Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-nmvwc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-14T00:01:06.400Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Probabilistic Causality and Multiple Causation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 March 2022

Paul Humphreys
Paul Humphreys*
Affiliation:
The University of Virginia
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

I shall argue in this paper that although much attention has been paid to causal chains and common causes within the literature on probabilistic causality, a primary virtue of that approach is its ability to deal with cases of multiple causation. In doing so I shall try to indicate some ways in which contemporary sine qua non analyses of causation are too narrow Cand ways in which probabilistic causality is not) and refine an argument by Relchenbach designed to provide a basis for the asymmetry of causation.

In his contribution to this symposium (Salmon 1981) Professor Salmon has emphasized the central role played by processes and interactions in causality. Whereas his discussion of common causes naturally has a futuristic orientation using causal fans of the type given in Fig. 1.,

I shall be rather more backwards-looking and concentrate on the advantages that probabilistic causation possesses for the analysis of multiple causes of the type in Fig. 2.

Type
Part I. Probability and Causality
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1980 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1980 , 1980 , pp. 25 - 37
Copyright
Copyright © 1981 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

1

This paper is a revised version of one presented as part of a symposium on probabilistic causality. The other symposiasts were Nancy Cartwright and Wesley Salmon. The original paper was read in my absence by James Fetzer.

References

Blalock, H.M. Jr., (1962). “Four-Variable Causal Models and Partial Correlations.” American Journal of Sociology 68: 182-194.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cartwright, N.D. (1979). “Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61; 75-84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duncan, O.D. (1975). Introduction to Structural Equation Models. New York: Academic Press.Google Scholar
Goosens, W.K. (1979). “Causal Chains and Counterfactuals.” Journal of Philosophy 76: 489-495.Google Scholar
Humphreys, P.W. (1980). “Cutting the Causal Chain.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61: 305-314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Humphreys, P.W. (1981). “Aleatory Explanation.” Synthese 48: 225-232.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D.K. (1973). “Causation.” Journal of Philosophy 70: 556-567. (As reprinted in Sosa, E. (ed.). (1975) Causation and Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pages 180-191.).Google Scholar
Loeb, L. (1974). “Causal Theories and Causal Overdetermination.” Journal of Philosophy 71; 525-544.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mackie, J.L. (1974). The Cement of the Universe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Reichenbach, H. (1956). The Direction of Time. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Rosen, D.A. (1980). “A Critique of Deterministic Causality.” Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Sakurai, J.J. (1973). Advanced Quantum Mechanics. Reading: Addison Wesley.Google Scholar
Salmon, W.C. (1978). “Why ask ‘Why?'?” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 51: 683-705. (As reprinted, with minor changes, in Salmon, W.C. (ed.). (1979). Hans Reichenbach: Logical Empiricist. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Pages 403- 425.)Google Scholar
Salmon, W.C. (1981). “Causality: Production and Propagation.” In PSA 1980, Volume 2. Edited by Asquith, P. and Giere, R.. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association. Pages 49-69.Google Scholar
Simon, H. (1953). “Causal Ordering and Identif lability.” In Studies in Econometric Method. Edited by Hood, W.C. and Koopmans, T.C.. New York: John Wiley . Pages 49-74.Google Scholar
Swain, M. (1978). “A Counterfactual Analysis of Event Causation.” Philosophical Studies 34: 1-19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Suppes, P. (1970). A Probabilistic Theory of Causality. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
van Fraassen, B.C. (1977). “The Pragmatics of Explanation.” American Philosophical Quarterly 14: 143-150.Google Scholar
Yule, G.U. (1911). An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics. London: Griffin and Co.CrossRefGoogle Scholar