1 A few examples must suffice. In note 265 on 246 a misprint and the omission of the last two words make Sprute's sentence unintelligible. Deicke's article (250, n. 285) is on Theaetetus 192 C 10, not 196 C 10; and in the same note “Brown, Malcolm, Martin” should be “Andic, Martin & Brown, Malcolm”. In note 290 on 251 “in reverse” should be “in reserve”. In note 429 on 272 “210 D 1–3” should be 201 D 1–3. In line 4 of note 445 on 277 “in the stoicheion” should be “is the stoicheion”; and in line 8 of note 485 on 286 “not yet” should be “nor yet”. In lines 7–8 of note 1 on 305 Lafrance says that his references are to the second German edition, 1931, of Stenzel's Plato's Method of Dialectic, whereas in fact they are (e.g. 310, n. 17; 345, n. 242; 370, n. 400) to the English translation of this book by D. J. Allan, 1940. In lines 8–9 of note 106 on 103 he names the present reviewer as one who along with R. Robinson allows only a single hypothesis in the Meno, whereas on the page to which he must be referring (A.J.P. 68 [1947], 140) it is explicitly stated that in that passage of the Meno both “virtue is good” and “virtue is knowledge” are posited as hypotheses. There are similar slips, not all inconsequential, in referring to interlocutors in the dialogues. So in line 8 from the bottom of the text on page 146 “Socrate” is a mistake for “Glaucon”; and in line 11 from the bottom of the text on 229 and in note 139 on 231 “Socrate” should be “Théétète”.

2 Lafrance admits (59, n. 2) that the authenticity of Alcibiades I has been seriously questioned but apparently is unaware of the reasons presented by C. A. Bos for holding that this dialogue was written after 349 B.C. and so could not be a work of Plato's youth (Bos, C. A., Interpretatie vaderschap en datering van de Alcibiades Maior [Culemborg, 1970])Google Scholar.

3 See especially 109–114 and 401. On 269–270 the αἰτας λογισμς is called “la capacité de relier ensemble plusieurs propositions dans un système cohérent” and on 301 “the comprehension of the link that unites the conclusion to its premises” after it has been said that the slave-boy's true opinions are not yet knowledge, because they are not connected in his mind to the general law governing the duplication of a square.

4 See 99 (last paragraph) to 100. On 97 Lafrance refers (note 84) to Phaedo 72 E ff. as “le passage du Phédon où Platon reprend sa théorie de la réminiscence pour l'expliciter davantage”.

5 Lafrance himself (109 [2]) takes the αἰτας λογισμς (interpreted as “connecting true opinions into genuine reasoning”) to refer to the second stage of interrogation, which will result in knowledge; but he avoids the express identification with reminiscence and disregards the implications of the language used of the two stages, in the former of which true opinions are set moving in the mind of the slave as in a dream (85 C 9–10, dismissed as merely “literary” by Lafrance [100, n. 93], who according to his own canon here is refuted by the πɛγɛιρθɛῑσαι πιστμαι … infra, which he neglects) while in the latter these are awakened and become knowledge (86 A 7–8). The αἰτας λογισμς consequently is reminiscence that by binding fast unstable and fugitive dream-like true opinions converts them into stable waking knowledge. That the true opinions of the slave are unstable Lafrance also admits (301 s.f.); and yet, holding that the instability of opinion retained in the Meno as a criterion for distinguishing it from knowledge no longer squares with the theory of true opinion in this dialogue, he calls the αἰτας λογισμς a second criterion newly added here (109–110 [3]). He does not mention, as might have been expected, the reference in Phaedo 96 B 5–8 to a theory in which knowledge arises from the coming to rest of memory and doxa, the origin of which is sensation.

6 The suggestion that Antisthenes is meant in 476 D 8–9 he ascribes (118, n. 10) to Chambry, apparently unaware that it had been proposed by F. Dümmler in 1882 (Antisthenica, 42–43 = Kleine Schriften 1, 47–48); but, whether or not Plato had any particular person in mind, οὗτος ὅν ϕαμɛν δοξζɛιν (476 D 8) refers back through τοῡ δ in D 7 to 476 C 2–4.

7 No more are being, absolute non-being, and the intermediate phenomenal world, to which the same metaphor is applied in 479 C 6 - D 1. In Republic 508 D 4–9 the region of the ideas is bright because it is illuminated by truth and so can be known, while the world of becoming is in twilight (“mingled with darkness”) and so can only be opined.

8 From the first sentence under (a) on 124 Lafrance might be thought to mean “different because related to different objects”; but see π' ἄλλῳ ἄρα … in 477 B 7–8; π' τρῳ ἄρα, ἕτɛρν τι δυναμνη κατρα … in 478 A 3–4; and 478 A 12-B 2: if different δυνμɛις are related to different objects and these, as we say, are δυνμɛις different from each other, it follows that the objects to which they are related cannot be the same. Lafrance says (147 with note 180) that in 478 A 3–4 Plato “conclut de la différence des effets à la différence des objets”, in this apparently following Chambry in mistaking, ἕτɛρν τι δυναμνη to mean “ayant un effet différent” as if it were the equivalent of ἕτɛρον πɛργαζομνη (477 D 4), whereas it can mean only “having a different power” and is merely a variation of “being a different δὑναμις ”. Nowhere in the passage does Plato speak of inferring the difference of the objects to which the δυνμɛις are related from the difference of the effects that they produce, so that Lafrance's criticism of such an inference (148) is entirely irrelevant. He is mistaken, moreover, in saying (146–148) that these different effects are “infallibility” and “fallibility”. The “infallible” and “not infallible” in 477 E 6–7 are given by Glaucon not as products or effects but as characteristics of the δυνμɛις themselves. In the case of πιστμη it is clearly stated (478 A 6, cf. 477 B 10–11) that the object to which it is related is being (π τῷ ντι) and what it produces is cognition of being as it is (τὂν γνναι ὡς ἔχɛι); for δξα the parallel to γνναι here is δοξζɛιν (478 A 8), and to τ ὂν … ὡς ἔχɛι it would be τ γιγνμɛνον … ὡς δοκɛῖ ɛἶναι (cf. 508 D 7–9), i.e., what the “power” of opinion produces is the opining of the phenomenal world as it seems to be or, as Proclus correctly paraphrases it (In Rempublicam I, 267, 6–8 [Kroll]), πɛργζɛται δ μν 〈πιστμη〉 γνωστικο ὺς μς το ντος δ 〈δξα〉 δοξαστικοὺς το πῇ μν ντος πῇ δ μ ντος. Timaeus 37 B 3–C 3, a passage neglected by Lafrance, gives a psycho–physical account of the two different “powers”, the objects to which they are related, and the effects that they produce: opinions result when one circle of the soul reports contact with the sensible, and knowledge is the result when the other circle reports contact with the intelligible.

9 On this see also Lafrance's, article, “Amour et violence dans la dialectique platonicienne”, Dialogue 12 (1973), 288–308CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 In support of this formulation Lafrance cites no text but instead refers (142, n. 150) to N. R. Murphy (The Interpretation of Plato's Republic, 123–124), who because πϕυκɛ rather than ἔστιν is used in Republic 477 B 10 and 478 A 3 and 13 contends that “the ideal forms are ϕσɛι γνωστ … but… may be apprehended also, κατ συμβɛβηκς, with something less than intelligence”. This far-fetched interpretation of the passage is implausible in itself and is refuted by 478 B 3–5 and 480 A 1. Moreover, the intelligible idea, which according to Murphy would be per accidens δοξαστν is explicitly characterized as τ δξαστον in Phaedo 84 A 8. Lafrance's version amounts to this, that doxa, being of a copy, is of the original as copied and to this extent of the original. According to Plato, however, doxa does not recognize what is a copy to be an “original as copied”; it is incapable of recognizing the sensible as copy or semblance at all, and only knowledge of the intelligible can distinguish from it as original the sensible as copy or semblance of it (Republic 476 C 5–D 7; cf. 520 C 3–6 and Cratylus 439 A 7–B 3).

11 Lafrance had already published two important articles on this passage: “Platon et la géométrie: La construction de la ligne en République, 509 d-511 e”, Dialogue 16 (1977), 425–450CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “Platon et la géométrie: la méthode dialectique en Reépublique 509 d- 511 e”, Dialogue 19 (1980), 46–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Cf. Plutarch, , Moralia (L.C.L.), XIII, 1, 40–41Google Scholar, my note c on Platonic Questions 1002 A. Lafrance in support of his statement cites Republic 510 B 4, 510 E 1–3, and 511 A 6–8; but in all these it is the correlative objects of πστις, of which those of ɛἰκασα are images, that are said to be used as images by δινοια and not these nor any other images of the objects of νησις but the ideas themselves, of which the only semblances are those objects of ποτις (510 D 7–8), are said to be the objects of δινοια (510 D 5–511 A 1). Later (183) Lafrance, taking Republic 596 B–597 D and the Divided Line to represent the same doctrine, has to admit that the idea itself is the object of both δινοια and νηις.

13 Cf. Goldschmidt, V., “La Ligne de la République et la classification des sciences”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 9/32 (1955), 237–255Google Scholar = Questions Platoniciennes (1970), 203–219; and much earlier Adam, James in his commentary, The Republic of Plato, vol. 2, (1902), 157–159Google Scholar. In the interpretation of παθματα (Republic 511 D 7) too Lafrance (184–185) follows Goldschmidt's article; but παθματα ν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνμɛνα would hardly be used of the “structure”, even of the “dynamic structure”, of the soul and is more likely to refer to the actual exercise of one of the soul's “powers” as what is happening in the soul, the “state” or “condition” occurring in it (cf. Adam's note on νησιν ad loc).

14 Cornford was not the first to interpret the Theaetetus as an indirect argument for the necessity of the theory of ideas; see e.g. P. Shorey, The Unity of Plato's Thought (1904), 34; Comperz, Th., Ghiechische Denker, vol. 2 ³ (1912), 445Google Scholar; and A. Levi, Il concetto del tempo … nella filosofia di Platone (1920), 39.

15 Earlier Lafrance had said that the final failure of the Theaetetus is due less to the absence of the ideas than to the difficulty of satisfactorily explaining false judgment (213), that he does not see how the theory of ideas could help resolve the problems left unsolved in the Theaetetus (303), and that what would have helped resolve these difficulties is not the theory of ideas but a clearer distinction between doxa as “representation” and doxa as “judgment” (304). Yet later the epistemological failure of the Theaetetus is said (387–388) to follow from the ontological failure and the latter is ascribed (386) to Plato's refusal to introduce his theory of intelligible ideas.

16 The “indices minimes” that he allows are 175 B 9–C 3, 173 E 3–174 A 2, and 176 A-C. He does not even mention 176 E 3–4 (παραδɛιγμτων … ν τῷ ντι σὡτων …).

17 So for example A. Levi, Il concetto in note 14 supra; G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought (1935), 38; and F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (1935), 105–106 and 108–109.

18 In Theaetetus 163 C 4–5, Socrates' remark, neglected by Lafrance in his interpretation of 163 B-C (234), shows Plato purposely hinting at something not expressed in the dialogue (cf. ad loc. L. Campbell, The Theaetetus of Plato² [1883], 84; M. Wohlrab, Platonis Theaetetus² [1891], 122).

