^{page 271 note 1} Travels in Northern Greece, iv. 1835, pp. 477–84.

^{page 271 note 2} Caesars gall. Krieg, etc. ii. 1880, pp. 149, 151–4.

^{page 271 note 3} Long, G., Decline of the Roman Republic, v. 1874, pp. 220–1Google Scholar

^{page 271 note 4} Trans. Roy. Soc. of Literature, 2nd ser. iv. 1853, pp 68–87.

^{page 271 note 5} Les operations mil. de Jules César, pp. 104–35.

^{page 271 note 6} Hist, de Jules César,—Guerre civile, ii. 1887, p. 240, n. I.

^{page 271 note 7} Vol. vi. 1885, pp. 170–89.

^{page 271 note 8} Decline of the Roman Republic, v. 213–21.

^{page 271 note 9} Guerre civile, ii. 241.

^{page 272 note 1} He gives reasons (pp. 288–9, infra) for rejecting von Göler's theory, but does not answer his arguments against placing the battle-field south of the Enipeus.

^{page 272 note 2} Heuzey, L., Les operations mil. de J. C. p. 105Google ScholarKromayer, J., Antike Schlachtfelder, etc. ii. 406Google Scholar

^{page 272 note 3} Except perhaps that of von Göler. See p. 289, infra.

^{page 273 note 1} B. C. iii. 81, § 3.

^{page 273 note 2} Ib. 82, § I; 84, § 2; 85, § I.

^{page 273 note 3} See p. 282, infra.

^{page 273 note 4} B. C. iii. 84, §§ 1–2; 85, §§ 2–4; 86, § 1.

^{page 273 note 5} See p. 288, infra.

^{page 273 note 6} B.C. iii. 88.

^{page 274 note 1} The MS. reading (ib. 97, § 2) is (diffisi ei loco relicto monte uniuersi) iuris eius (Larisam uersus serecipere coeperunt). As this is nonsense, numerous emendations (Meusel, H., Lex. Caes. Tab. Coniect. p. 90),Google Scholar most of which are justly ignored by editors, have been proposed. The one commonly accepted is iugis eius; but Meusel(C.I Caearis comm.de b.c.1906, p. 342) reads iugis iis on the ground that ‘this hill [one of the hills on the “massif” of Karadja-Ahmet, selected by Stoffel] has no iugum.’ The uncertainty of the text matters nothing; for the fugitives would undoubtedly have retreated as far as possible on high ground in order to keep the tactical advantage which it afforded them.

^{page 274 note 2} B.C. iii. 89, §§3–4; 93–8.

^{page 274 note 3} (Пoμπήïos) νrεστραroπδευσαro Kαíσαρι περì Фάσαλoν,καì rριάκoνrα σrαδíous λλήλων ὺπεîχoν (B.C. ii. 65).

^{page 274 note 4} (Пoμπήïos) παρrασσε roὺs λoιπoὺs s τò μετξυ Фαρσάλoυ τε πóλεωs καì 'Eνιπωs πoταμo***, νθα καì ò Kαîσαρ ντιδιεκóσμει(ib. 75).

^{page 274 note 5} Caesar…Palaepharsali rem feliciter gerebat (Bell. Alex. 48, § I).

^{page 274 note 6} Cn. Pompeius aduersus C. Caesarem Palaepharsali triplicem instruxit aciem (Strat. ii. 3, x00A7; 22).

^{page 274 note 7} deinde in Thessalia apud Palaeopharsalum… dimicauerunt (20).

^{page 274 note 8} hic exitus pugnae ad Palaeopharsalum fuit (vi. 15, § 27).

^{page 274 note 9} Pharsalici proelii (Bell. Alex. 42, § 3). I assume that Pharsalici is the adjective of Pharsalus and not of Pharsalia (the Pharsalian district). But for my purpose the point is immaterial.

^{page 241 note 10} Caesar, 52; Cato, 5–6; Cicero, 39; Antonius,8,62; Brutus, 6; Otho, 13.

^{page 274 note 11} vii. 23, § 25.

^{page 274 note 12} Divus Julius, 35.

^{page 274 note 13} Caesar, 43.

^{page 274 note 14} Brutus, 4.

^{page 274 note 15} Ib.6.

^{page 274 note 16} Strat. ii. 3, § 22.

^{page 275 note 1} at iuxta fluuios et stagna undantis Enipei Cappadocum montana cohors et largus habenae Ponticus ibat eques (Pharsalia, vii. 224–6).

^{page 275 note 2} Guerrt civile, ii. 244.

