This paper advances the concept of a policy conspiracy – perpetrators strive together to steer the policy process in a direction which they believe to be worthwhile and possible. A policy conspiracy is conceived as an exclusive social network of policy participants who commit themselves to the advancement of a policy quest which embodies their shared hopes and who promote one another to positions of influence on the basis of the mutual trust they develop through regular interaction. The degree to which the network of technocrats, technopols and change agents who played a pivotal role in the implementation and consolidation of the ‘New Zealand experiment’ between 1984 and 1993 exhibit these characteristics is considered. By examining the way this policy conspiracy took advantage of a significant window of opportunity for reform, this paper seeks to make a contribution to the literature concerned with the conditions for radical policy reform.

Within the advanced capitalist world, Japan and France have normally been the main examples of strong, interventionist states. From the 1960s onwards, government policy in each nation attempted to cultivate a domestically based computer industry in response to American dominance. This seemed to be parallel cases of strong states attempting to target an industry in order to catch up. However, by the start of the 1980s it was clear that French policy had failed, whereas Japan was relatively successful. We explain this difference by stressing that Japanese policy was ultimately more market conforming. This occurred because Japanese companies were less dependent on government financing and procurement for their business compared to French counterparts. In short, the Japanese state had less power over its domestic computer companies than did the French state. This national difference in ‘state strength’, i.e., state-business power relations, accounts for a negotiated pattern of industrial restructuring in Japan compared to the predominantly state-led pattern in France.

Military administrators in sub-Saharan Africa often appoint civilian political elites to cabinet positions for the following reasons: to advance effective governance, as a response to demands for transition to civilian rule, and as a political technique to civilianize the military regime. Empirical patterns of civilian cabinet appointments by the types of post-military political regimes show that the nature of civilian involvement in military administration is a valid predictor of the types of regime likely to follow military rule. Further findings confer some historical insights to the programmed and the national conference models of democratization in the region. In addition, military administrative analysis is a way to gain new insights into military transition in the region.

The United Kingdom's system of utility regulation – controlling prices rather than profits – is under increasing criticism. At the same time, the government continues to employ rate of return controls when purchasing from the defence and pharmaceutical industries. The existence of alternative regulatory regimes raises three questions. First, has price cap regulation enabled the UK utilities to earn excessive profits? Second, has profit regulation prevented excessive profitability in the defence and pharmaceutical industries? Third, how does profitability compare between price cap (utilities) and rate of return (defence/pharmaceuticals) regulation? Our results suggest that three of the four utilities studied have been able to earn rates of return that are considerably greater than in the corporate sector as a whole. Price caps have been far too lenient. In defence and pharmaceuticals there is less evidence of excessive profitability but these suppliers still earn 25 per cent more than comparable firms elsewhere.

Many countries have experimented with decentralization and privatization policies in hopes of increasing public sector efficiency. This article explores the impact of decentralization and privatization of education in Chile. Decentralization did have some benefits such as improved administrative efficiency and greater productive efficiency. However, government size, as measured by the total personnel working in the education sector, increased under decentralization. Privatization of education in Chile created a type of voucher system. Although educators are more accountable to parents who compare products, the greatest problem is that schools do not necessarily respond to competition by promoting better quality education. Comparisons of student performance in public and private schools in Chile is not conclusive, but national average scores have not risen even though private provision of education has expanded dramatically while public education has waned. Finally, both decentralization and privatization resulted in greater inequity in expenditures and in the performance of students from different income groups.