84.

28 “The theory of nationality is involved in the democratic theory of the sovereignty of the general will.” Acton, ‘Nationality,’ 147.

29 “Thus after surrendering the individual to the collective will, the revolutionary system makes the collective will subject to conditions which are independent of it, and rejects all law, only to be controlled by an accident.” Acton, ‘Nationality,’ 159.

30 For an example of an early mixture of both concepts of nationhood, see Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 20ff.

31 This intertwining of nationalism with (pseudo)religious language has been noted by Hayes, C.J.H.. See his Nationalism: A Religion (New York 1960)Google Scholar. The relation between nationalism and religion (or fundamentalism) is in fact extremely complex. Often religion competes with the nation by claiming exclusive loyalty. See, for example, Hobsbawm, , Nations and Nationalism, 67ff., 168ffGoogle Scholar.

32 This difference in virulence most likely has to do with the fact that nations which can count on a sufficiently high degree of internal cohesion can also afford to tolerate more liberal and subjective elements in the state. If this is not the case, unity and homogeneity must be compelled by force.

33 Weber, E., Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford 1976)Google Scholar

34 Mommsen, W.J., ‘Varieties of the Nation State,’ 215ffGoogle Scholar.; Hobsbawm, , Nations and Nationalism, 80ffGoogle Scholar

35 “La coïncidence entre unité politique et communauté culturelle a été l'idéal politique de la nation, ce n'en est pas pour autant le type-idéal, au sens analytique du terme” [“The coincidence of political unity and cultural community has been the political ideal of the nation. It was, however, not its ideal type in the analytical sense of the word“]. Schnapper, , La communauté des citoyens, 43Google Scholar.

36 [“transcendence by the abstract political society, but also a social reality concretely inscribed in time and space.“] Schnapper, , La communauté des citoyens, 82Google Scholar.

37 In this connection, it should not be overlooked that the idea of nationhood sets in motion a dynamic which moves in the direction of the welfare state. Indeed, the very idea of integrating all individuals into one single political bond has consequences not only for the diversity of ethnic groups and regions, but also for social and economic disparities. The principle of the equal value of every citizen which forms the basis of the logic of the nation may not be contradicted by too great a social or economic inequality. A generalized citizenship cannot really, nor symbolically compensate for this. The nation-state, therefore, has felt itself to be increasingly responsible for the economic and social development of the nation.

38 Acton, , ‘Nationality,’ 157Google Scholar

39 This explains why the thought of Herder and Fichte also contain references to humanism and universalism. Similarly, Renan was not insensitive to the ethnic element in the concept of a nation. Just as in the first section, then, this is also a description of an ideal type.

40 Mommsen, , ‘Varieties of the Nation State,’ 214Google Scholar

41 Because of this, Theodor Schieder believes that the nationalist politics of these empires has not been correctly evaluated (Schieder, , Nationalismus und Nationalstaat, 30ff.)Google Scholar.

42 Thus, paradoxically, modem individualism acquires more depth. Cf. Meinecke, , Weltbürgertum, 168ff.Google Scholar; Dumont, L., Essais sur l'individualisme. Une perspective anthropologique sur l'idéologie moderne (Points) (Paris: Editions du Seuil 1991), 134ff.Google Scholar

43 Meinecke, , Weltbürgertum, 19-20, 189Google Scholar; The state is national because it is the product of a specific national soul or Volksgeist, not of the will of the people. In the same sense, the Historical Law School opposes the doctrines of natural law. According to this school, all law arises intrinsically from customs, tradition, and popular belief. On “national” science, see Meinecke, , Weltbürgertum, 125ffGoogle Scholar.

44 Meinecke, , Weltbürgertum, 247-8Google Scholar

45 Ranke, L. Von, Politisches Gespräch [1836], quoted in Meinecke, Weltbürgertum, 246-7Google Scholar

46 Fichte, , Reden an die Deutsche Nation, 313ff., 359ffGoogle Scholar

47 ‘'Hier heiszt es nicht: Eine Nation ist, was eine Nation sein will, - sondern umgekehrt: Eine Nation ist, mögen die Einzelnen, aus denen sie besteht, ihr zugehören wollen oder nicht. Sie beruht nicht auf freier Selbstbestimmung, sondern auf Determination” [“Here we do not say: a nation is what wants to be a nation. The contrary is true. A nation exists whether the individuals wish to belong to it or not. It is not rooted in free self-determination but in determinacy“]. Meinecke, Weltbürgertum, 247. As a result, revolutionaries consider this view to be undemocratic and irrational.

48 Assimilation is, on this view, impossible. Nationalists of the Romantic nation saw the high degree of assimilation by the German Jews as proof of their perfidy and of the extent to which they had already compromised the purity of the Volksgeist. On this point, see Bauman, Z., Modernity and Ambivalence (Cambridge: Polity Press 1991), 102ff., 121Google Scholar.

49 Meinecke, , Weltbürgertum, 130Google Scholar. The introduction of a British-style parliamentary democracy would therefore be like planting a foreign (British) flower on German soil. At the same time, the liberal constitution is identified with a materialistic, utilitarian bourgeois society, such that loyalty to the Volksgeist entails loyalty to a way of life which transcends egoism.

50 Meinecke, , Weltbürgertum, 78Google Scholar

51 Meinecke, , Weltbürgertum, 225-6Google Scholar

52 Fichte, , Reden an die Deutsche Nation, 384ffGoogle Scholar

53 Meinecke, , Weltbürgertum, 252Google Scholar. It is the task of the intellectuals to keep the nation alive and guide it by interpreting its deepest nature and singularity.

54 Arendt, H., The Human Condition (Chicago-London: University of Chicago Press 1958), 214Google Scholar

55 Habennas, J., Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaat (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1992), 190ffGoogle Scholar

56 It is a strange but perhaps not entirely fortuitous coincidence that Rousseau's project, which tries to elevate the “public” into a completely transparent nation, seems so easily to undergo a reversal into a completely “privatized,” ethnic nation. The totalitarianism of universality seems here to touch on that of particularity. It seems that only a simultaneous recognition of particularity and universality can shield us from totalitarianism.

57 Acton, , ‘Nationality,’ 149Google Scholar

58 This is indirectly confirmed by the thesis that the functioning of consociative democracies presupposes a sufficiently unified elite with a “common background and outlook.” Cf. Lijphart, A., Democracies in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press 1977), 168Google Scholar.

59 Acton, ('Nationality,’ 150ff.) sees the coexistence of several nations in a single state as a source of progress. Diversity and difference are “resources” and “incentives.” When national and political borders coincide, society is at risk of sclerosis, of reverting to itself.