19 Theaetetus 185 C 4–5 (Burnet) = 185 C 3–4 (Diès), which alone is cited by Lafrance in his note 61 on 214. The τ π τοτοις there refers back to τ κοινν … πɛρ αὐτ ν in 185 B 8–9, one of the two passages cited by Lafrance in his note 59 on 214, the other being 184 D 5, which concerns the sensibles perceived δι ργανν and so is irrelevant to the κοιν; the τ π πσιν κοινν recurs in 186 A 2–3 as τοτο (scil. οὐσα)… π πντων (cf. ad loc. L. Campbell, Theaetetus, 162).

20 This is one of the passages that Lafrance cites (215, n. 68) for knowledge described in the Republic as an apprehension of the ideas.

21 So in Parmenides 130 A 1–2 Socrates calls the ideas τοῖς λογισμῷ λαμηανομνοις, and in Sophist 248 A 11 “the friends of the ideas” are represented as saying that we have communication with real being by the soul δι λογισμο

22 This is το πικρινοντος of which in these circumstances the soul stands in need (524 E 4); cf. κρνɛιnu; πɛιρται in Theaetetus 186 B 8–9.

23 In 185 A 4, 185 A 9, and 185 B 7. Although Lafrance on page 389 refers (n. 477) to 185 C 8–D 3 as evidence that the κοιν “have their origin in the human soul”, something the passage does not say, and (n. 478) to 185 D 9–E 2 and 185 E 6–7 as evidence that they are “concepts formed by the cognitive soul”, whereas in both these passages the soul is said not t o “form” them but t o “observe” (πισκοπɛῖν) them, yet on 248 he says that the perception of the κοιν is also described as an operation of αἴσθησις and for this cites (n. 272) 185 A 4–6 and 185 D 1–4. This is a misrepresentation of both passages. The former says: “if you think (διανο) anything about both, you could not be having a perception (οὐκ … αἰσθνοι' ἄν) of both through either of the two organs”; and in the latter Theaetetus says “you are clearly asking through what bodily organ do we perceive (αἰσθανμɛθα) such things”, and his answer is “none at all, but the soul by itself observes (πισκοπɛῖν) them” (185 D 8–E 2). So also, when on 263 Lafrance cites (n. 379) 185 C 7 (i.e. 7–8) and 185 D 3–4 as evidence that the term αἴσθησις “signifies now a sensation and again a perception of the κοιν by the soul alone”, he fails to observe that αἰσθνɛσθαι occurs in a question the answer to which is that these are not cases of sensation but of observation (πισκοɛῖν) by the soul itself through itself (185 D 8–E 2). When this action of the soul and its perception through the organs of sense have both to be covered by a single verb, Plato uses πισκοπɛῖν (185 E 6–7), and nowhere in 185 E 1–186 E 12 is αἰσθνɛσθαι or αἴσθησις used of the “perception des communs par l'âme seule”.

24 So δινοια has been used in the sense of “thought” or “mind” (150 C 2, 155 D 10, 160 D 1, 168 B 3, 173 B 2 and E 3). It should be understood as “thought” in 170 B 8–9 too, where ληθ δινοιαν and ψɛυδ δξαν are contrasted, though Lafrance says (237, n. 190 and 247) that it is used there as a synonym of δξα.

25 For this activity he uses πισκοπɛῖν (185 E 1–2), which Socrates repeats after him (185 E 6–7), ποργɛται (186 A 4), and σκοπɛῑσθαι (186 A 10).

26 Lafrance (241, 248, 387) like many others makes no distinction between the statement by Theaetetus and the comment by Socrates; but cf. E. Stoelzel, Die Behandlung des Erkenntnisproblems bei Platon (1908), 77–78.

27 Lafrance (248, n. 273) insists that Cornford's “making judgments” is the correct translation of δοξζɛιν in 187 A 8 and that this is supported by 189 E-190 A; but Cornford's own comment on this translation (110) is against giving such a restricted meaning to δοξζɛιν and δξα as used by Theaetetus in 187 A-B. Even after 190 A δοξζɛιν is used to mean “to think” or “to think of” something and not “to make a judgment” (e.g. 190 D 4, 7–8 [cf. Cornford, 119, n. 2], 10–11; 209 A 3, B 2–3, C 2); and 189 E itself suggests that διανοɛῖσθαι rather than δοξζɛιν would have been Plato's own term for the activity of the soul described in 187 A 5–6 (cf. Stoelzel, Die Behandlung in note 26 supra).

