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Debating Basic Income: Distributive Justice and the Normative-Technical Nexus

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 August 2017

Matt Wilder
Matt Wilder*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
*
Department of Political Science, University of Toronto100 St. George Street M5S 2E5, matt.wilder@mail.utoronto.ca
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Abstract

Much of the literature on unconditional basic income considers reciprocity to be necessary for its success. From a normative standpoint, receiving without giving is unjust. From a technical standpoint, the absence of mechanisms that promote reciprocation invites free riding which threatens to erode the economic structure upon which the system of distribution depends. As a solution, it has been proposed that communities adopt social norms that encourage basic income recipients to contribute to the productive capacity of society by engaging in volunteer work. This article interrogates whether this alternative to conditionality is consistent with the rationale for implementing unconditional basic income and finds the instillation of stronger norms to be unnecessary for the project's success.

Résumé

La plus grande partie des écrits sur le revenu de base inconditionnel estiment que la réciprocité est nécessaire au succès de la mesure. D’un point de vue normatif, recevoir sans donner est injuste. D’un point de vue technique, l’absence de mécanismes favorisant la réciprocité invite au free riding [concept de « passager clandestin »] qui menace d’éroder la structure économique dont dépend le système de distribution. On a proposé, comme solution, l’adoption par les collectivités de normes sociales incitant les bénéficiaires du revenu de base à contribuer à la capacité productive de la société au moyen d’un engagement bénévole. Cet article s’interroge sur la compatibilité de cette alternative avec les raisons justifiant la mise en œuvre d’un revenu de base et observe que l’introduction de normes plus strictes n’est pas nécessaire à la réussite du projet.

Type
Research Article/Étude originale
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 51 , Issue 2 , June 2018 , pp. 279 - 303
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 2017 

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