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³⁶ ibid 95–6.

³⁷ Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) ICJ Reports [1949] (hereafter Reparation).

³⁸ ibid 179.

³⁹ Kammerhofer, ‘Benefits’ (n 17) 36.

⁴⁰ ‘The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights’. Reparation (n 37) 178.

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⁷¹ ibid arts 4, 5 and 6.

⁷² ibid art 7.

⁷³ Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia, App No 48787/99 (ECtHR 2004) [319].

⁷⁴ I Tófalo, ‘Overt and Hidden Accomplices: Transnational Corporations’ Range of Complicity for Human Rights Violations’ in De Schutter, Transnational Corporations (n 2) 336–9; Arts 16–18, which deal with relations between two States have also been used by analogy vis-à-vis States and private entities: Ratner, S, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’ (2001) 111 YaleLJ 500–6Google Scholar.

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⁷⁷ ASRIWA (n 70) art 5.

⁷⁸ The ASRIWA do ‘not attempt to identify precisely the scope of “governmental activity”… what is regarded as “governmental” depends on the particular society, its history and traditions’. ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session’ (n 76) 43.

⁷⁹ Clapham, Human Rights Obligations (n 2) 3; Zerk (n 64) 77–8; Rosemann, N, ‘The Privatisation of Human Rights Violations – Business’ Impunity or Corporate Responsibility? The Case of Human Rights Abuses and Torture in Iraq’ (2005) 5 Non-State Actors and Intl L 77 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁸¹ ibid art 8.

⁸² ILC, ‘Report on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session’ (n 76) 47.

⁸³ Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v United States of America) ICJ Reports [1986] [109].

⁸⁴ In Tadić, the acts of an armed group were attributable where it ‘has a role in organizing, coordinating, or planning the military actions’, rather than controlling particular operations: Prosecutor v Tadić, (Appeals Chamber) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) 1541 [117], [137]; cf Bosnian Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) ICJ Reports [2007] [392] (hereafter, Bosnian Genocide).

⁸⁵ ILC, ‘Report on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session’ (n 76) 48.

⁸⁶ Ratner (n 74) 500.

⁸⁷ Cronogue (n 69) 365–88.

⁸⁸ Ratner (n 74) 493–4.

⁸⁹ Doe v Unocal Corp, 395 F. 3d 932 (9th Cir 2002); W Kaleck and M Saage-Maaβ, ‘Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations Amounting to International Crimes’ (2010) 8 JICJ 704; Tófalo (n 74) 339–48.

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⁹⁴ ASRIWA (n 70) art 16.

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⁹⁸ R Ago, Summary Record of the 1519th Meeting, UN Doc A/CN.4/SR1519 reprinted in [1978] 1 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1, 240; Similarly, the ILC stated: ‘aid or assistance in the commission of a wrongful act by another remains in international law, like complicity in internal law, an act separate from such commission, an act that is classified differently and that does not necessarily produce the same legal consequences’. Report of the ILC on the Work of Its Thirteenth Session, 8 May–28 July 1978, UN Doc A/33/10 reprinted in [1978] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Comm 2, 103 para 16; V Lanovoy, ‘Complicity in an Internationally Wrongful Act’ in Nollkaemper and Plakokefalos (n 63) 139–40.

⁹⁹ This situation is captured under ASRIWA (n 70) art 47.

¹⁰⁰ Nollkaemper and Jacobs (n 62) 396–7; Vandenhole, ‘Shared Responsibility’ (n 59) 60–1; J Fry, ‘Attribution of Responsibility’ in Nollkaemper and Plakokefalos (n 63) 99.

¹⁰¹ Nolte and Aust (n 96) 7–8; Crawford, ‘The ILC's Articles’ (n 68) 879.

¹⁰² Bosnian Genocide (n 84); Jackson (n 45) 202–3.

¹⁰³ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948) 78 UNTS 277, art 1.

¹⁰⁴ Bosnian Genocide (n 84) [167]; The approach was extended to art 3 of the Genocide Convention, which lists other punishable acts such as conspiracy, direct and public incitement, and attempt to commit genocide: Jackson (n 45) 203.

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¹⁰⁷ Jackson (n 45) 214.

¹⁰⁸ R Ago, ‘Seventh Report on State Responsibility’ 29 March, 17 April and 4 July 1978, UN Doc A/CN.4/307 1 UNYBILC 1, 55 para 63.

¹⁰⁹ Jackson (n 45) 210.

¹¹⁰ Gibney, M, ‘Litigating Transnational Human Rights Abuses’ in Vandenhole, W (ed), Challenging Territoriality in Human Rights Law: Building Blocks for a Plural and Diverse Duty-Bear Regime (Routledge 2015) 93Google Scholar.

¹¹¹ Aust (n 96) 195.

¹¹² ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session’ (n 76) 66 para 5.

¹¹³ Lowe, V, ‘Responsibility for the Conduct of other States’ (2002) 101 Japanese Journal of International Law 1, 11–12; Nolte and Aust (n 96) 10Google Scholar.

¹¹⁴ ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session’ (n 76) 67 para 10.

¹¹⁵ Lowe (n 113) 6; On the conduct of international organizations such as the IMF: Reinisch, A, ‘Aid or Assistance and Direction and Control between States and International Organizations in the Commission of Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (2010) 7 IOLR 67–73 Google Scholar.

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¹¹⁷ For the UK, assistance would include ‘planning with others … training others … agreeing Rules of Engagement [and] operational plans permitting the use of APM [anti-personnel landmines] … requests to non-State actors to use APM; and providing security or transport for APM’. United Kingdom Intervention on Article 1, Statement in the Standing Committee of 16 May 2003, <http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC_may03/speeches_gs/UK_Art_1.pdf>.

¹¹⁸ Jackson (n 45) 158; Nolte and Aust (n 96) 12.

¹¹⁹ Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) (18 September 1997) 2056 UNTS 211, art 1(1)(c).

¹²⁰ Cluster Munitions Convention (30 May 2008) 2688 UNTS 39, art 1(c).

¹²¹ Proposal by the United Kingdom for the Amendment of Article 1, CCM/14 (19 May 2008) <http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2013/01/CCM14_001.pdf>.

¹²² Bosnian Genocide (n 84) [432].

¹²³ Ago, ‘Seventh Report on State Responsibility’ (n 108) 53 para 57.

¹²⁴ Jackson (n 45) 211; Aust (n 96) 230.

¹²⁵ ‘An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State… can lead to the international responsibility of the State… because of the lack of due diligence to prevent or respond to it’. Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 4 (29 July 1988) [166]–[174]; Barnidge, RP, ‘The Due Diligence Principle under International Law’ (2006) 8 IntCLRev 81 Google Scholar.

¹²⁶ Aust (n 96) 230; Bosnian Genocide (n 84) [430].

¹²⁷ Aust (n 96) 231.

¹²⁸ Jackson (n 45) 160.

¹²⁹ Lanovoy (n 98) 140.

¹³⁰ Bolvin, A, ‘Complicity and Beyond: International Law and the Transfer of Small Arms and Light Weapons’ 87 (2005) IRRC 471 Google Scholar.

¹³¹ A State is only responsible if ‘the relevant State organ intended, by the aid or assistance given, to facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful conduct’. Crawford, J, The International Law Commissions Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge University Press 2002) 149 para 5; Nolte and Aust (n 96) 13–15; ibidGoogle Scholar.

¹³² For Lowe, it is ‘unlikely that a tribunal would permit a State to avoid responsibility by deliberately holding back from inquiring into clear indications that its aid would probably be employed in an unlawful manner’. Lowe (n 113) 10; Lanovoy (n 98) 153; Gibney, ‘Litigating Transnational Human Rights’ (n 110) 98.

¹³³ See generally: R Suda, ‘The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Human Rights Enforcement and Realisation’ in De Schutter, Transnational Corporations (n 2) 73.

¹³⁴ Bolvin (n 130) 471–2.

¹³⁵ Crawford, The ILC's Articles on State Responsibility (n 131) 13.

¹³⁶ It is interesting to note the variance between standards within the ASRIWA, art 41(2) providing a similar aid or assistance provision in relation to serious breaches of peremptory norms, without the requirement of intent or knowledge of the principal wrong: ASRIWA (n 70) art 41(2); E Wyler and L Castellanos-Jankiewicz, ‘Serious Breaches of Peremptory Norms’ in Nollkaemper and Plakokefalos (n 63) 284–311.

¹³⁷ Aust (n 96) 232.

¹³⁸ ibid 246.

¹³⁹ Velásquez Rodríguez (n 125).

¹⁴⁰ ibid [166].

¹⁴¹ Aust (n 96) 246.

¹⁴² ‘[I]t must be ascertained whether the acts of the individuals implicated in the incident in violating such fundamental rights … are attributable to the State … [I]t is sufficient to show that the infringement … has been supported or tolerated by the government.’ Riofrío Massacre, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report No 62/01 (6 April 2001) [48].

