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The Front Lines: A Space of Violence. Characteristics, Mechanisms, and Contexts of Military Violence in the First World War between Containment and Escalation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 December 2023
Abstract
This article deals with the war crimes committed during the First World War. Whereas in historiography the presence of franc-tireurs, the new industrial warfare or the specific military and radicalised command culture of individual armies often served as explanatory patterns for the escalation of violence, this contribution attempts to introduce a different perspective into the discussion. The focus is on the specific violence of mobile warfare, which was articulated in the context of military “forward panics” (Randall Collins) on the Eastern and Balkan fronts and was responsible for a considerable part of the war crimes committed there. The article therefore deals with the nature and character of these military forward panics. Starting with a description of the spatial characteristics of the front as a specific space of violence, the role of military orders and the significance of the front as a soldierly space of imagination, the article analyses above all the structural violence of forward panics. In this context, the article discusses three factors that played an essential role in this escalation process: first, the special soldierly frame of reference of combat in mobile warfare, which continuously lowered the inhibition thresholds for the escalation of violence; second, the escalation-forcing dynamics that the swift advance or the flight-like retreat of the troops brought with it for the process of violence; and finally, third, the significance of soldierly group pressure for the process of escalation of violence.
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References
1 Report of the Imperial-Royal Governor of Galicia to the Minister of the Interior, November 29, 1914 (strictly confidential), Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA), Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv (AVA), Ministerium des Innern (MdI), Präs. 1915, 19/3, Kt. No. 1810, at: No. 453, December 28, 1915 (Wirtschaftliche und politische Verhältnisse in Galizien unter Einwirkung der Kriegsereignisse).
2 K.u.k. 9. Infanterie-Truppendivisionskommando, dispatch October 29, 1914. ÖStA, Kriegsarchiv (KA), Neue Feldakten (NFA), 19. Brigade, Kt. No. 191, Fasc. 1. The dispatch refers to an identical order of the High Command of the Balkan army of October 25, 1914. Major General Daniel, commander of the Fifth Army, wrote on the course of action of the imperial-royal troops in Serbia at the beginning of the war: “I was rather disconcerted to realize that in some cases troops destroyed property of another in an irresponsible manner during the occupation of Serbian villages. I should like to remind you of the orders already issued and the relevant provisions of our regulations. Such behavior of our troops, which is contrary to all international law and customs, not only lowers the reputation of our army abroad to the level of that of our enemy but is also evidence of a very concerning relaxation of discipline of the relevant body of troops.” Decree of Fifth operating Army Command, Op. No. 443/19. ÖStA, KA, NFA, 19. Brigade, Kt. No. 191, Fasc. 1, at: K.u.k. 9. Infanterietruppendivisionskommando, Op. No. 3/1, October 3, 1914.
3 Diary no. 2 (September 9–November 17, 1914), entry October 1, 1914. ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B 36 Karl Günste.
4 Evidenzbüro to Sixth Army Command, December 14, 1914. ÖStA, KA, NFA, Sixth Army, operating army command, 1914, Res.-Akten, Kt. No. 17, at: Res. No. 3072, December 1914.
5 For example, the 6th Corps command on the actions of Russian troops on the eastern front. 6th Corps command to Fourth Army Command, October 16, 1914. ÖStA, KA, NFA, 4. Armee, Operierendes Armeekommando, Op. Akten 1914, Kt. No. 4.
6 War diary Fritz Ortlepp, 138, entry February 10, 1915. Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv Freiburg (BArch-MA), N 787/8 Fritz Ortlepp.
7 Fritz Ortlepp on the situation in East Prussia. War diary Fritz Ortlepp, 138, entry February 10, 1915, vol. 2 (Die Winterschlacht in Masuren. II. Die Vernichtung der 10. Russischen Armee im Walde von Augustowo February 15–23, 1915), 288.
8 Diary Ernst Cermak, entry August 12, 1914. ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B 528 Ernst Cermak, sign. 14.
9 A prime example for this is the study by Hull, Isabell V., Absolute Destruction, Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004)Google Scholar.