^{page 275 note 3} Les operations mil. de J.C. p. 133.

^{page 275 note 4} American Journal of Philology, vi. 1885, pp. 178–9.

^{page 275 note 5} ν δ*** χώρ*** ταύτ*** καì τò θετíδειóν στι πλήσιoν r***ν Фαρσλων μφoîν, τ***s rε παλαι***s καì τ***s ναs (Geogr. ix. 5, § 6). This passage alone proves, against the view of Leake, that Palaepharsalus and Pharsalus were not on the same hill, but that their sites were distinct. Moreover, as von Göler observes (Caesars gall. Krieg, etc. ii. 151), ‘if Old and New Pharsalus had been so closely connected, no writer would have described the battleas “at Palaepharsalus.” but simply as “at Pharsalus.”’

^{page 275 note 6} xviii. 3, §§ 1–6.

^{page 275 note 7} Les operations mil. de J.C. PI. vii.

^{page 276 note 1} Format orbis antiqui, xv.

^{page 276 note 2} Stoffel does deny this by implication; and this is one of the weak points of his theory. Professor Postgate justly says (Class. Rev. xix. 1905, p. 259): ‘No Roman writer that I have examined affords any indication whatever that he placed the battle at or near Pharsalus or Fersala. You have to go to late Greek writers such as Plutarch, Appian, Dio Cassius, and Polyaenus, to find this town apparently associated with the engagement.’

^{page 276 note 3} Antike Schlachtfelder, etc. ii. 408.

^{page 277 note 1} See American Journal of Philology, vi. 1885, p. 182.

^{page 277 note 2} B.C. iii. 84, §§ 1–2; 85, § 2.

^{page 277 note 3} Caesars gall. Krieg, etc. ii. 1880, p. 149.

^{page 277 note 4} Les operations mil. de J.C. pp. 120, 122–3.

^{page 277 note 5} B.C. ii. 66.

^{page 278 note 2} Caesars gall. Krieg, etc. ii. 1880, p. 152.

^{page 278 note 3} Decline of the Roman Republic, v. 216.

^{page 278 note 4} Ib. p. 220.

^{page 278 note 5} See Plutarch, Caesar, 43.

^{page 278 note 6} It is hardly necessary to say that the passage of the Trebia by the Romans before the battle of the Trebia and of the Aufidus by the Romans and the Carthaginians before the battle of Cannae prove nothing against Napier's argument. The circumstances in thesé two cases were utterly different from those in which Pompey and Caesar acted.

^{page 278 note 7} ‘Napier,’ says Long, ‘makes some other objections,’ about which Long is silent.

^{page 279 note 1} Antike Schlachtfelder, etc. ii. 410.

^{page 279 note 2} See p. 287, n. 6, infra.

^{page 279 note 3} Trans. Roy. Soc. of Literature, 2nd ser. iv. 1853, p. 87.

^{page 279 note 4} Decline of the Roman Republic, v. 219.

^{page 279 note 5} B.C. iii. 85, §2.

^{page 279 note 6} Les operations mil. de J.C. p. 123.

^{page 279 note 7} xlii. I, §3.

^{page 279 note 8} Dr. Kromayer (Antike Schlachtfelder, etc. ii. 419–20) argues that ‘from a strategical point of view the position [on Mount Krindir, south of the Enipeus, which he believes Pompey to have selected for his camp] was not unfavourable’; for, although ‘in case of a defeat his retreat to Larissa was, to be sure, cut off,’ he could not have made good his retreat in any case. For him the alternatives were victory or annihilation. Besides, who in Pompey's camp admitted the possibility of defeat?

Obviously, whatever this argument may be worth, it is no answer to the objections stated in the text.

^{page 279 note 9} Guerre civile, ii. 243–4.

^{page 280 note 1} Totius latinitatis lexicon, v. 1871, p. 247. Cf. S. P. Festi De verborum significatione, ed. C. O. Müller, 1839, p. 273.

^{page 280 note 2} As Professor Postgate has pointed out (M. Annaei Lucani de b.c. lib. vii. p. xxxix), when Stoffel insists that the Enipeus had no more water than a brook, he contradicts Frontinus and Lucan—‘two out of the three authorities on whom the identification [of the riuus with the Enipeus] is based’—who both affirm that it had overflowed its banks. Yet Stoffel himself says (Guerre civile, ii. 251) that when it is merely a question of reporting facts Lucan ‘shows himself one of the most faithful of historians.’

^{page 280 note 3} i. 1313–22.