¹⁴³ ‘[T]he acts of private individuals involved in said acts can be attributed to the State … for which it is sufficient to prove that there has been support or tolerance by the public authorities in the breach of the rights embodied in the Convention.’ Mapiripán Massacre (Columbia) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 134 (15 September 2005) [98a].

¹⁴⁴ Jackson (n 45) 195.

¹⁴⁵ ibid 196.

¹⁴⁶ For extensive discussion: Aust (n 96) 230–49; ibid 159–62.

¹⁴⁷ Gibney, M, ‘Genocide and State Responsibility’ (2007) 7 HRLRev 760 Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁸ Gibney, ‘Litigating Transnational Human Rights Abuses’ (n 110) 110.

¹⁴⁹ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171, art 2(1).

¹⁵⁰ ‘An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State … can lead to the international responsibility of the State … because of the lack of due diligence to prevent or respond to it.’ Velásquez Rodríguez (n 125) at [166]–[174]; Barnidge, ‘The Due Diligence Principle under International Law’ (n 125) 81.

¹⁵¹ UN Human Rights Commission, ‘General Comment No 31 [80] – The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 para 8.

¹⁵² Hopu and Bessert v France, Communication 549/1993, UN Doc CPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev.1 (1997); Love et al v Australia, Communication 983/2001, UN Doc CCPR/C/77/983/2001 (2003); Ilmari Länsman et al v Finland, Communication 511/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994).

¹⁵³ Chief Bernard Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada, Communication 167/1984, UN Doc CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (1990).

¹⁵⁴ Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication 155/96 (2001).

¹⁵⁵ ibid at [67].

¹⁵⁶ Karavias, Corporate Obligations (n 2) 49–52.

¹⁵⁷ Zegveld, L, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (CUP 2002) 182CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵⁸ Karavias, Corporate Obligations (n 2) 12.

¹⁵⁹ Lauterpacht, H, Private Law Analogies in International Law (1926)Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁰ Gibney, ‘Litigating Transnational Human Rights Abuses’ (n 110) 96–7.

¹⁶¹ Vandenhole, ‘Shared Responsibility’ (n 59) 68–9; ‘It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in adequate form.’ Chorzów Factory Case (Claim for Indemnity; jurisdiction) (Germany v Poland), 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A) No 9, 21.

¹⁶² Brownlie, I, Principles of Public International Law (OUP 2008) 436; Wyler and Castellanos-Jankiewicz (n 136) 303Google Scholar.

¹⁶³ ‘“Public” and “Private” are indistinguishable; the treaty is an undifferentiated instrument, and so is the law of responsibility.’ Crawford, ‘The ILC's Articles’ (n 68) 878.

¹⁶⁴ Nollkaemper and Jacobs (n 62) 398–9.

¹⁶⁵ Noyes and Smith (n 12) 226.

¹⁶⁶ Alford, R, ‘Apportioning Responsibility Among Joint Tortfeasors for International Law Violations’ (2011) 38 PeppLRev 233, 240–6Google Scholar; Oil Platforms (Iran v US) (Separate opinion of Judge Simma) ICJ Reports [2003] 197–201 at [65]–[76].

¹⁶⁷ While Brownlie disputed the relevance of this principle in international law, scholars have provided detailed accounts of its prevalence in Western common law and civil jurisdictions, Eastern jurisdictions and Islamic law: Brownlie, I, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility (Clarendon Press 1983) 189; Noyes and Smith (n 12) 249–58Google Scholar; Verheyen, R, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility (Martinus Nijhoff 2005) 270–2Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁸ Statute of the International Court of Justice, as annexed to Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 38(1)(c); Noyes and Smith (n 12) 250.

¹⁶⁹ Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (29 March 1972) 961 UNTS 187.

¹⁷⁰ ibid art 5.

¹⁷¹ ibid art 4.

¹⁷² ibid art 4(2).

¹⁷³ Noyes and Smith (n 12) 259.

¹⁷⁴ In Martini, a State's compensation payment was vastly reduced to reflect the independent acts of revolutionaries during the Venezuelan civil war which contributed significantly to the injury incurred: Martini Case (Italy v Venezuela) 10 RIAA 666–8.

¹⁷⁵ Plakokefalos, I, ‘Shared Responsibility Aspects of the Dispute Settlement Procedures in the Law of the Sea Convention’ (2013) 4 JIDS 396 Google Scholar.

