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Inductive Immodesty and Lawlikeness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Juhani Pietarinen*
Affiliation:
University of Turku

Extract

David Lewis [2] suggests that an adequate inductive method should be immodest, i.e. recommend itself as at least as accurate as any of its rivals. On this basis he works out a solution to the intricate problem of choosing among Carnap's λ-methods. Lewis himself points out certain undesirable consequences of his solution. I will argue that the solution breaks down for a more general reason than that indicated by Lewis; like other procedures for estimating degrees of belief I am familiar with, it overlooks the component of lawlikeness of inductive situations. This is not to object to the requirement of immodesty; I only want to draw attention to certain assumptions which Lewis makes in deriving his equations and which seem to be unjustified.

Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © 1974 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

[1] Carnap, R.Inductive Logic and Inductive Intuition.” in The Problem of Inductive Logic. Edited by Lakatos, I. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1968. Pages 258267.10.1016/S0049-237X(08)71047-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Lewis, D.Immodest Inductive Methods.” Philosophy of Science 38 (1971): 5463.10.1086/288339CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] Pietarinen, J. Lawlikeness, Analogy, and Inductive Logic. Acta Philosophica Fennica 26. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1972.Google Scholar