28 Cf. especially Zeller, E., Die Philosophie der Griechen, vol. 2/1⁵ (1922), 589–191Google Scholar. Zeller had given this interpretation in the edition of 1846, Part 2, 153; but in the subsequent editions he elaborated it especially by replying to Bonitz. Cf. also Susemihl, F., Die genetische Entwickelung der platonischen Philosophie, vol. 1 (1855), 198–199Google Scholar.

29 The ambiguity to which Lafrance refers here (263–264) is twofold: (1) doxa conceived now as apprehension by direct contact and again as judgment in propositional form and (2) doxa used both for judgment in thought independent of sensation and for judgment based upon sensation, as in the “waxen tablet” (191 C 8–196 C 4), mistakenly called (263, n. 379 and 264, lines 3–4) analogous to an ambiguity in the use of αἴσθησιζ (see note 23 supra). It is never the judgment itself, however, but always that about which it is made that is supposed to be apprehended; and Lafrance neglects to observe that this difference is preserved and clearly expressed by the syntactical distinction in the governance of δοξζɛιν even in the very passages (190 C 6–8, 190 D 4–10, 195 E 5–7 [Burnet]) cited by him (264) to show that the verb refers to contact with an object. The second “ambiguity” is a consequence of reducing knowledge to identity with true doxa.

30 See Lafrance himself (344) citing Parmenides 132 B 3-C 12 against Lutoslawski's interpretation of ideas as thoughts in the mind.

31 Cf. Theaetetus 173 C 8-D 2: the true philosophers do not know the way to the marketplace or where any public meeting-place is.

32 In 201 E 1 Socrates speaks of having heard it from “some people” (τινν); but in 202 E 7 he refers to its supposed author in the singular, and in 202 C 5–6 Theaetetus says that it is just what he had heard (cf. 201 D 5).

33 Though Lafrance correctly says (294) that 205 C 4–9 shows why the elements do not have a logos while composites do (cf. 272 s.f.), he nevertheless makes the strange statement elsewhere that in the dream of Socrates the only things that possess their οἰκɛῖοζ λγοζ are the simple elements and in support of this mistaken assertion refers to 202 A 7–8 (286 with note 483 and 296 s.f.), apparently not recognizing that δɛῖν δ, ɛἴπɛρ ἦν … κα ɛἶχɛν οἰκɛῖον αὑτοῡ λγον, … λγɛσθαι is a contrary to fact condition.

34 Though rejecting with good reason Burnyeat's thesis that the theory is Plato's own (283), Lafrance suggests that the dream may be an amalgam of notions taken by Plato from various persons. This, he says, is a customary procedure of Plato's; he might have cited as an example the “secret doctrine” ascribed to Protagoras in this same dialogue (Theaetetus 152 C 8–157 C 3.

35 An interpretation resembling this, unnoticed by Lafrance, is that by Friedländer, P. (Platan, vol. 2 [1930], 453–454Google Scholar = vol. 3 [1975], 167), who, taking the definition to be not very far from Plato's own view, holds that for this reason Plato clarifies the meaning of logos by criticizing a theory with which he does not wish to be identified. Cf. the second alternative (b) in Lafrance's note 533 on his 300 (see note 37 infra).