¹⁷⁶ Karavias, Corporate Obligations (n 2) 157–63; SL Seck, ‘ITLOS Case No 17 and the Evolving Principles for Corporate Accountability under International Law’ in Gal-Or, Ryngaert and Noortmann (n 17) 243–5.

¹⁷⁷ Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982) 1833 UNTS 3, art 139(2) (hereafter, UNCLOS).

¹⁷⁸ Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with

Respect to Activities in the Area (No 17) (Advisory Opinion of 01 February 2011) 11 ITLOS Rep 2011 10, 201 (hereafter, ITLOS Case No 17).

¹⁷⁹ ASRIWA (n 70) art 47; While this provision may appear to mirror the concept of joint and several liability in the ASRIWA, the ILC advises to make such an analogy ‘with care’: ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session’ (n 76) 124 para 3; Verheyen (n 167) 268–76.

¹⁸⁰ ITLOS Case No 17 (n 178) at [192].

¹⁸¹ Plakokefalos (n 175) 397–8.

¹⁸² Fry (n 100) 128–133.

¹⁸³ Plakokefalos (n 175) 397.

¹⁸⁴ ITLOS Case No 17 (n 178) at [204].

¹⁸⁵ Vandenhole, ‘Shared Responsibility’ (n 59) 70.

¹⁸⁶ UNCLOS (n 177) art 139(2).

¹⁸⁷ A Nollkaemper, ‘The Seabed Disputes Chamber’ (SHARES Project, 25 November 2011) <http://www.sharesproject.nl/the-seabed-disputes-chamber-clarified-the-meaning-of-joint-and-several-liability-but-also-raised-new-questions/>.

¹⁸⁸ UNCLOS (n 177) art 22 Annexe 3.

¹⁸⁹ Nollkaemper, ‘The Seabed Disputes Chamber’ (n 187); Brown, ED, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime (Martinus Nijhoff 2001) 144Google Scholar.

¹⁹⁰ Noyes and Smith (n 12) 234–5, 258–9; Note the compulsory dispute settlement regime under UNCLOS (n 177) art 287.

¹⁹¹ Plakokefalos (n 175) 404.

¹⁹² ibid 401.

¹⁹³ Okowa (n 60) 196–7; States have ‘diplomatic and other legal means as a substitute’ in the absence of an express regime in international law for joint tortfeasors to recover damages: Verheyen (n 167) 277.

¹⁹⁴ Nollkaemper and Jacobs (n 62) 423.

¹⁹⁵ JG Ruggie, ‘A UN Business and Human Rights Treaty?’ (Harvard Kennedy School, 28 January 2014) 3 <https:// www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/UNBusinessandHumanRightsTreaty.pdf>; M Addo, UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations: Paving the Way for a Legally Binding Instrument’ (Geneva, 11–12 March 2014) 4 <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/WGStatementEcuadorWorkshop12Mar2014.pdf>.

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¹⁹⁸ United Nations Convention against Corruption (31 October 2003) UN Doc A/58/422, art 26.

¹⁹⁹ ‘Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary … to establish the liability of legal persons’ (emphasis added) ibid.

²⁰⁰ Nollkaemper, A, ‘Responsibility of Transnational Corporations in International Environmental Law: Three Perspectives’ in Winter, G (ed), Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental Change – Perspectives from Science, Sociology and Law (CUP 2006) 196Google Scholar.

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²⁰² Clapham, A, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (OUP 1993) 205; ibidGoogle Scholar.

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²⁰⁴ Karavias, Corporate Obligations (n 2) 170.

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²⁰⁷ ‘Because human rights situations are dynamic, assessments of human rights impacts should be undertaken at regular intervals.’ UNGPs (n 1) Commentary to Principle 18.

²⁰⁸ ‘The exercise of jurisdiction is a necessary condition for a Contracting State to be able to be held responsible for acts or omissions imputable to it which would give rise to an allegation of the infringement of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention.’ Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom, App No 55721/07 (ECtHR 2011) at [130] (hereafter, Al-Skeini); Karavias, Corporate Obligations (n 2) 85–9.

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²¹¹ W Vandenhole, ‘Obligations and Responsibility in a Plural and Diverse Duty-Bearer Human Rights Regime’ in Vandenhole (n 110) 121 (original emphasis).

²¹² Ratner (n 74) 525.

²¹³ ibid 525–6.

²¹⁴ Human Rights Council, ‘Clarifying the Concepts of “Sphere of influence” and “Complicity”’, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, UN Doc A/HRC/8/16, 6 para 15.

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²²⁰ S Deva, ‘Scope of the Legally Binding Instrument’ (n 3).

