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Glutty and simple?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2024

Anna Marmodoro Open the ORCID record for Anna Marmodoro [Opens in a new window]
Anna Marmodoro*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Durham University, Durham, UK
*
Email: anna.marmodoro@durham.ac.uk
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Abstract

Beall's original understanding of the nature of the divine allows for contradictory statements to be true of God, by assuming that parts of reality, such as the Trinity, are ‘glutty’ (namely, what we can say about them is both true and false). Is the divine is the only glutty part of reality, and if so, why? Furthermore, does the glutty nature of the divine undermine its simplicity? Beall argues that God is not mereologically complex, but on his account God is logically and hence, it appears, metaphysically complex.

Keywords

Godglutsimplicity
Type
Book Symposium
Information
Religious Studies , First View , pp. 1 - 4
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Beall, Jc (2023) Divine Contradiction. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Priest, G (2014) One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, Including the Singular Object which is Nothingness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar