Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-wzw2p Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-11T00:07:46.375Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Multiple Large Shareholder Structure and Governance: The Role of Shareholder Numbers, Contest for Control, and Formal Institutions in Chinese Family Firms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 February 2015

Jin-hui Luo
Affiliation:
Xiamen University, China
Di-fang Wan
Affiliation:
Xi'an Jiaotong University, China
Di Cai
Affiliation:
Xi'an Jiaotong University, China
Heng Liu
Affiliation:
Sun Yat-sen University, China
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

The principal–principal (PP) perspective of corporate governance shows that multiple large shareholder (MLS) structure has competing monitoring and entrenchment governance effects. We argue that the dominant effect depends on contest for control among large shareholders and the number of large shareholders involved. Using data from Chinese family listed companies from 2004 to 2007, this study shows inverse U-shaped relationships between contest for control and corporate market value, as measured by Tobin's Q, and between the number of large shareholders and corporate market value. Findings indicate that at low to medium levels of contest for control or number of large shareholders, formal institutions can strengthen MLS structure's monitoring effect and can help this effect last longer. As a whole, the findings extend the institution-based view in the context of family corporate governance by showing that formal institutions can shape the ability of MLS structure to exert governance.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © International Association for Chinese Management Research 2013

References

Aguilera, R., & Jackson, G. 2003. The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: Dimensions and determinants. Academy of Management Review, 28(3): 447465.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. 1991. Multiple regression; Testing and interpreting interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.Google Scholar
Allen, F., Qian, J., & Qian, M. 2005. Law, finance, and economic growth in China. Journal of Financial Economics, 77(1): 57116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance, 58(3): 13011328.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Attig, N., Ghoul, S. E., & Gucdhami, O. 2009. Do multiple large shareholders play a corporate governance role: Evidence from East Asia. Journal of Financial Research, 32(4): 395422.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bai, C. E., Liu, Q, Lu, J., Song, F. M., & Zhang, J. 2004. Corporate governance and market valuation in China. Journal of Comparative Economics, 32(4): 599616.Google Scholar
Bennedsen, M., & Wolfenzon, D. 2000. The balance of power in closely held corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1/2): 113139.Google Scholar
Berglöf, E., & Pajuste, A. 2003. Emerging owners, eclipsing markets? Corporate governance in Central and Eastern Europe. In Cornelius, P. K. & Kogut, B. (Eds.), Corporate governance and capital flows in a global economy: 267303. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Bloch, F., & Hege, U. 2001. Multiple shareholders and control contests. Working Paper, Aix-Marseille University.Google Scholar
Cai, D., Luo, J.-H., & Wan, D.-F. 2012. Family CEOs: Do they benefit firm performance in China? Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 29(4): 923947.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Canarella, G., & Gasparyan, A. 2008. New insights into executive compensation and firm performance: Evidence from a panel of ‘new economy’ firms, 1996-2002. Managerial Finance, 34(8): 537554.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carney, M., & Gedajlovic, E. 2002. The coupling of ownership and control and the allocation of financial resources: Evidence from Hong Kong. Journal of Management Studies, 39(1): 123146.Google Scholar
Chang, S. J. 2003. Ownership structure, expropriation, and value of group-affiliated companies in Korea. Academy of Management Journal, 46(2): 238253.Google Scholar
Chen, C. C., Chen, X. P., & Huang, S. 2013. Chinese guanxi: An integrative review and future research directions. Management and Organization Review, 9(1): 167207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chen, G., Firth, M., & Xu, L. 2009. Does the type of ownership control matter? Evidence from China's listed companies. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(1): 171181.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chen, V. Z., Li, J., & Shapiro, D. M. 2011. Are OECD-prescribed ‘good corporate governance practices’ really good in an emerging economy? Asia Pacific Journal of Manage ment, 28(1): 115138.Google Scholar
Chen, Y. Y., & Young, M. N. 2010. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions by Chinese listed companies: A principal-principal perspective. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(3): 523539.Google Scholar
Chen, Z., & Xiong, P. 2002. The illiquidity discount in China, Working Paper, International Center for Financial Research, Yale University, New York, USA.Google Scholar
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1): 81112.Google Scholar