10 Horne, John and Kramer, Alan, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (London: Yale University Press, 2002)Google Scholar. Compare the biting criticism of Horne and Kramer's thesis in the recently published study by Keller, Ulrich, Schuldfragen. Belgischer Untergrundkrieg und deutsche Vergeltung im August 1914 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
11 This thesis regarding the Imperial-Royal Army builds upon the works by Anton Holzer. Compare Anton Holzer, “Augenzeugen. Der Krieg gegen Zivilisten, Fotografien aus dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” Fotogeschichte. Beiträge zur Geschichte und Ästhetik der Fotografie 22, no. 85–86 (2002): 45–74. Older works by Hans Hautmann, which will not be quoted here, argue in a similar vein. Recent research has largely refuted these interpretations. Compare the well-founded study by Schmitz, Martin, “Als ob die Welt aus den Fugen ginge.” Kriegserfahrungen österreichisch-ungarischer Offiziere 1914–18 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 In recent decades, research in gender history has focused strongly on sexual violence in wars. Compare, for example, the more recent overview Gaby Zipfel, Regina Mühlhäuser, Kirsten Campbell, ed., In Plain Sight. Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (New Delhi: Zubaan, 2019), which, however, focuses on the history of the Second World War. The number of studies on the First World War is rather small. In addition to older research primarily addressing sexual violence of German soldiers against women in occupied Belgium and northern France, there are also more recent studies on other fronts, for example Engelstein, Laura, “‘A Belgium of Our Own’. The Sack of Russian Kalisz, August 1914,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 10, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 441–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bianchi, Bruna, Crimini di guerra e contro l'umanità. Le violenze ai civili sul fronte orientale, 1914–1919 (Milan: Unicopli, 2012)Google Scholar; Nadia Maria Filippini, “Hunger, Rape, Escape:. The Many Aspects of Violence against Women and Children in the Territories of the Italian Front,” in Rethinking the Age of Emancipation: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives on Gender, Family, and Religion in Italy and Germany, 1800–1918, ed. Martin Baumeister, Philipp Lenhard, and Ruth Nattermann (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2020), 332–50. It should be noted that this contribution largely disregards the gender aspects because it primarily focuses on the theoretical and methodological foundations of the escalation of violence and the analysis of the specifics of spaces of violence rather than examining the nature of war crimes. For more information on sexual violence in the First World War, compare the planned research project (“Sexual Violence and the Habsburg Army in the First World War”), which is to be carried out in the next years at the universities of Vienna and Bolzano.
13 Compare, for example, Watson, Alexander, “‘Unheard-of Brutality’: Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia, 1914–1915,” Journal of Modern History 86 (2014): 780–825CrossRefGoogle Scholar; compare also, championing a comparative perspective, Oswald Überegger, “‘Verbrannte Erde’ und ‘baumelnde Gehenkte.’ Zur europäischen Dimension militärischer Normübertretung im Ersten Weltkrieg,” in Kriegsgreuel. Die Entgrenzung der Gewalt in kriegerischen Konflikten vom Mittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Daniel Hohrath and Sönke Neitzel (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), 241–78.
14 Compare with the overview by Markus Pöhlmann, “Über die Kriegsverbrechen von 1914,” in Globale Machtkonflikte und Kriege. Festschrift für Stig Förster zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Flavio Eichmann, Markus Pöhlmann, and Dierk Walter (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2016), 125–44; Lieb, Peter, “Der deutsche Krieg im Osten von 1914 bis 1919. Ein Vorläufer des Vernichtungskriegs?,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 65, no. 4 (2017): 465–506CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Oswald Überegger, “Kriegsverbrechen im Ersten Weltkrieg als interdisziplinäre Gewaltgeschichte. Entwicklungslinien und Desiderata,“ in Kriegsgefangenschaft in Österreich-Ungarn 1914–1918. Historiographien, Kontext, Themen, ed. Verena Moritz and Julia Walleczek (Vienna: Böhlau, 2021), 403–34.
15 The most inspiring study in this respect is Ziemann, Benjamin, Gewalt im Ersten Weltkrieg. Töten, Überleben, Verweigern (Essen: Klartext, 2013)Google Scholar. On the development of the history of violence, compare the overview by Christoph Nübel, “Neuvermessungen der Gewaltgeschichte. Über den ‘langen Ersten Weltkrieg’ (1900–1930),” Mittelweg 36, no. 1–2 (2015): 225–48.
16 Following Thorsten Bonacker, these were “interactions” based on the “mutual perception of presence.” Thorsten Bonacker, “Zuschreibungen der Gewalt. Zur Sinnförmigkeit interaktiver, organisierter und gesellschaftlicher Gewalt,” Soziale Welt 53, no. 1 (2002): 31–48, esp. 38.
17 On this notion compare Collins, Randall, Violence: A Micro-sociological Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 83–133CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
18 Ortmann, Günther, Organisation und Moral. Die dunkle Seite (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2010), 25Google Scholar.
19 Ortmann, Organisation und Moral.
20 Following Jens Marburg, who speaks of the “hermetic of this social space” regarding the battlefield. Jens Warburg, “Maschinen der Vernichtung. Das industrialisierte Schlachtfeld,” in Ordnungen der Gewalt. Beiträge zu einer politischen Soziologie der Gewalt und des Krieges, ed. Sighard Neckel and Michael Schwab-Trapp (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1999), 87–118, esp. 110.