^{page 280 note 4} The following are the streams which he did not name:—(1) the river (Dranse) which flowed past Octodurus (Martigny) into the Rhdne (B.G. iii 1, § 6); (2) the river (Stour) on the banks of which he defeated the Britons on the morning after his second landing in Britain (ib. v. 9, § 3); (3) the riuus which he crossed when he was marching in 54 B.C. to relieve Quintus Cicero (ib. 49, § 5); (4) the river in crossing which Indutiomarus was killed [ib. 58, § 6); (5) the river near which Labienus defeated the Treveri (ib. vi. 7, § 5); (6) the little stream at Avaricum (Bourges) (ib. vii. 15, § 5); (7) the two streamlets that encompassed Alesia (Mont Auxois) (ib. 69, § 2); (8) the river Aternus, near Corfinium (B.C. i. 16, § 2); (9) the riuus which bounded the camp of Scipio when he was threatened by Gnaeus Domitius (ib. iii. 37, § 3); (10) the rivulets near Dyrrachium (ib. 49, § 4); (11) the whose identity we are discussing; and (12) the stream which washed the base of the hill on which the Pompeians, after the battle of Palaepharsalus, made their final stand.

^{page 280 note 5} B.G. vii. 61, § 5. Cf. my Caesar's Conquest of Gaul, 1899, pp. 763–5.

^{page 281 note 1} Mr. Perrin (American Journal of Philology, vi. 1885, p. 186) argues that ‘in Livy … who followed an account of the battle which certainly was not from so competent a witness as Caesar or Pollio [cf. H. Grohs, Der Werth des Geschichtswerkes des Cassius Dio, 1884, p. 69], there may have been expressions of local description which led Frontinus to call the stream covering Pompey's right the Enipeus:’ at the same time he suggests (p. 189) that Frontinus's statement may be ‘his own expansion and elucidation of Caesar's “riuus quidam impeditis ripis,”’; but, as he reasonably adds, the Enipeus, being ‘the main river of the scene … would naturally suggest itself to one indifferent about and ignorant of the exact geographical details.’

^{page 281 note 2} See p. 286, n. 4, infra.

^{page 281 note 3} Travels in Northern Greece, iv. 1835, pp. 481, 483.

^{page 281 note 4} Trans. Roy. Soc. of Literature, 2nd ser. iv. 1853, p. 87.

^{page 281 note 5} Guerre civile, ii. p. 242.

^{page 282 note 1} Antike Schlachtfelder, etc. ii. 415.

^{page 282 note 2} Cf. B.G. i. 21, § 1; 48, § I; B.C. i. 45, § 6.

^{page 282 note 3} Ib. iii. 84, § 2.

^{page 282 note 4} Cf. J. Kromayer, Antike Schlachtfelder, etc. ii. 409.

^{page 282 note 5} Röm. Gesch. iii. 1889, pp. 424 and note, 428. (Eng. trans, v. 1894, pp. 258–9, and note, 263.)

^{page 283 note 1} Guerre civile, ii. 252.

^{page 283 note 2} B.G. vii. 35.

^{page 283 note 3} B.C. i. 50.

^{page 283 note 4} Mommsen argues (Röm. Gesch. iii. 1889, p. 425, note) that ‘the retreat at least of their centre and their right wing was not accomplished in such haste as to be impracticable under the given conditions,’ but admits that the retreat of the left wing ‘was not accomplished without severe loss.’ But the infantry (B.C. iii.94, § 2) fled all together.

^{page 283 note 5} B.C. iii. 84, §2.

^{page 283 note 6} Ib. 88, § I.

^{page 284 note 1} Dr. Kromayer (Antike Schlachtfelder, etc. ii. 406) says that M. Heuzey's estimate is too high, and that the Tabakhana is only about 2 metres broad.

^{page 284 note 2} Les opérations mil. de J.C. pp. 132.

^{page 284 note 3} Ib.

^{page 284 note 4} Ib. pp. 114, 116.

^{page 284 note 5} Kα***σαρ...τϕoν ξαρετoν ντηεν γγνς τo*** πoλυανδρoν (B. C. ii. 82).

^{page 284 note 6} Les opérations mil. de J.C. pp. 117–8.

^{page 284 note 7} Ib. p. 133.

^{page 284 note 8} Ib. p. 134.

^{page 284 note 9} Ib.

^{page 284 note 10} Ib. pi. vii. The only instance in the Pharsalian plain is that of the Aikli.

^{page 284 note 11} Ib. p. 135.

^{page 285 note 1} Cf. J. Kromayer, Antike Schlachtfelder, etc. ii. 413.

^{page 285 note 2} Ib. p. 412.

