¹ Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803): Those, then, who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law. This doctrine would subvert the very foundations of all written constitutions.” See also the thorough treatments by Charles F. Abernathy, The Lost European Aspirations of U.S. Constitutional Law, 4 German Law Journal 595 (2003); Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Two Hundred Years of Marbury v. Madison: The Struggle for Judicial Review of Constitutional Questions in the United states and Europe, 5 German Law Journal 685 (2004). Both pieces available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com.Google Scholar

² “De rechter treedt niet in de beoordeling van de grondwettigheid van wetten en verdragen” in Dutch. To read the Constitution in English, consult the website of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations at: http://www.minbzk.nl/contents/pages/6156/grondwet_UK_6-02.pdf.Google Scholar

³ The website edited by Arne Mavčič, http://www.concourts.net, collects information on judicial constitutional review. In his most recent table, dating from 2004, he identifies five countries which have not adopted any form of judicial constitutional review, of which the Netherlands is one.Google Scholar

⁴ See C.A.J.M. Kortmann, Constitutioneel recht 374–381 (2005).Google Scholar

⁵ R. Leysen & J. Smets, Toetsing van de wet aan de Grondwet 7 (1991).Google Scholar

⁶ For a thorough historical analysis, see P.B. Cliteur, Constitutionele toetsing 27–118 (1991).Google Scholar

⁷ See Maurice Adams & Gerhard van der Schyff, Constitutional Review by the Judiciary in the Netherlands: A Matter of Politics, Democracy or Compensating Strategy?, 66 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 399 (2006).Google Scholar

⁸ Hoge Raad, 27 January 1961, NJ 1963, 248 (Van den Bergh). See Leonard F.M. Besselink, Constitutional law of the Netherlands: An Introduction With Texts, Cases and Materials 91–94 (2004).Google Scholar

⁹ Hoge Raad, 25 November 1912, W., 9419.Google Scholar

¹⁰ E.g. in Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage, 27 September 1990, AB 1991, 85 the applicants requested the court to review a bill that still had to be considered by the upper house of parliament. The court refused by basing itself on the strict separation of powers between the legislature and judiciary.Google Scholar

¹¹ Hoge Raad, 14 April 1989, AB 1989, 207 (Harmonization Act), para. 4.6. On the Charter, see Constantijn A.J.M. Kortmann & Paul P.T. Bovend'eert, Dutch Constitutional law 28–34 (2000); Constitutionele toetsing in de Nederlandse Antillen, ja of nee? (A.B. van Rijn ed., 1995).Google Scholar

¹² Id., para. 3.1.Google Scholar

¹³ Hoge Raad, 12 April 1978, NJ 1979, 533; Hoge Raad, 15 July 1988, RvdW 1988, 133.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Hoge Raad, 12 April 1978, NJ 1979, 533. See also the explanation in Harmonization Act judgment (note 11), para. 3.4.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See A.W. Hins, Constitutionele toetsing, proportionaliteit, Verhältnismässigkeit, in Proportionaliteit in het publiekrecht, 61, 66 (Aernout J. Nieuwenhuis, Ben J. Schueler & Carla M. Zoethout eds., 2005).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Rechtbank's Gravenhage of 18 January 1995; E.C.M. Jurgens, Wetgever heeft laatste woord over uitleg van Grondwet, Regelmaat, 68–69 (1995). Arguing for full judicial scrutiny of delegated legislation irrespective of the parent act, see G. Leenknegt, Hoe lang is de arm van artikel 120 Gr.w.?, Regelmaat 65 (1995).Google Scholar

¹⁷ English Public law, 44 (David Feldman ed., 2004).Google Scholar

¹⁸ M.C. Burkens, H.R.B.M. Kummeling, B.P. Vermeulen & R.J.M. Widdershoven, Beginselen van de Democratische Rechtsstaat 89–91 (2006).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Id., 329–331.Google Scholar

²⁰ Id. 329–331.Google Scholar

²¹ “Binnen het Koninkrijk geldende wettelijke voorschriften vinden geen toepassing, indien deze toepassing niet verenigbaar is met een ieder verbindende bepalingen van verdragen en van besluiten van volkenrechtelijke organisaties” in Dutch.Google Scholar

²² J. M. de Meij & I.C. van der Vlies, Inleiding tot het staatsrecht en het bestuursrecht 195–196 (2000).Google Scholar

²³ Burkens (note 18), 340–341.Google Scholar

²⁴ See City Council of Pretoria v. Walker, 1998 2 SA 363 (CC); Government of the RSA v. Grootboom, 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Rassie Malherbe, The development of socio-economic rights in South Africa, 60 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 111 (2005).Google Scholar