21 Compare with, for example, Bayrisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv (BayHStA-KA), 11. Bayrische Infanterie-Division, Bund 94, Akt 2 Zivilbevölkerung, Armeegruppe Bernhardi, Ie No. 786, September 2, 1916 (Bestimmungen für die Zivilbevölkerung im Bereiche der Armeegruppe Bernhardi); BayHStA-KA, Alpenkorps, Bund 525, Generalkommando Korps Krafft, Ib No. 216, January 27, 1917; BayHStA-KA, Bayrische Kavallerie-Division, Bund 30, Akt 4, 10. Armeeoberkommando, Nachrichtenoffizier, No. 184/16 I, January 9, 1916 (Feindliche Spionagetätigkeit).
22 BayHStA-KA, Bayrische Kavallerie-Division, Bund 30, Akt 4, 10. Armeeoberkommando, Nachrichtenoffizier, No. 184/16 I, January 9, 1916.
23 Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden (SHStA), 11362 Feldartilleriebrigaden/Artilleriekommandeure, Artilleriekommandeur No. 140, Einwohner im besetzten Gebiet, No. 759, Verst. III. Reserve-Korps, General-Kommando, Abt. Ic No. 1175/17, June 27, 1917.
24 Compare with ÖStA, KA, 4. Armee, Operierendes Armeekommando, 1915, Kt. No. 19, Fourth Army Command to Army Group Command Linsingen, December 22, 1915; SHStA Dresden, 11362 Feldartilleriebrigaden/Artilleriekommandeure, Artilleriekommandeur No. 140, Einwohner im besetzten Gebiet, No. 759, General Command of verst. IIIrd Reserve Corps to Army Group Eichhorn, March 9, 1917 (Abschub der Landeseinwohner) (confidential).
25 Compare, for example, the regulations in the area of the Army Group Bernhardi: BayHStA-KA, 11. Bayrische Infanterie-Division, Bund 94, Akt 2 Zivilbevölkerung, Armeegruppe Bernhardi, Ie No. 786, September 2, 1916 (Bestimmungen für die Zivilbevölkerung im Bereiche der Armeegruppe Bernhardi). Compare also the regulation in the area of the 10th Bavarian Infantry Division at Bayrische Infanterie-Division, Bund 41, Akt 4, 10. Bayrische Infanteriedivision, Ib No. 6319, October 6, 1916 (Generalkommando des Karpathenkorps, Ia No. 150, October 5, 1916).
26 The General Command of the verst. IIIrd Reserve Corps ordered for example: “Warning signs in German and Russian reading: ‘Stop!’ have to be installed at all paths and roads leading into the prohibited zone, if this has not yet been done.” BayHStA-KA, Bund 41, Akt 4, 10. Bayrische Infanteriedivision. The Alpine Corps in Transylvania ordered that the “rearward demarcation line of this zone must be marked with warning signs.” BayHStA-KA, Alpenkorps, Bund 525, Generalkommando des Korps Krafft, Ib No. 216, January 27, 1917 (Polizeiliche Überwachung der Einwohner).
27 ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B3 Dankl, sign. 5/1, war diary of Viktor Dankl, entry September 8, 1914, 133.
28 BayHStA-KA, 11. Bayrische Infanterie-Division, Bund 53, Akt 5, Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe von Mackensen, O.-Qu No. 5292, December 17, 1916.
29 ÖStA, KA, NFA, 16. Infanterie-Division, Op. Akten 1914, Kt. No. 965, K.u.k. 32. Infantry Division Command to Second Army Command, Op. No. 82/8, October 21, 1914, at Op. No. 103/1, October 23, 1914.
30 ÖStA, KA, NFA, 8. Infanterie-Division, Op. Akten 1914, Kt. No. 471, Imperial-Royal Fourth Army Command to 8th Infantry Division, September 4, 1914.
31 As an example of the extensive regulations in the area of the Third Austro-Hungarian Army operating in Serbia, compare ÖStA, KA, NFA, 8. Korps, Kt. No. 928, K.u.k. 3. Armee-Etappenkommando, Op. No. 10.809/I., February 8, 1915 (Behebung der grossen Standesabgänge der Feldtruppen, ad: Feldgendarmerieabteilung des 8. KK, E. No. 150).
32 Compare ÖStA, KA, NFA, 8, Infanterie-Division, Op. Akten 1914, Kt. No. 472, Fasc. “Abfertigungen,” dispatch December 3, 1914; ÖStA, KA, NFA, 8. Korps, Kt. No. 928, K.u.k. 3. Armee-Etappenkommando, Op. No. 10.809/I., February 8, 1915 (Behebung der grossen Standesabgänge der Feldtruppen, ad Feldgendarmerieabteilung des 8. KK, E. No. 150); BHStA-KA, AOK Süd, Bund 15, Armeeoberkommando der deutschen Südarmee, Abt. 1b, No. 2460 geh., November 13, 1915.
33 A space open to violence—“gewaltoffener Raum”— in the sense of Georg Elwert is a space “where no fixed rules contain or limit violence.” Georg Elwert, “Gewaltmärkte. Beobachtungen zur Zweckrationalität der Gewalt,” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, special issue 37 (1997): 86–101, esp. 88.