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J., & Lang, L. 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment e fleets of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance, 57(6): 27412771.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Claessens, S., & Fan, J. P. H. 2002. Corporate governance in Asia: A survey. International Review of Finance, 3(2): 71103.Google Scholar
Dharwaclkar, R.; George, G., & Brandes, P. 2000. Privatization in emerging economies: An agency theory perspective. Academy of Management Review, 25(3): 650669.Google Scholar
Ding, Y., Zhang, H., & Zhang, J. 2007. Private vs. state ownership and earnings management: Evidence from Chinese listed companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(2): 223238.Google Scholar
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. 2004. Private benefits of control: An international comparison. Journal of Finance, 59(2): 537600.Google Scholar
Faccio, M., & Lang, L. 2002. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 65(3): 365395.Google Scholar
Faccio, M., Lang, L., & Young, L. 2001. Dividends and expropriation. The American Economic Review, 91(1): 5478.Google Scholar
Fan, G., Wang, X., & Zhu, H. 2010. NERI Index of Marketization of China's Provinces. Beijing: Economics Science Press (in Chinese).Google Scholar
Fan, J. P. H., Wong, T. J., & Zhang, T. 2005. The emergence of corporate pyramids in China. Working Paper. Hong Kong, China: The Chinese University of Hong Kong.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fan, J. P. H., Huang, J., Morck, R., & Yeung, B. 2008. Vertical integration, institutional determinants and impact: Evidence from China. Working Paper. Hong Kong, China: The Chinese University of Hong Kong.Google Scholar
Fang, T. 2010. Asian management research needs more self-confidence: Reflection on Hofstede (2007) and beyond. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(1): 155170.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Firth, M., Lin, C., Liu, P., & Wong, S. M. L. 2009. Inside the black box: Bank credit allocation in China's private sector. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(6): 11441155.Google Scholar
Friedman, E., Johnson, S., & Mitton, T. 2003. Propping and tunneling. Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4): 732750.Google Scholar
Gomes, A., & Novaes, W. 2001. Sharing of control as a corporate governance mechanism. SSRN Working Paper.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greene, W. H. 1993. Econometric analysis. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Grossman, S., & Hart, O. 1980. Takeover bids, the free rider problem, and the theory of the corporation. Bell Journal of Economics, 11(1): 4269.Google Scholar
Gutiérrez, L. H., & Pombo, C. 2009. Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia. Journal of Economics and Business, 61(2): 112139.Google Scholar
Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. 2004. Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(4): 725740.Google Scholar
Heugens, P., van Essen, M., & van Oosterhout, J. 2009. Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26(3): 481512.Google Scholar
Hoskisson, R. E., Eden, L., Lau, C. M., & Wright, M. 2000. Strategy in emerging economies. Academy of Management Journal, 43(3): 249267.Google Scholar
Hu, H. W., Tam, O. K., & Tan, M. G.-S. 2010. Internal governance mechanisms and firm performance in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(4): 727749.Google Scholar
Huang, M. 2010. Annual report of non-state-ovoned economy in China No. 7 (2009-2010). Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China).Google Scholar
Janssen, O. 2001. Fairness perceptions as a moderator in the curvilinear relationships between job demands, and job performance and job satisfaction. Academy of Management Journal, 44(5): 10391050.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4): 305360.Google Scholar
Jiang, Y., & Peng, M. W. 2011. Principal-principal conflicts during crisis. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28(4): 683695.Google Scholar
Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 2000. Tunneling. The American Economic Review 90(2): 2227.Google Scholar
Kahn, C., & Wintern, A. 1998. Ownership structure, speculation, and shareholder intervention. Journal of Finance, 53(1): 99129.Google Scholar
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 2002. Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of Finance, 57(3): 11471170.Google Scholar
Laeven, L., & Levine, R. 2008. Complex ownership structures and corporate valuations. Review of Financial Studies, 21(2): 579604.Google Scholar
Le Breton-Miller, I., & Miller, D. 2009. Agency vs. stewardship in public family firms: A social embeddedness reconciliation. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(6): 11691191.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leung, K. 2012. Indigenous Chinese management research: Like it or not, we need it. Management and Organization Revietv, 8(1): 15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Li, J. J., Poppo, L., & Zhou, K. Z. 2008. Do managerial ties in China always produce value? Competition, uncertainty, and domestic vs. foreign firms. Strategic Management Journal, 29(4): 383400.Google Scholar
Li, K., Yue, H., & Zhao, L. 2009. Ownership, institutions, and capital structure: Evidence from China. Journal of Compara tive Economics, 37(3): 471490.Google Scholar