²⁵ See Constitutionele rechtspraak, 51–52 (A.H.M. Dölle & J.W.M. Engels eds., 1989); P.B. Cliteur, Argumenten voor en tegen constitutionele toetsing, Nederlands Juristenblad 1369 (1989); C.B. Schutte, De verwarring van rechtsstaat en rechtersstaat. Kanttekeningen bij constitutionele rechtspraak volgens het voorstel-Halsema, Regelmaat 93 (2004); R.J.B. Schutgens, Het voorstel-Halsema en de toelaatbaarheid van de wet, Regelmaat 12 (2007); Maurice Adams & Gerhard van der Schyff, Grondwettigheidstoetsing door de rechter als “list van de rijke”? Methodologische en andere vragen bij processen van rechtsverandering, 45 Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht 913 (2008).Google Scholar

²⁶ Ministry of the Interior, Proeve van een nieuwe Grondwet (1966).Google Scholar

²⁷ J.L.M.Th. Cals & A.M. Donner, Tweede Rapport van de Staatscommissie van advies inzake de Grondwet en de kieswet (1969).Google Scholar

²⁸ C. Flinterman, Het rechterlijk toetsingsrecht, in Verhalen over de Grondwet, 142, 144 (A.W. Heringa, C.H.A. Litjens & R.E. de Winter eds., 1993) refers to this reluctance as a fear of getting one's feet wet.Google Scholar

²⁹ Harmonization Act judgment (note 11), para. 3.4, 4.2.Google Scholar

³⁰ Government Publication, Nota inzake rechterlijke toetsing (1991).Google Scholar

³¹ Parliamentary Proceedings II 2001–2002, 28, 331, no. 2; Parliamentary Proceedings, 2002–2003, 28, 331, no. 9.Google Scholar

³² S. 22(1) of the Constitution reads: “De overheid treft maatregelen ter bevordering van de volksgezondheid” in Dutch. Other provisions than those in the bill of rights are also earmarked for exemption (s. 54(1), (2)(a)-(b), 56, 99, 113(3), 114, 121, 129(1)) on account of the fact that they guarantee enforceable civil and political rights, such as s. 121, which provides that trials must be held in public and judgments also passed in public.Google Scholar

³³ Parliamentary Proceedings II, 2002–2003, 28, 331, no. 9, 16–18.Google Scholar

³⁴ For some examples, see M.M. Bense, Aandacht voor recente grondwetswijzigingen, Regelmaat 89 (2002).Google Scholar

³⁵ Adams & Van der Schyff (note 25), 916–917.Google Scholar

³⁶ For one ne of the arguments on which the Halsema Proposal also relies, see Gerhard van der Schyff, Rethinking the Justification for Constitutional Review of Legislation in the Netherlands: A Critique of the “Treaty Argument” and Thoughts on the Way Forward, in Europa EN de toekomst van de nationale wetgever, 129 (R.A.J. van Gestel & J. van Schooten eds., 2008).Google Scholar

³⁷ Ackerman, Bruce, We the People: Foundations (1991); Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (1998). At such moments in the constitutional history, he points to the foundation of the United States, the Civil War and the New Deal. See also Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 Stanford law Review 759 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 Constitutional Commentary 115 (1994).Google Scholar

³⁸ Mark Tushnet, Potentially Misleading Metaphors in Comparative Constitutionalism: Moments and Enthusiasm, in Altneuland: The EU Constitution in a Contextual Perspective, Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/04, 1, 2 (J.H.H. Weiler & C. Eisgruber, eds., 2004). Available at: http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040501-04.html.Google Scholar

³⁹ For a succinct exposition, see Neil Walker, The Legacy of Europe's Constitutional Moment, 11 Constellations 368 (2004); Neil Walker, After the Constitutional Moment, paper 32/03 The Federal Trust, 1, 3 (2003).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Walker, Legacy, id., 369.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 Yale law Journal 2279, 2282–2283 (1999): Call it revolution on a human scale and define it as a self-conscious effort to mobilize the relevant community to reject currently dominant beliefs and practices in area or another of social life.”Google Scholar