34 BayHStA-KA, 11. Bayrische Infanterie-Division, Bund 94, Akt 2 Zivilbevölkerung, Verordnung der Heeresgruppe Linsingen, September 1, 1916.
35 BayHStA-KA, Alpenkorps, Bund 525, Generalkommando Korps Krafft, Ib No. 216, January 27, 1917.
36 HStA Stuttgart, M 33/2 Gen. Kdo. XIII. A. K. 1914–1918, Bündel 304, AOK 8 to General Command XIII (Royal Württemberg) Army Corps, May 1, 1915 (confidential).
37 ÖStA, KA, NFA, 13. Schützen-Division, Op. Res. u. gew. No. v. October 1914, Kt. No. 771, 17. Korpskommando, dispatch October 20, 1914. A similar order was issued in the area of the Austro-Hungarian 16th Infantry Division that read as follows: “All civilians lingering in the position are to be eliminated immediately, suspicious persons are to be arrested and or to be shot dead if even the most minor misdemeanor can be proved.” ÖStA, KA, NFA, 16. Infanteriedivision, Op. Akten 1914, Kt. No. 964, Op. No. 39/6 (Imperial-Royal 12th Corps Command, dispatch September 15, 1914).
38 BayHStA-KA, 11. Bayrische Infanterie-Division, Bund 53, Akt 5, Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe von Mackensen, O.-Qu. No. 5292, December 17, 1916.
39 ÖStA, KA, NFA, 6. Armee-Etappenkommando, Op. Akten 1914, Kt. No. 24, K.u.k. Oberkommando der Balkanstreitkräfte, Op. No. 3948, ad Op. No. 2105, December 18, 1914.
40 ÖStA, KA, NFA, 13. Schützendivision, Op. Res. u. gew. No., December 1914, Kt. Nr 773, Op. No. 119/1914 (Fourth Army Auxiliary Command to Imperial-Royal 13th Landwehr Infantry Division Command, December 4, 1914).
41 ÖStA, KA, NFA, 6. Infanterie-Division., Res. Akten, Div. Kommandoabfertigungen 1914, Kt. No. 365, Fasc. 11a, K.u.k. Infanterietruppendivisionskommando, Res. No. 269, September 7, 1914 (Res. No. 134 of the Third Army Command).
42 ÖStA, KA, NFA, 11. Armee, Armee-Ergänzungskommando, Res. Akten 1914, Kt. No. 371, K.u.k. 1. operierendes Armeekommando, dispatch September 7, 1914, at Res. 272, September 1, 1914 (Behandlung der Landesbewohner).
43 ÖStA, KA, NFA, 8. Infanterie-Division, Op. Akten 1914, Kt. No. 472, Fasc. “Abfertigungen,” dispatch December 3, 1914.
44 ÖStA, KA, NFA, 4. Armee, Operierendes Armeekommando, Op. Akten 1914, Kt. No. 4, Fourth Army Command to 2nd, 6th, 14th, and 17th Corps, October 24, 1914, at Op. No. 1212, October 24, 1914.
45 ÖStA, KA, NFA, 15. Korps, Res.-Akten, Kt. No. 1894, Commander of the Balkan Army (Potiorek) to the 15th Corps Command, Res. No. 1921/OK, November 3, 1914 (Vormarsch auf serbischem Gebiete—Verhalten).
46 ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B 3 Dankl, sign. 5/1, war diary, entry September 3, 1914, 116.
47 As remembered by Major Artur Hausner. ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B 217 Artur Hausner, sign 1, war diary, entry October 20, 1914.
48 ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B 170 Karl von Czapp, Sign. 1, Kriegserinnerungen 1914—I. Teil.
49 ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B 786 Kolbay, Sign. 2, war diary, entry August 1, 1915. The officer's duty to bring soldiers back to the front lines—if necessary with force—is a consistent pattern in the largely unpublished officers’ war diaries and memories.
50 BfZ, Nachlass Otto Bachof, entry January 25, 1915.
51 In the area of the 35th Reserve Division it was decreed: “NCO's and troops are repeatedly instructed that they not only have the right but even the duty to shoot everyone who crosses the wire entanglements unauthorized.” HStA Stuttgart, M 122, Landsturm-Infanterie-Regiment (1. Württ.) No. 19, Bund 1, Fasc. confidential, 35th Reserve Division to Army Detachment Woyrsch, July 11, 1917.
52 Aptly described by Welzer, Harald, Täter. Wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 2005), 225Google Scholar, on the Vietnam War. The principle also applies to the First World War.
53 Jan Philipp Reemtsma, “Gewalt: Monopol, Delegation, Partizipation,” in Gewalt. Entwicklungen, Strukturen, Analyseprobleme, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer and Hans-Georg Soeffner (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), 346–61, esp. 350 and 352.
