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Trading integrity for competence? The public's varying preferences for bureaucratic types across government levels in China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 April 2023

Lin Zhu  and
Feng Yang Open the ORCID record for Feng Yang [Opens in a new window]
Lin Zhu
Affiliation:
Center for Chinese Public Administration Research, School of Government, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China
Feng Yang*
Affiliation:
Center for Social Research, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing, China
*
*Corresponding author. Email: yangfengnk@gmail.com
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Abstract

People's willingness to forgive corrupt government officials has intrigued many researchers. According to a prominent explanation, citizens tolerate corrupt officials in exchange for their ability to deliver public benefits, such as promoting economic development. We contextualize this corruption–competence tradeoff thesis by assessing individuals' evaluations of local officials in China. We conduct a nationwide vignette experiment with 5527 citizens, and find that the corruption–competence tradeoff exists and is hierarchical. Respondents prefer competent but corrupt low-level officials over those who are honest but incompetent, but this relative preference vanishes when they evaluate high-level local officials. Our interviews reveal that proximity to citizens and position in the power hierarchy primarily drive citizens' sophisticated assessments of officials at different levels.

Keywords

Chinacompetencecorruptiongovernment officials
Type
Original Article
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 11 , Issue 4 , October 2023 , pp. 877 - 892
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the European Political Science Association

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