⁴² Id., 2285.Google Scholar

⁴³ Id., 2287–2288.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Id., 2287.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Id., 2287. As examples Ackerman refers to the expansion of federal power between 1781 and 1791, as well as the abolition of slavery between 1860 and 1870.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Sharing this view, see András Sajó, Constitution without the Constitutional Moment: A View from the New Member States, 3 International Journal of Constitutional law 243 (2005).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ S. v. Makwanyane, 1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC), par. 262. Similarly S. v. Mhlungu, 1995 3 SA 867 (CC), 1995 7 BCLR 793 (CC), para. 111 where the Court explained that: “[t]he introduction of fundamental rights and constitutionalism in South Africa represented more than merely entrenching existing common law rights, such as might happen if Britain adopted a bill of rights. The Constitution introduces democracy and equality for the first time in South Africa. It acknowledges a past of intense suffering and injustice, and promises a future of reconciliation and reconstruction.” See also Arthur Chaskalson, From Wickedness to Equality: The Moral Transformation of South African Law, 1 International Journal of Constitutional law 590 (2003).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ As s. 8(1) of the Constitution of South Africa (1996) declares that: The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.”Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Contrast Albie Sachs, Towards a Bill of Rights for a Democratic South Africa, 12 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 289, 294 (1988–1989) (where judicial review is characterized as “racist” as it would serve white interests more than achieve transformation) with Albie Sachs, Human Rights in South Africa (1992) (where it was argued that a judicial bill of rights offered an opportunity to realize democratic ideals instead of being a brake on the process). See also Michael Mandel, A Brief History of the New Constitutionalism, or “How We Changed Everything so that Everything Would Remain the Same”, 32 Israel Law Review 251, 278–279 (1998).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Erhard Blankenburg, Warum brauchen wir kein Verfassungsgericht? Die niederländische Diskussion im Licht der deutschen Erfahrung, in Migratierecht en rechtssociologie: Gebundeld in Kees'studies, 303, 310 (Anita Böcker et al., 2008) writes that: “In the Netherlands the idea of ‘democracy’ is not often associated with a ‘dictatorship of the majority’ (…) but one associates democracy more easily with the protection of minorities and pluralism.” Author's translation of: “In der niederländischen Diskussion wird der Begriff der ‘Demokratie’ selten mit einer ‘Diktatur der Mehrheit’ assoziiert (…) sondern man assoziiert mit Demokratie viel eher den Schutz von Minderheiten und die Pluralität von Souveränitäten.”Google Scholar

⁵¹ Rudy B. Andeweg & Galen A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands 148 (2002).Google Scholar

⁵² E.g. in 2008 the Netherlands occupied the 16^th place in a ranking of 173 countries. Available at: http://www.rsf.org/en-classement794-2008.html.Google Scholar

⁵³ E.g. in 2008 the Netherlands occupied the 6^th place in a ranking of 179 countries. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Making the same point, P.W.C. Akkermans, C.J. Bax & L.F.M. Verhey, Grondrechten 36 (2005).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See Grażyna Skapska, Paradigm Lost? The Constitutional Process in Poland and the Hope of “Grass-roots Constitutionalism”, in The Rule of law After Communism: Problems and Prospects in East-Central Europe 149 (Martin Krygier & Adam Czarnota eds., 1999); Tushnet (note 38), 6.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ W.J. Witteveen, Hamilton, Koopmans en Ackerman over constitutionele toetsing, Regelmaat 177 182 (2006).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Some commentators have so much faith in the political process in the Netherlands that they even favor that the Constitution be abolished so that it can resemble the British constitution, such as E.C.M. Jurgens, Geen eed op de Grondwet! Een pleidooi om de geschreven constitutie sober te houden, Regelmaat 68, 69 (2002). Interestingly, in his analysis F.H. van der Burg, Heeft Nederland een Grondwet?, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Bestuursrecht 157 (1990) reaches the conclusion that very little separates the written Dutch Constitution from the unwritten British constitution.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ In his foreword to J.R. Stellinga, De Grondwet systematisch gerangschikt (1950).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See Evert Alkema, The Effects of the European Convention on Human Rights and Other International Human Rights Instruments on the Netherlands Legal Order, in The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe: Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, 1 (Rick Lawson & Matthijs de Blois eds., vol. III, 1994) who charts this evolution.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ E.g. Hoge Raad, 16 May 1986, NJ 1987, 251, where the Supreme Court stressed that courts had to be careful of value judgments as this has to be left to the legislature. It continued by opining that the courts must be “terughoudend” or reluctant to exercise their powers of review.Google Scholar

⁶¹ On this, see Gerhard van der Schyff, Rethinking the Justification for Constitutional Review of Legislation in the Netherlands, in Europa en de toekomst van de nationale wetgever: Liber amicorum PHilip Eijlander 129 (R.A.J. van Gestel & J. van Schooten eds., 2008); Gerhard van der Schyff, Waarom het wetsvoorstel Halsema tekort schiet: Mythes rondom het verdragsargument, Nederlands Juristenblad 2408 (2009); Jit Peters & Geerten Boogaard, De myhes van Van der Schyff over het initiatiefwetsvoorstel-Halsema, Nederlands Juristenblad 2628 (2009); Joseph Fleuren, Waarom het voorstel-Halsema superieur is, Nederlands Juristenblad 2630 (2009); Gerhard van der Schyff, Over een interpretatierichtsnoer en mythes, Nederlands Juristenblad 2632 (2009).Google Scholar

⁶² Why else would the Halsema Proposal resemble treaty review in so many ways? For example, supporting the review of civil and political rights, as opposed to socio-economic rights, as well as favoring decentralized review by the courts.Google Scholar

⁶³ See the doubts of P.A.M. Mevis, Constitutioneel toetsingsrecht: Zuinigheid in plaats van revolutie, 32 Delinkt en Delinkwent 933 (2002) who criticizes the Halsema Proposal for being too “stingy” instead of bringing about a “revolution”.Google Scholar