54 Compare on this Überegger, Oswald, “Kampfdynamiken als Gewaltspiralen. Zur Bedeutung raum-, zeit- und situationsspezifischer Faktoren der Gewalteskalation im Ersten Weltkrieg,” zeitgeschichte 45, no. 1 (2018): 79–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar; in a broader context compare also Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, Soldaten. Protokolle vom Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 2011), 37. With a view to the frame of reference, Neitzel and Welzer state: “What would be considered a deviation under the circumstances of civilian everyday life—and thus is in need of explanation and justification—becomes normal and conformist behavior.”
55 K.u.k. 9. Infanterietruppendivisionskommando, dispatch September 7, 1914. ÖStA, KA, NFA, 19. Brigade, Kt. No. 191, Fasc. 1.
56 According to the commander of the 9th Infantry Division, Viktor Graf von Scheuchenstuel. 9th Infantry Division to 18th Infantry Brigade, No. 9, August 9, 1914. K.u.k. 9. Infanterietruppendivisionskommando, dispatch September 7, 1914. ÖStA, KA, NFA, 19. Brigade, Kt. No. 191, Fasc. 1.
57 K.u.k. 9. Infanterietruppendivisionskommando, Op. No. 20/1, Direktiven für das Verhalten der Truppen im Gefechte und im Feindeslande. K.u.k. 9. Infanterietruppendivisionskommando, dispatch September 7, 1914. ÖStA, KA, NFA, 19. Brigade, Kt. No. 191, Fasc. 1.
58 K.u.k. Armeeoberkommando/Etappenoberkommando Res. No. 7, July 29, 1914. ÖStA, KA, Qu.-Abteilung, Reservats-Akten 1914–1915, Kt. No. 1443. Compare also the decree of the Imperial-Royal Fifth Army Command, 5. Operierendes Armeekommando to 13th Corps Command in Tavna, Op. No. 403/20, August 25, 1914. ÖStA, KA, NFA, 13. Korps, Op. Akten 1914, Kt. No. 1668, at 13. Korpskommando, Op. No. 194/56, August 27, 1914.
59 According to Feldzeugmeister Oskar Potiorek, the Imperial-Royal commander of the Balkan army. Command of the Balkan Army to 15th Corps Command, Res. No. 1921/OK, November 3, 1914 (Vormarsch auf serbischem Gebiet—Verhalten). ÖStA, KA, NFA, 15. Korps, Res.-Akten, Kt. No. 1894, at 15. Korpskommando, Res. No. 739, November 5, 1914.
60 15. Korpskommando, Res. No. 16, July 30, 1914. ÖStA, KA, NFA, 15. Korps, Res.-Akten 1915, Kt. No. 1893.
61 “The line of action towards the population must be vigorous, objective, strict, and fair,” reads a similar German order in the context of the advance in Russian Poland. “Anordnungen und Bekanntmachungen des deutschen Kriegschefs und des Militärgouverneurs in Lukow 1915–1917 (Russisch-Polen), Anweisung für die Gendarmerie in Polen links der Weichsel.” BArch-MA, PH 30 II/36.
62 On the officers’ role, compare Schmitz, “Als ob die Welt aus den Fugen ginge.”
63 Second Army Command, Res. No. 42, to Lothar Edler von Hortstein, Oberstinhaber of Infantry Regiment No. 92, Commander of the 9th Corps in Ruma, August 6, 1914. ÖStA, KA, NFA, 5. Armee, K.-Akten 1914, Kt. No. 916.
64 Holzer, “Augenzeugen,” 55. Compare also Oswald Überegger, “‘Man mache diese Leute, wenn sie halbwegs verdächtig erschienen, nieder.’ Militärische Normübertretungen, Guerillakrieg und ziviler Widerstand an der Balkanfront 1914,” in Der Balkan—Raum und Bevölkerung als Wirkungsfelder militärischer Gewalt, ed. Bernhard Chiari and Gerhard P. Groß (Munich: XXX, 2009), 121–36; and the recent study Schmitz, “Als ob die Welt aus den Fugen ginge.” which clearly refutes the assumption of a war of extermination.
65 Browning, Christopher R., Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 11 and the Final Solution in Poland, 2nd ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1998), 160–61Google Scholar.
66 Collins, Violence, 76.
67 As argued by Harald Welzer regarding the American soldiers in the Vietnam War. Welzer, Täter, 224.
68 Friedens- und Kriegs-Erinnerungen, issue 1, fol. 79, entry August 21, 1914. ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B 301 Friedrich Tollich, Sign. 6.
69 War diary Albrecht Harrer, entry September 29, 1915, 164. BHStA-KA, HS 2876.
70 War diary of Colonel Alexander Brosch von Aarenau, August 1026, 1914, entry August 21, 1914. ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B 232 Alexander Brosch von Aarenau, Sign. 8.
