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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2009
In recent years there has been a marked tendency to assess French foreign policy in terms of continuity and change in the aims, organization and actions associated with General de Gaulle and his pursuit of national independence. Analysts have found that in spite of major personality differences between de Gaulle, Pompidou9 Giscard d'Estaing and Mitterrand, and a presidential system of government that maximizes the opportunities for personal direction,, there has been paradoxically a high degree of continuity in French foreign and defence policies. Until recently it was possible to account for this by emphasizing the influence of the GauIIist party in government and the National Assembly, but now that it is no longer the largest party nor enjoying a share in power it is necessary to seek other explanations for continuity in policy. Moreover, the return to power in 1981 of men of the Fourth Republic who continue to maintain many of their predecessors’ policies reveals the inadequacy of Gaullism as a basis for analysis and the need for terms of reference allowing for a longer view of the French role in world affairs. If that role has been so consistent in spite of changes in society, economy, political leadership and even regime is it not time to seek reasons for continuity by analysing external influences on French foreign and defence policies in the light of international relations theory? This is particularly appropriate in view of current French interest in systemic approaches to international politics. The intention here is to examine some relevant developments in the theoretical study of the international system and to consider their implications for existing interpretations and future study of French foreign policy and its claim to independent The French case is of obvious relevance to the situation of other middle-sized powers pursuing an ambitious role in world affairs, yet finding access to power and independence severely restricted.
1. French interest is expressed by Jean Klein who advocates related research in France in his recent review of Waltz, K. N., Theory of International Politics (Reading, USA, 1979)Google Scholar in Defense nationale, juin 1982, pp. 97–101Google Scholar; also indicative is the simultaneous French and English publication of Wallerstein, I., The Capitalist World Economy (Paris and Cambridge) in 1979Google Scholar, and the French translations of Wallerstein' other major works*
2. This is discussed in Singer, J. D., ‘The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations’, in World Politics, xiv (1961), pp. 77–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3. Waltz, op. cit. p. 58.
4. Buzan, B. and Jones, R. J. B. (eds.), Change and the Study of International Relations (London, 1981), pp. 15–16Google Scholar; the importance of specific capability rather than merely relative aggregate power was illustrated dramatically by American difficulties in handling the Vietnam war and the Iranian revolution.
5. Wallerstein, op. cit.
6. For this definition and a detailed discussion of hegemony see Wallerstein, I., The Modern World-System (New York, 1980), vol. II, p. 38ffGoogle Scholar.
7. Pagé, J-P (ed.), Profil économique de la France au seuil des années 80 (Paris, Documentation française, 1981), pp. 356Google Scholar and 360; for corresponding US statistics see Waltz, op. cit. p. 216.
8. For an appreciative review of Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, by Charles Wilson, see the Journal of Modern History, Sept. 1981, pp. 517–20Google Scholar.
9. Claude, I., Power and International Relations (New York, 1962), pp. 6Google Scholar and 64.
10. No one has yet considered French policy with a perspective stretching from say Clemenceau to Giscard d'Estaing.
11. For example, see Duroselle, J-B, Tout empire perira (Paris, 1981), pp. 340Google Scholar and 348; also the views of Freymond, J. in Relations Internationales, No. 21 (printemps 1980), p. 6Google Scholar.
12. Duroselle, op. cit. p. 340; Aron, R., Paix et guerre entre les nations (Paris, 1962), pp. 732–4Google Scholar.
13. For example see de Carmoy, G., Les Politiques étrangères de la France de 1944 á 1967 (Paris, Table Ronde, 1967Google Scholar; trans, by Chicago Univ. Press, 1968); also Tint, H., French Foreign Policy Since the Second World War (London, 1972).Google Scholar
14. Grosser, A., La Quatrième République et sapolitique extérieure (Paris, 1961)Google Scholar and La Politique extérieure de la Cinquième République (Paris, 1965Google Scholar; rev. and trans., Boston, 1967).
15. Morse, E. L., Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France (Princeton, 1973).Google Scholar
16. Cerny, P. G., The Politics of Grandeur (Cambridge, 1980)Google Scholar.
17. Rosenau, J. N., The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York, 1971), p. 100Google Scholar.
18. Kolodziej, E. A., French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou (Ithaca, 1974).Google Scholar
19. Colard, D., ‘La Conception francaise de l'independance nationale’, in Studia Diplomatica, No. 1 (1975), pp. 47–73Google Scholar.
20. For an appreciation of the kaleidoscopic variants within de Gaulle' independence policy, though concluding that it was doomed to failure, see Hoffmann, S., Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s (New York, 1974)Google Scholar, chap. 10; see also his Foreword to the translated edition of Grosser, op. cit. p. xi.
21. de La Gorce, P-M., De Gaulle entre deux mondes (Paris, 1964).Google Scholar
22. Williams, P. M., Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic (London, 1964), pp. 6–8Google Scholar.
23. Article by Pfaff, William, International Herald Tribune, 5 July 1982, p. 4Google Scholar.
24. This view was reaffirmed recently by the CERES group within the French PS, stressing the prime importance of the will to use nuclear weapons even at the risk of suicide (‘la volonté d'un peuple à se défendre bees et ongles, et à décider que sa liberté et son indépendance peuvent valoir le risque du sacrifice suprême’), Non! Repères pour le socialisme, no. 14 (juillet-août 1982), p. 48Google Scholar.