²²¹ Karavias, ‘Shared Responsibility’ (n 61) 113.

²²² UNGPs (n 1) Principle 17(a); S Michalowski, ‘Due Diligence and Complicity: A Relationship in Need of Clarification’ in Deva and Bilchitz (n 197) 218–42; S Deva, ‘Treating Human Rights Lightly: A Critique of the Consensus Rhetoric and Language Employed by the Guiding Principles’ in Deva and Bilchitz (n 197) 98–101.

²²³ UNGPs (n 1) Commentary to Principle 17.

²²⁴ Human Rights Council, ‘Clarifying the Concepts’ (n 214) 4.

²²⁵ ibid 6, paras 10–13.

²²⁶ Karavias, Corporate Obligations (n 2) 173.

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²²⁹ Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v United Kingdom, App No 61498/08 (ECtHR 2009); Al-Skeini (n 208); Medvedyev and Others v France, App No 3394/03 (ECtHR 2010).

²³⁰ ‘The Court does not consider that jurisdiction… arose solely from the control exercised by the contracting state over the buildings, aircraft or ship in which the individuals were held. What is decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and control over the person in question.’ Al-Skeini (n 208) at [136] (emphasis added); Andreou v Turkey, App No 45653/99 (ECtHR 2009) at [25].

²³¹ In Jamaa the ‘custody’ requirement was effectively resurrected: Jamaa and Others v Italy, App No 22765/09 (ECtHR 2012) at [73]; In Jaloud, jurisdiction was established on the basis of the use of force by State agents, but Dutch control of the checkpoint at which the acts occurred was also critical: Jaloud v The Netherlands, App No 47708/08 (ECtHR 2015) at [152].

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²³³ Karavias, Corporate Obligations (n 2) 174.

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²³⁷ Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 18 December 2002) 2375 UNTS 237, art 11.

²³⁸ A Dolidze, ‘The Arctic Sunrise and NGOs in International Judicial Proceedings’ (2014) 18(1) ASIL Insights <http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/1/arctic-sunrise-and-ngos-international-judicial-proceedings> International Status of South West Africa (Advisory Opinion, Pleadings) ICJ Reports [1949] 324 is the sole instance in which the ICJ has permitted an amicus brief from an NGO (the International League for Human Rights); GI Hernández, ‘Non-State Actors from the Perspective of the International Court of Justice’ in d'Aspremont, Multiple Perspectives (n 17) 140–63; S Tully, Corporations and International Lawmaking (Martinus Nijhoff 2007) 242–5.

²³⁹ Ruggie, ‘A UN Business and Human Rights Treaty?’ (n 195); P Muchlinski, ‘Beyond the Guiding Principles? Examining New Calls for a Legally Binding Instrument on Business and Human Rights’ (Institute for Business and Human Rights, 15 October 2013) <http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/guest/beyond-the-guiding-principles.html>.

²⁴⁰ A Kassam, ‘Spain's campaigning judge seeks change in law to prosecute global corporations’ (Guardian, 20 August 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/20/spain-judge-baltasar-garzon-prosecute-global-corporations>.

²⁴¹ Clapham, Human Rights Obligations (n 2) 245–7; C Chiomenti, ‘Corporations and the International Criminal Court’ in De Schutter, Transnational Corporations (n 2) 306–7.

²⁴² Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court and Draft Final Act, UN Doc A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, arts 23, 49 para 5.

²⁴³ Clapham, Human Rights Obligations (n 2) 246.

²⁴⁴ O De Schutter, ‘The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European Law’ in Alston, Non-State Actors (n 18) 232.

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²⁴⁸ Chiomenti (n 241) 292.

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²⁵⁰ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/9, art 28(b) (hereafter, ICC Statute)

²⁵¹ McBeth (n 67) 308; ibid art 28(b).

²⁵² Prosecutor v Musema (Trial Chamber) ICTR-96-13-A (27 January 2000) at [247].

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²⁵⁷ C Cronstedt and D Rönnegard, ‘International Tribunal on Business & Human Rights – Reshaping the Judiciary’ (September 2013) <http://www.l4bb.org/news/tribunal.pdf>.

²⁵⁸ ibid.

²⁵⁹ ‘Any inter-governmental and non-governmental organization, including any business corporation, which has made a specific declaration in accordance with article 37, shall fully cooperate with the Court in any proceedings.’ Nowak and Kozma (n 256) art 33.

²⁶⁰ Plakokefalos (n 175) 398.

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²⁶⁴ ibid 224.

²⁶⁵ ibid 227.

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