71 Notes about war experiences, entry October 10, 1914. BArch-Ma, N 201/4 Paul Klette.
72 Dairy, vol. 1, entry August 17, 1914. ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B 974 Lechner, Sign. 1.
73 On this in general compare with Welzer, Täter, 223–24.
74 Social science studies that explore this phenomenon for the time of the world wars point out that over the course of a battle only 15 to 25 percent of the troops even used their weapons. Compare on this Ulrich Bröckling, “Schlachtfeldforschung,” in Schlachtfelder. Codierung von Gewalt im medialen Wandel, ed. Steffen Martus, Martina Münkler, and Werner Röcke (Berlin: Akademie, 2003), 189–206, esp. 200; Collins, Violence, 44; Herberg-Rothe, Andreas, Der Krieg. Geschichte und Gegenwart (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2003), 109Google Scholar; Hew Strachan, “Ausbildung, Kampfgeist und die zwei Weltkriege,” in Erster Weltkrieg—Zweiter Weltkrieg. Ein Vergleich. Krieg, Kriegserlebnis, Kriegserfahrung in Deutschland, ed. Bruno Thoß (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002), 265–86, esp. 272.
75 According to a report of initial war experiences on the eastern front by the 95th Infantry Brigade Command. Bericht des 95. Infanteriebrigadekommandos, undated, ÖStA, KA, AOK, Operationsabteilung, Op. Akten 1914, Kt. No. 4, at: AOK, Op. No. 2734, October 1, 1914.
76 On this compare also Collins, Violence, 59–65. Seventy-five thousand French soldiers fell victim to “friendly fire” during the First World War. According to estimates, 15 to 25 percent of total losses were from accident. Compare Collins, Violence, 60.
77 “Mutual shootings—mostly during night panics—often cause a murderous, self-destructing fight before one realizes the mistake.” Rudolf Mlaker, Paniken im Kriege (no place given, 1930) (typescript manuscript). ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B 1120 Rudolf Mlaker, Sign. 9. Mlaker mentions many examples of First World War Austro-Hungarian troops that shot at one another. The soldier Friedrich Tollich noted in his diary on August 21, 1914: “Vehemently shot by one of our own batallion from close range—a panic developed.” Meine Kriegserinnerungen! Erlebnisse aus dem Sommerfeldzuge 1914 gegen Russland, issue 2, fol. 99, entry August 23, 1914. ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B 301 Friedrich Tollich, Sign. 6.
78 In his study on the psychographics of the warrior, Paul Plaut quotes the account of a soldier on the baptism of fire. Paul Plaut, “Psychographie des Kriegers,” in Beiträge zur Psychologie des Krieges, ed. William Stern and Otto Lipmann (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1920), 1–123, esp. 20.
79 Aptly Thomas Kliche, “Militärische Sozialisation,” in Krieg und Frieden. Handbuch der Konflikt- und Friedenspsychologie, ed. Gert Sommer (Weinheim and Basel and Berlin: Beltz, 2004), 344–56, esp. 345.
80 Compare the many points of reference in Lieb, Peter and Nübel, Christoph, “Raum und Militärgeschichte,” Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift 73, no. 1 (2014): 277–307Google Scholar.
81 Compare on war experiences on the eastern and the Balkan fronts: Überegger, Oswald, “Lebenswelten und Deutungszusammenhänge im modernen Massenkrieg. Soldatische Kriegserfahrungen im Osten und auf dem Balkan (1914–1918),” Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift 78, no. 2 (2019): 377–411Google Scholar.
82 Compare on this the overviews in Überegger, “‘Verbrannte Erde’ und ‘baumelnde Gehenkte,’” and Lieb, “Der deutsche Krieg im Osten von 1914 bis 1919.“ Laura Engelstein analyses the dynamics of violence using the example of the Polish town Kalisz in Engelstein, “A Belgium of Our Own.”
83 Compare for other studies: Holzer, Augenzeugen.
84 Compare among others Wolfgang Dornik, Stefan Karner, ed., Die Besatzung der Ukraine 1918. Historischer Kontext—Forschungsstand—wirtschaftliche und soziale Folgen (Graz and Wien and Klagenfurt: Leykam, 2008); Wolfram Dornik et al., ed., Die Ukraine zwischen Selbstbestimmung und Fremdherrschaft 1917–1922 (Graz: Leykam, 2011).
85 On the terminology compare Lewin, Kurt and Blower, Jonathan, “The Landscape of War,” Art in Translation 1, no. 2 (2015): 199–209Google Scholar.
86 Lewin and Blower, “The Landscape of War,” 205.
87 Lewin and Blower, “The Landscape of War.”
88 Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 66–82.