^{page 285 note 3} Stoffel affirms (Guerre civile, ii. 243) that at various points on the right of Pompey's alleged camp the slopes of the hill show traces of having been artificially scarped, which, if it is a fact, does not prove that the work was done by Pompey.

^{page 285 note 4} See p. 281, supra.

^{page 285 note 5} Guerre civile, ii. 244.

^{page 285 note 6} Ib. p. 250 and pl. 17.

^{page 286 note 1} Julius Caesar, 1892, p. 298, note.

M. Heuzey (Les operations mil. de J.C. p. 131) denies that Karadja-Ahmet, surrounded as it is by the Enipeus, can have been the mons sine aqua; but this is hardly a valid objection. Karadja-Ahmet is a ‘massif,’ —a mountain mass; and the particular hill on which, according to Stoffel (pl. 17), the Pompeians were grouped when Caesar began to throw up an earthwork round it, is without water.

^{page 286 note 2} Antike Schlachtfelder, etc ii. 417–20, 424. Cf. W. Drumann, Gesch. Roms, ed. P. Groebe, iii. 751.

^{page 286 note 3} M. Heuzey (Les operations mil. de J.C. p. 131), in criticizing Leake's theory, objects that Mount Krindir is ‘covered by sharp rocks, which make it impossible to encamp there.’ Dr. Kromayer (Antike Schlachtfelder, etc. ii. 417, n. 1), admitting that M. Heuzey's observations are correct in so far as they refer to the summit and north-eastern declivity of Krindir properly so called—the highest and northernmost of the three low hills which are known by that name—points out that on the smaller hills and the plateau-like saddle which connects them with each other and with Mount Sourla there is excellent camping-ground.

Dr. Kromayer (ib. p. 418), remarking that Pompey must have drawn his water-supply from the Enipeus, and must therefore have made arrangements for the protection of his water-carriers, argues that one of Plutarch's statements is explained by the hypothesis that Pompey's redoubts (castella [B.C. iii. 88, §4]) were in the plain between his camp and the river, Plutarch, as we have seen (p. 274, supra), says that the camp was close to marshy ground, and that Brutus escaped by a gate leading to a marshy spot full of water. Dr. Kromayer regards this statement as a proof that Brutus had encamped in the redoubt nearest to the river. But Plutarch does not say that Brutus had his own encampment close to marshy ground; he only says that the Pompeian encampment was so situated. Anyhow his statement is obviously consistent with the view that the battle-field was north of the Enipeus.

^{page 286 note 4} W. Drumann, Geschichte Roms, ed. P. Groebe, iii. 751, n. 4. Mr. A. G. Peskett (Class. Rev. xxi. 1907, p. 187) pleads that the Enipeus ‘might at one time be a raging torrent, at another a thread of water, in other words, it might at one time be a riuus, at another a flumen.’ Surely not on the same day!

^{page 287 note 1} Antike Schlachtfelder, etc. ii. 411, n. 3.

^{page 287 note 2} See p. 282, supra.

^{page 287 note 3} See p. 273, supra.

^{page 287 note 4} See Dr. Kromayer's map (Karte 12).

^{page 287 note 5} L. Heuzey, Les oplrations mil. de j. C. p. 105.

^{page 287 note 8} ‘Diese Überschreitung ist aber eine Unmöglich-Keit, wenn der Feind so nahe im Nacken sitzt’ (Antike Schlaehtfelder, etc. ii. 410).

^{page 287 note 7} Ib. p. 419.

^{page 287 note 8} Decline of the Roman Republic, v. 221.

^{page 287 note 9} Caesars gall. Krieg, etc. Taf. xv. Fig. 1. Virtually identical with von Göler's theory is that of Herr K. Seldner (Das Schlachtfeld von Pharsalos, 1883). This program is not mentioned in the British Museum catalogue; but its contents are summarized in Bursian's Jahresbericht, xxxvi. 1885, p. 495

^{page 288 note 1} Les operations mil. de J.C. p. 125.

^{page 288 note 2} Ib. p. 126.

^{page 288 note 3} See A. Pitt-Rivers, Excavations in Cranborne Chase, i. 27; ii. 56; iii. 3; iv. 19–20.

^{page 288 note 4} B.G. vii. 35, § I.

^{page 288 note 5} See p. 274, supra.

^{page 288 note 6} Les operations mil. de J.C. p. 128.

^{page 288 note 7} 1b. p. 129.

^{page 288 note 8} Antike Schlachtfelder, etc. ii. 410. Dr. Kromayer's map misrepresents von Göler's meaning; for it would lead readers to believe that, according to von Göler, Pompey's army was drawn up across the riuus instead of resting its right wing upon it.