36 In fact the meaning of logos here given is “the exposition of one's thought by means of voice with verbs and nouns, stamping the image of doxa on the oral stream as on a mirror” (cf. 208 C 5: the vocal image of thought). Logos is no more and no less “proposition”, then, than is doxa but is simply doxa orally expressed, as in 190 A 4–6 doxa was said to be logos silently spoken to oneself. That earlier passage itself may have been the reason why Plato felt it necessary here to show succinctly that in the definition of knowledge this was probably not the meaning of logos intended. Lafrance contends (274 and 299) that 206 D 1–5 briefly recalls that first part of the dream where (202 B 3–5) the combined names of the elements of a composite are said to constitute a logos, νομτων γρ συμπλοκν ɛἶναι λγου οὐσαν, and that, since enough attention had been given to this sense of logos, it suffices for Socrates to recall it in 206 D 1-E 3; but the critique of the dream is concerned entirely with the knowability of a compound of unknowable elements, and no mention at all is made of the nature of logos in relation to doxa, which is the subject of 206 D 1-E 3.

37 I presume that in the fourth line of note 533 (the second line of it on 300) “avec la science” is a misprint and was meant to be “avec la sienne”.

38 Cf. Theaetetus 145 E 9–146 A 1, 146 E 9–10, 147 B 10-C 1, 148 D 1–2, 151 D 4, 208 B 12, 210 A 3. In 148 D 2 logos is used in the sense of “definition”; and in 208 B 12 Plato plays upon this sense, which is not one of the meanings it might have in the definition being considered.

39 Nor is it in this sense “Mitursache für die Konstitution der Erkenntnis”, as P. Friedländer says it is (Platon 2 [1930], 454 = 3 [1975], 167).

40 On 306 Lafrance calls this “la communication des genres”, but usually for the ideas in the Sophist and especially for the μγιστα γνη he uses “Formes-Genres”, an expression that he defends in note 203 on 337. For my persistence in using the traditional designation “ideas” cf. Lustrum 4(1959), 278, n. 1 and Ilting, K.-H., Gnomon 45 (1973), 650Google Scholar, n. 1 and Lafrance himself earlier (128, n. 67).

41 This is hardly compatible with the importance that Lafrance had attached to Sophist 265 B–266 D for Plato's theory of human production and the disciplines of the “inferior education” (179–183 and 193–194); and it disregards the fact that the relation of sophist, statesman, and philosopher is explicitly declared to be the subject of the Sophist and the Politicus (Sophist 217 A–218 C, Politicus 257 B 8–C 5).

42 He calls the intercommunion of ideas in the Sophist a “notion tout à fait nouvelle” in the same paragraph in which he admits a reference to it in Republic 476 A and Phaedo 102 B-E, passages to which he says (310) attention has been called by Hamlyn after Ross. In fact, to mention no scholars still earlier, attention was called to the intercommunion of ideas in the Phaedo by L. Robin (Phédon [1934], lvi-lvii, and Platon [1935], 109 and 274) and to the implication of λλλων κοινωνα in Republic 476 A by O. Apelt (Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie [1891], 87) and P. Shorey (The Unity of Plato's Thought [1903], 36, n. 244). For μ ν in the sense of θτɛρον earlier than the Sophist cf. Cherniss, H., J.H.S. 77/1 (1957)Google Scholar, 19 with notes 13–23; and for an anticipatory refutation of the contention that diaeresis in the Sophist is more advanced than in the Phaedrus cf. P. Shorey, Unity, 51, n. 377.

43 Lafrance's summary statements about diaeresis occur on 310 and 410. On 308 he calls Sophist 253 B-254 B “l'interlude sur la méthode dialectique”, on 331 “l'interlude sur la diairesis”; and on 311 he says that in 253 D 1–3 the “science dialectique est décrite comme une diairesis”. In fact in 253 D 1–3 τ κατ γνη διαιρɛῑσθαι is not given as a description of dialectic (that is differently described in 253 D 9-E 6 as the knowledge of determining how the several ideas can and cannot intercommunicate) but is said to belong to dialectic as a function of it, and this is just what in Republic 454 A is said to distinguish dialectic from eristic. On this and against Stenzel cf. P. Friedländer, Platon II (1930), 212, n. 1 and 381–382 = II (1957), 314, n. 27 and III (1960), 95–96 with 444, n. 35; and for diaeresis in Plato's writings generally cf. Cherniss, H., Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, vol. 1 (1944), 46–47Google Scholar and 55.