89 Scholz, Ludwig, Seelenleben des Soldaten an der Front. Hinterlassene Aufzeichnungen des im Kriege gefallenen Nervenarztes (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1920), 200Google Scholar
90 Lewin and Blower, “The Landscape of War,” 205.
91 The soldiers’ particular ethical concept deviated from the general “universalistic moral concept,” According to Welzer, “We need to acknowledge different moral concepts” if “we want to better understand the actions of perpetrators from an analytical point of view.” Welzer, Täter, 31. In a similar vein, Kliche, “Militärische Sozialisation,” 346, speaks about a “special form of morality.”
92 Harald Welzer understands “particular rationality” as “a process that the actors enter with their specific perceptions and interpretation patterns and whose interpretation prompts them to actions that they consider meaningful.” Welzer, Täter, 46.
93 As Wolfgang Sofsky has put this bluntly: “There might be rules that prohibit certain weapons or cruelties. However, once the fighting has started, they are meaningless.” He continues: “When it is about life and death, moral considerations are irrelevant.” Wolfgang Sofsky, Traktat über die Gewalt (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 1996), 141 and 146.
94 Quoted in Harald Welzer, “Die soziale Situation. Wie ganz normale Männer töten,” in Die Anatomie des Bösen. Ein Schnitt durch Körper, Moral und Geschichte, ed. Roger Fayet and Hans-Georg von Arburg (Baden: Hier und jetzt, 2008), 191–216, esp. 213. These are violent situations with soldiers “realizing that they can suddenly do things that would be prohibited under normal circumstances.” Welzer, “Die soziale Situation,” 212–23.
95 Compare Elwert, “Gewaltmärkte.”
96 Plaut, “Psychographie des Kriegers,” 69.
97 Everth, Erich, Von der Seele des Soldaten im Felde. Bemerkungen eines Kriegsteilnehmers (Jena: Diederichs, 1915), 26Google Scholar.
98 See Collins, Violence, 103.
99 On this compare Wolfgang Sofsky, “Gewaltzeit,” in Soziologie der Gewalt, ed. Trutz von Trotha (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997), 102–21, esp. 112–115; also Sofsky, Traktat über die Gewalt, 155–72.
100 Everth, Von der Seele des Soldaten im Felde, 18.
101 Collins, Violence, 87, 102.
102 Collins, Violence, 243–315.
103 Scholz, Seelenleben des Soldaten an der Front, 195.
104 Scholz, Seelenleben des Soldaten an der Front, 205.
105 Michael Geyer, “Vom massenhaften Tötungshandeln, oder. Wie die Deutschen das Krieg-Machen lernten,” in Massenhaftes Töten. Kriege und Genozide im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Peter Gleichmann and Thomas Kühne (Essen: Klartext, 2004), 105–142, esp. 140.
106 In the sense of Jan Philipp Reemtsma as senseless violence. Compare Reemtsma, Jan Philipp, Vertrauen und Gewalt. Versuch über eine besondere Konstellation der Moderne (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2008), 116Google Scholar.
107 Ludwig Scholz wrote on this: “In war, the moral senses are put to an acid test: the soldier as the ‘sole free man’ makes concessions to himself and his urges. Self-consciousness and a feeling of power prompt him to set aside qualms and glorify atrocities, which he would discard immediately when calm and sober-minded, with a certain appeal.” Scholz, Seelenleben des Soldaten an der Front, 203. “At a later date, when all is over,” Plaut quotes a soldier, “One feels a certain shudder about everything that has happened and that one has observed. And when the feverish nervous tension gradually gives way after the end of the battle, the civilized human being gradually comes into his own again.” Plaut, “Psychographie des Kriegers,” 21.
108 Plaut, “Psychographie des Kriegers,” 20.
109 In Michel Wieviorka's sense. It “can happen,” he writes, “that violence contains dimensions which are partially or entirely arbitrary or cruel, that it appears to be a phenomenon by itself, without any other purpose than to satisfy the perpetrator, without any other sense as the one that is inherent to itself.… With violence as an end in itself it is difficult to refer to the one who is committing this violence as a subject, at least if one understands the subject as being able to construe oneself, as having virtuality, and being in control over one's own experiences as well as allowing others exactly the same.” Wieviorka, Michel, Die Gewalt (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006), 192–93Google Scholar.
110 Ludwig, Walter, Beiträge zur Psychologie der Furcht im Kriege (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1919), 152Google Scholar. According to Ludwig, the “impressions” of the battle could be “strong enough to crush the sense of self.” Only after the battle, “ideas and associations … can be put back in order, ‘I’ try to think clearly again, the sense of self gradually comes back.”
111 Randall Collins rightly points out that “forward panics occur in a wide range of situations, many of which lack any long-term ideology; and ideology alone without situational conditions does not produce forward panic.” Collins, Violence, 102. Compare in general Sofsky, Traktat über die Gewalt, 171; on the Second World War, compare Browning, Christopher R., Ganz normale Männer: Das Reserve-Polizeibataillon 101 und die “Endlösung” in Polen (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1993), 238Google Scholar, and Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 288–93.
