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Structural Decision Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Tung-Ying Wu
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Abstract

Judging an act’s causal efficacy plays a crucial role in causal decision theory. A recent development appeals to the causal modeling framework with an emphasis on the analysis of intervention based on the causal Bayes net for clarifying what causally depends on our acts. However, few writers have focused on exploring the usefulness of extending structural causal models to decision problems that are not ideal for intervention analysis. The thesis concludes that structural models provide a more general framework for rational decision makers.

Type
Decision Theory and Formal Epistemology
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 88 , Issue 5 , December 2021 , pp. 951 - 960
Copyright
Copyright 2021 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Chuang Liu and Malcolm Forster for helpful suggestions and comments.

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