^{page 288 note 9} See pp. 275–6, supra.

^{page 288 note 10} Cf. B.G. vi. 34, § 2 (palus impedita); vii. 19, § I (hunc [collem] ex omnibus fere partibus palus difficlis atque impedita cingebat non latior pedibus quinquaginta); vii. 57, § 4 {is cum animadvertisset perpetuam esse paludem quae influeret in Sequanam atque illum omnem locum magnopere impediret.

If Caesar had been referring to the Enipeus, would he not have written altissimis atque praeruptissimis ripis ? Cf. B.G. ii. 17, § 5 vi. 7, § 5.

^{page 289 note 1} Dr. Kromayer means, as his plan(Karte II) shows, the undulating hills between the Larissa-Pharsalus road and Scotussa. He refers to Baron F. de Beaujour (Voyage mil. dans l'empire Othoman, i. 1829, pp. 173–4), who observes that ‘Entre ces collines [those of “les monts Cynoscéphales”] se prolongent de petites vallées, qui ressemblent de loin aux ondulations de la mer, quand elle est légèrement agitée.’ Nevertheless the baron places the battle-field north of the Enipeus.

^{page 289 note 2} Dr. Kromayer also makes these objections against the theories of Leake and Mommsen.

^{page 289 note 3} In regard to Caesar's use of the word iugum see H. Meusel, Lex. Cats. ii. 388–9. In B.G. vii. 67, § 5, summum iugum was undoubtedly the ridge of very gently sloping heights little more than 40 metres above the plain. See my Caesar's Conquest of Gaul, 1899, pp. 780–1, and C. Jullian's Vercingétorix, 1902, pp. 379–82.

^{page 289 note 4} S.G. vii. 62, §9.

^{page 289 note 5} See n. 1, supra. M. Heuzey's plan (PI. vii.) shows no rivulet on the northern bank which can NO. VIII. VOL. II. possibly be identified with Caesar's riuus except that of Orman-Magoula. Stoffel's (Pl. 17) shows two small riui east and west of the Larissa-Pharsalus road and both within less than a quarter of a mile of it, but not flowing into the Enipeus. In Kiepert's Formae orbis antiqui (xv.) only the western of these is traced, entering the Enipeus a little more than half a mile west of the road; and the same remark is applicable to Dr. Kromayer's Karte II, which is based upon the latest information available (see Antike Schlachtfelder, etc. ii. 447–8). Stoffel also shows two tiny rivulets terminating abruptly on the lowest slopes of the heights which ascend towards Scotussa and respectively about one mile five furlongs and two miles and a half east of the Orman-Magoula rivulet; while a rivulet which flows south of the Orman-Magoula railway station and joins the Orman-Magoula rivulet just north of the Enipeus and of the site which he selected for Pompey's camp is also marked in his map.

^{page 290 note 1} Les opérations mil. de J.C. p. 125.

^{page 290 note 2} P. 275, supra.

^{page 290 note 3} Guerre civile, Pl. 17. Cf. J. Kromayer, Antike Schlachtfelder, etc. Karte 11.

^{page 291 note 1} Cf. B.G. vii. 58, § I.

^{page 291 note 2} It might conceivably be argued, against Sir William Napier, that Caesar would have refrained from opposing Pompey's passage of the Enipeus because he felt confident of being able to defeat him more decisively in a pitched battle. But would Pompey have reckoned upon such forbearance ?

^{page 292 note 1} I need hardly say, however, that if they had done so they would have been intercepted long before they could reach Larissa.

^{page 292 note 2} Unless the river was in flood, in which case no one will argue that they would have dreamed of crossing it.

^{page 292 note 3} M. Heuzey thinks (Les opérations mil. de J.C. p. 113) that ‘in a highly cultivated district, where the soil is annqally disturbed by the plough, it would be impossible to reckon seriously upon the discovery of any material trace of the camps.’ But such traces would be visible below the ‘terre végétale,’ which alone would be disturbed by the plough. See Stoffel, Guerre civile, ii. 243, and my Caesar's Conquest of Gaul, 1899, pp. xxviii-xxx.

^{page 292 note 4} Dr. Kromayer (Antike Schlachtfelder, etc. ii. 421, n. 2) thinks that it would be worth while to excavate the two tumuli which are respectively one kilometre north-east of Fersala and one kilometre and a half north-west of Krindir, one of which, he suggests, may be the πoλυνδριoν mentioned by Appian (B.C. ii. 82).