112 Walter Ludwig wrote: “The urge to fight takes on a special character through the motive of revenge for fallen comrades….” Ludwig, Beiträge zur Psychologie der Furcht im Kriege, 156. “A captivating impression—for instance, seeing a killed comrade—together with an agitating word, an outcry, possibly under the influence of alcohol, increases the affect of the mass to the extreme,” writes, for example, Scholz, Seelenleben des Soldaten an der Front, 205.
113 Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 45.
114 Ludwig Scholz recalls a certain incident: “One of the soldiers who came to help us was shot in the finger of his left hand. His wound was dressed and he was told to go to the city from where he could go to a military hospital. But he said that he was in full swing, had already killed ‘six Russians,’ and wanted to continue….” Scholz, Seelenleben des Soldaten an der Front, 113.
115 Wolfgang Sofsky describes the nature of the technicalized massacre as follows: “The entire territory is razed to the ground, entire residential quarters blown up. It does not matter who is present in the village or the city, who is part of the refugee trek. But when houses are reduced to rubble, when explosions lighten up the sky like thunderbolts, when the firestorm is spreading and paints the sky a glowing red, then the perpetrator is seized with rare excitement.” Sofsky, Traktat über die Gewalt, 183.
116 As an example for many others, the soldier Friedrich Tollich. Im Kriegsdienst! Erinnerungen aus dem Feldzuge gegen Russland, issue III, entry October 22, 1914. ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B 301 Friedrich Tollich, Sign. 6.
117 Diary notes of the World War 1914–1919, 38. ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B 1302 Otto Humpelstätter.
118 War diary, vol. 2, entry late August 1914. ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B 773 Franek, Sign. 38. “During such a withdrawal, morale gets worse and worse,” Heinrich Wiesinger, a soldier from Vienna, wrote in his diary in September 1914. “Many thousands walked, as is said ‘alongside the road,’ they no longer have a master, they throw away their bullets, they only carried what they thought was useful to them….” My military service from October 1913 to November 1918 in the “k. u. k. Feldjägerbataillon Oberst Kopal No. 10,” vol. 1, entry September 15, 1914, 134. ÖStA, KA, Nachlass B 434 Heinrich Wiesinger.
119 Compare in general Bröckling, “Schlachtfeldforschung,” 197. “Endurances and danger experienced together create a strong cohesion among the combatants, as every field soldier can confirm,” writes Walter Ludwig in Beiträge zur Psychologie der Furcht im Kriege, 156.
120 Scholz, Seelenleben des Soldaten an der Front, 205–04.
121 Compare on the marginal significance of orders and commands in battle; Plaut, “Psychographie des Kriegers,” 23–24. According to Scholz “the whiff of freedom” was “strongest in the fresh world of mobile warfare.” “With the current scattered warfare,” Scholz continues, “comings and goings, bravery and cowardice of an individual or a group can be decisive. Consider, for example, an assault. Not even the company leader, or the platoon leader, has complete control over his men: what is he supposed to do if he jumps out of the trenches and his troops won't follow him?” Scholz, Seelenleben des Soldaten an der Front, 52.
122 On formal and informal groups as “basic forms of social structure formation” and the “spontaneous character” of the informal group, compare Hermann L. Gukenbiehl, “Formelle und informelle Gruppe als Grundformen sozialer Strukturbildung,” in Einführung in die Gruppensoziologie, ed. Bernhard Schäfers (Wiesbaden: Quelle & Meyer, 1999), 80–96, esp. 83–84.
123 Compare also Bröckling, “Schlachtfeldforschung,” 197–98.
124 Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 31.
125 Plaut, “Psychographie des Kriegers,” 24–25.
126 Welzer, Täter, 89.
127 Ortmann aptly in Organisation Moral, 125.
128 Ortmann speaks of “organization as a machinery of suppression.” Ortmann, Organisationund Moral, 129. Dave Grossmann speaks of “group absolution.” Dave Grossmann, “Eine Anatomie des Tötens,” in Massenhaftes Töten. Kriege und Genozide im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Peter Gleichmann and Thomas Kühne (Essen: Klartext, 2004), 55–104, esp. 62.
129 According to Lewin as the “total range of what … determines the behavior of an individual at a certain point of time.” Lewin, Kurt, Grundzüge der topologischen Psychologie (Bern and Stuttgart: Huber, 1969), 34Google Scholar.
130 On this compare Hüppauf, Bernd, “Das Schlachtfeld als Raum im Kopf. Mit einem Postscriptum nach dem 11. September 2001,” in Schlachtfelder. Codierung von Gewalt im medialen Wandel, ed. Martus, Steffen, Münkler, Marin, and Röcke, Werner (Berlin: Akademie, 2003), 207–33Google Scholar.
131 Welzer, Täter, 31.