Li, Y., Guo, H., Yi, Y., & Liu, Y. 2010. Ownership concentration and product innovation in Chinese firms: The mediating role oflearning orientation. Management and Organization Reviews 6(1): 77100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Liu, H., Lu, Y., & Song, L. 2009. Tunneling of large shareholders; Co-monitoring or competitive colluding? China Accounting Review, 7(1): 97112 (in Chinese).Google Scholar
Luo, J.-H., Wan, D.-F., & Cai, D. 2012a. The private benefits of control in Chinese listed firms: Do cash flow rights always reduce controlling shareholders' tunneling? Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 29(2): 499518.Google Scholar
Luo, Y., Huang, Y., & Wang, S. L. 2012b. Guanxi and organizational performance: A meta-analysis. Management and Organization Review, 8(1): 139172.Google Scholar
Luo, Y., & Peng, M. W. 1999. Learning to compete in a transition economy: Experience, environment, and performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 30(2): 269296.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
March, J. 2005. Parochialism in the evolution of a research community: The case of organization studies. Management and Organization Revievu, 1(1): 522.Google Scholar
Maury, B., & Pajuste, A. 2005. Multiple large shareholders and firm value. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(7): 18131834.Google Scholar
Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D., & Yeung, B. 2005. Corporate governance, economic entrenchment, and growth. Journal of Economic Literature, 43(3): 655720.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, D. C. 1990. Institutions, institutional change, and economic preference. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
North, D. C. 2005. Understanding the process of institutional change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Pagano, M., & Roell, A. 1998. The choice of stock ownership structure: Agency costs, monitoring, and the decision to go public. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1): 187225.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pan, H., & Yu, M. 2010. Soft budget constraint and expropriation: Evidence from privately-owned firms in China. CFRN Working Paper. Wuhan, China: Economics and Management School, Wuhan University.Google Scholar
Peng, M. W. 2003. Institutional transitions and strategic choices. Academy of Management Review, 28(2): 275296.Google Scholar
Peng, M. W. 2004. Outside directors and firm performance during institutional transitions. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 453471.Google Scholar
Peng, M. W., & Jiang, Y. 2010. Institutions behind family ownership and control in large firms. Journal of Management Studies, 47(2): 253273.Google Scholar
Peng, M. W., Sun, S. L., Pinkham, B., & Chen, H. 2009. The institution-based view as a third leg for a strategy tripod. Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(3): 6381.Google Scholar
Peng, M. W., Zhang, S., & Li, X. 2007. CEO duality and firm performance during China's institutional transitions. Management and Organization Review, 3(2): 205225.Google Scholar
Rozelff, M. S. 1982. Growth, beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios. Journal of Financial Research, 5(3): 249259.Google Scholar
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52(2): 737783.Google Scholar
Su, Y., Xu, D., & Phan, P. H. 2008. Principal-principal conflict in the governance of the Chinese public corporation. Management and Organization Review, 4(1): 1738.Google Scholar
Suhomlinova, O. 2006. Towards a model of organizational co-evolution in transition economics. Journal of Management Studies, 43(7): 15371558.Google Scholar
Tan, J., & Peng, M. W. 2003. Organizational slack and firm performance during economic transitions: Two studies from an emerging economy. Strategic Management Journal, 24(13): 12491263.Google Scholar
Tian, L., & Estrin, S. 2008. Retained state shareholdings in Chinese PLCs: Does government ownership always reduce corporate value? Journal of Comparative Economics, 36(1): 7489.Google Scholar
Tsui, A. S. 2006. Contextualization in Chinese management research. Management and Organization Review, 2(1): 113.Google Scholar
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. 2006. How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2): 385417.Google Scholar
Wang, Q., Wong, T. J.; & Xia, L. 2008. State ownership, the institutional environment, and auditor choice: Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 46(1): 112134.Google Scholar
Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., Hoskisson, R., & Peng, M. W. 2005. Strategy research in emerging economics: Challenging the conventional wisdom. Journal of Management Studies, 42(1): 133.Google Scholar
Yeh, Y. 2005. Do controlling shareholders enhance corporate value? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(2): 313325.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yoshikawa, T., Phan, P. H., & David, P. 2005. The impact of ownership structure on wage intensity in Japanese corporations. Journal of Management, 31(2): 278300.Google Scholar
Yoshikawa, T., & Rasheed, A. A. 2010. Family control and ownership monitoring in family-controlled firms m Japan. Journal of Management Studies, 47(2): 274295.Google Scholar
Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. 2008. Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal-principal perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45(1): 196220.Google Scholar
Zwiebel, J. 1995. Block investment and partial benefits of corporate control. Reviezv of Economic Studies, 62(2): 161185.Google Scholar