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What Matters in Love: Reflections on the Relationship between Love and Persons

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 July 2018

GARY FOSTER
GARY FOSTER*
Affiliation:
Wilfrid Laurier University
*
*<gfoster@wlu.ca>
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Abstract

In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit takes issue with Bernard Williams’ view of the relation between love and identity. Williams thought that, in a world where there were several co-existing replicas of one’s beloved, our current conception of love would begin to crumble. Parfit agrees with Williams in the branching case of replication, but thought that, where replication takes a non-branching form, our ordinary view of love would remain intact. I believe Parfit arrives at this conclusion because he has not fully appreciated the degree to which Williams’ claim is primarily about a view of love rather than one of identity.

Dans Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit conteste le point de vue de Bernard Williams quant à la relation entre l’amour et l’identité. Williams pensait que dans un monde où plusieurs répliques de son bien-aimé existeraient, notre conception actuelle de l’amour s’avèrerait caduque. Parfit partage l’avis de Williams sur les ramifications de la réplication, mais croit que lorsque la réplication adopte une forme non ramifiée notre vision courante de l’amour demeure intacte. Je pense que Parfit arrive à cette conclusion parce qu’il a mésestimé combien l’affirmation de Williams se rapportait davantage à une vision de l’amour que de l’identité.

Keywords

lovepersonal identityembodimentreplicationfungibility
Type
Original Article/Article original
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 58 , Issue 2 , June 2019 , pp. 323 - 340
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2018 

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