44 Cf. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism, 317. The relations of ideas in intercommunion are called “réciproques” by Lafrance himself (e.g. in lines 11–12 on 349). Lafrance is not always accurate in his paraphrase of this section of the Sophist. So, for example, 250 D 1–5 becomes in his words (332 with n. 167) “mais comment peut-on … dire que le mouvement n'est pas ou que le repos n'est pas”, whereas the Stranger here asks how one can say that being is neither in motion nor at rest. On 340 Lafrance says “L'autre est donc une Forme-Genre à laquelle communiquent toutes les Formes-Genres … en vertu de leurs relations entre elles” and for this refers (n. 214) to 255 E 3–6, which in fact says that each one is different from the others … because of participation in the idea of difference. On 374 “ce que l'on disait … de la Forme de l'Autre en particulier à 259 B 5–6” may be a lapsus calami, for what is said there is said not of “La Forme de l'Autre” but of the idea of being in particular and then of all other ideas.

45 Taking 259 E 5–6 as a definition of logos, one of two, of which the otheris 262 D 5–6, is not just a terminological inaccuracy but is the foundation of Lafrance's thesis that Plato has two different explanations of logos, one “ontological” and the other “semeiotic”. According to 259 E 5–6, in fact, the intercommunion of the ideas is not logos but what makes logos possible. Thereafter logos itself, the question of what it is having been raised (260 A 7–8, cf. 260 E 3–5), is treated only as “statement”, a combination of verbal signs which are nouns and verbs (262 D 5–6; cf. 262 C 4–7, 263 D 3–4, 263 E 3–8), and not as the interrelation of the ideas itself, which after all is just what it is and could not, if itself logos, ever be “false”.

46 N. B. Lafrance's words on 372: “Il faut … conserver au terme ‘Théétète’ sa double référence à la réalité sensible et à la Forme à laquelle Théétète participe. … la Forme ‘Homme’ à laquelle participe Théétète et la Forme ‘Être Assis’ qui sont deux Formes qui s'accordent entre elles …”.

47 Cf. Grote, G., Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates, vol. 3 (1888), 239–241Google Scholar, who says (239) that in the statement “there is no negation of anything but simply affirmation of a different positive attribute” and (241) that “the predicate affirms what is just as much as the predicate of the first” (i.e. of “Theaetetus is sitting down”). He also observes (249) that the sophist has already been represented (239 E 5–240 A 2) as admitting no evidence of the senses but only τ κ τν λγων.

48 The ἔϕαμɛν must refer back to 256 E 5–6, as he says, and possibly also to 259 B 5–6, though for the latter see note 44 supra.

49 So it cannot be “sitting” in the true statement, as it is said to be, for example, by Grote (Other Companions in note 47 supra, 250): “Because (says the Eleate) the first predicates Ens, the second predicates Non-Ens (or to substitute his definition of Non-Ens) another Ens different from the Ens predicated in the first” (my italics).

50 It has been observed by many and long ago that “Theaetetus is flying” must be false because of the participation of Theaetetus in the idea “man”; cf. for example the succinct note by G. Fraccaroli, Platone, Il Sofista e l' Uomo Politico (1911), 234, n. 1 (on 235).

51 According to Lafrance (391) λλοδοξα in the Sophist is a satisfactory explanation of false doxa because Plato now holds that one can have knowledge of an idea “in its essence” without knowing its relations with the other ideas, a notion of knowledge of the ideas unlikely in itself and more than unlikely in the light of Sophist 253 B 8–254 B 1 and Philebus 62 A 2–5.

52 Since Lafrance was unable to take account of such literature more recent than 1976, I have thought it proper also to refrain from referring to anything published later than that date.