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‘Stand up like a Taiwanese!’: PRC coercion and public preferences for resistance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2023

Ja Ian Chong Open the ORCID record for Ja Ian Chong[Opens in a new window] ,
David W. F. Huang  and
Wen-Chin Wu Open the ORCID record for Wen-Chin Wu[Opens in a new window]
Ja Ian Chong
Affiliation:
National University of Singapore, Singapore
David W. F. Huang
Affiliation:
Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
Wen-Chin Wu*
Affiliation:
Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: wenchinwu@sinica.edu.tw
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Abstract

Taiwan's opposition to PRC demands such as acceptance of the ‘92 Consensus’ and ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula since 2016 has invited a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, designed to coerce Taiwan into compliance. Given the stark asymmetry in economic size, military capability, and diplomatic status, Taiwan provides a case for studying coercive diplomacy that takes the form of threats to punish. Material differences suggest that Taiwan should capitulate, and ‘cheap talk’ theses expect PRC threats to have no discernible effect, while balance of threat arguments expect resolve. In this article, we use the survey data collected in the 2016, 2019, and 2020 rounds of the Taiwan National Security Study to examine how Taiwanese respond to China's intensifying and expanding threats. Our paper identifies four strategies that the public sees as responses to PRC coercion: isolation, bandwagon with China, balance against China by allying with the USA and Japan, and hedge by deepening economic ties with China while aligning with the USA and Japan against China. We show that the popular support for balancing against China rises as PRC coercion grows and Taiwanese citizens increasingly perceive China to be a threat. Our findings imply that citizens in a liberal democracy can develop the will to pushback against pressure from an authoritarian regime despite sharp asymmetries in capabilities and material limitations.

Keywords

Chinacross-Strait relationsIR theorysurveyTaiwan
Type
Research Article
Information
Japanese Journal of Political Science , First View , pp. 1 - 22
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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