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Approximative Explanation is Deductive-Nomological

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

David Pearce  and
Veikko Rantala
David Pearce
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy, Free University of Berlin
Veikko Rantala
Affiliation:
Academy of Finland Helsinki
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Abstract

We revive the idea that a deductive-nomological explanation of a scientific theory by its successor may be defensible, even in those common and troublesome cases where the theories concerned are mutually incompatible; and limiting, approximating and counterfactual assumptions may be required in order to define a logical relation between them. Our solution is based on a general characterization of limiting relations between physical theories using the method of nonstandard analysis.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 52 , Issue 1 , March 1985 , pp. 126 - 140
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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