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“H Newman” and Ludwig Wittgenstein: Re-evaluating the History of John Henry Newman's Philosophical Reception
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
Abstract
It is commonly held that that the dominance of logical positivism, in the early part of the twentieth-century, hindered Newman's philosophical recognition. However, commentators also argue that Newman's writing began to gain wider recognition following Wittgenstein's reference to “H Newman” (1969) in the posthumous publication of On Certainty. This essay explores whether or not this version of the history of Newman's philosophical reception rings true – exploring whether or not the reference to “H Newman” really marks a watershed for Newman's philosophical legacy.
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- Copyright © 2019 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers
Footnotes
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I would like to dedicate this article to my mentor the late Mervyn Davies – a “St. Andrew” in Newman scholarship: John Henry Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, 8 Vols (London: Longmans, Green, 1907–1909), II, 3.
References
1 The prevalence of logical positivism during this period in Anglophone philosophy as argued by Garcia: ‘From the 1920s to the 1960s, large tracts of English-speaking philosophy labored under the shadow of logical positivism and its verification criterion of meaning. Positivism is evidentialism for the twentieth-century; empirical certitude extends only to what is immediately presented to sense experience (sense-data), and statements that cannot be verified falsified by such evidence are…meaningless.’ Garcia, Laura L, ‘Catholic Philosophical Theology,’ in Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. Meister, C & Copan, P (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 525-534, at p. 530Google Scholar.
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