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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2009
With characteristic insight, intelligence, and good humour, the eighteenth-century Scottish poet, Robert Burns, once remarked that ‘the best-laid schemes o'mice an men gang aft agley’. Written primarily as a commonsense observation on success and unintentional failure experienced during life's travails, Burns’ witticism does ironically account for much in the world of politics as it functions both within societies and between nation-states. For in international politics, established patterns of action and reaction are often poor guides to resolving complex disputes, whereas innovative, original, and flexible policies, assisted by a good measure of paradox and luck, can sometimes settle the most intractable of problems. Not surprisingly, therefore, political pundits like to stress: ‘Be careful of asking the wrong question, because you may just get the right answer.’
1 From the poem, ‘To a Mouse, On turning her up in her Nest, with the Plough, November, 1785’.
2 See Morgenthau, Hans J., ‘The Problem of German Reunification’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 330 (July 1960), pp. 124–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For Henry Kissinger's testimony, given before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on the future of Germany and NATO, see his article, ‘For a New Atlantic Alliance’, The Reporter: The Magazine of Facts and Ideas, 35, no. 1 (14 July 1966), pp. 18–27Google Scholar. This article was edited and translated by Helga Haftendorn and printed in German as ‘Die deutsche Frage als Problem der europäischen und der internationalen Sicherheit’, Europa-Archiv, 21, no. 23 (1966), pp. 831–8Google Scholar. See also Strauβ, Franz Josef, The Grand Design: A European Solution to German Reunification, trans. Connell, Brian (New York, 1966), pp. 9–30Google Scholar, 80–1, and 104–5; the book concludes: ‘In order to remain German, or British, or French, or Italian we must become Europeans’. Finally, see Schmidt, Helmut, The Balance of Power, trans. Thomas, Edward (London, 1971), pp. 29–36Google Scholar and 131–8.
3 For analyses of the conventional wisdom, see Hacke, Christian, ‘Henry Kissinger und das deutsche Problem’, Deutschland Archiv, 8, no. 9 (September 1975), pp. 973–87Google Scholar; and Ritter, Helgine, ‘Adenauer und Kissinger: Ein Vergleich ihrer Pläne zur Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands’, Deutschland Archiv, 10, no. 3 (March 1977), pp. 266–70Google Scholar.
4 For a representative cross-section of opinion regarding the role and relevance of Mikhail Gorbachev in successful arms control initiatives and the peaceful termination of the Cold War, see Gaddis, John Lewis, ‘Hanging Tough Paid Off’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 45, no. 1 (January-February 1989), pp. 11–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Risse-Kappen, Thomas, ‘Did “Peace Through Strength” End the Cold War? Lessons from INF’, International Security, 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 162–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Deudney, Daniel and Ikenberry, G. John, ‘The International Sources of Soviet Change’, International Security, 16, no. 3 (Winter 1991-1992), pp. 74–118CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Deudney, Daniel and Ikenberry, G. John, ‘Who Won the Cold War?’ Foreign Policy, no. 87 (Summer 1992), pp. 123–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Craig, Gordon A., ‘Did Ostpolitik Work? The Path to German Reunification’, Foreign Affairs, 73, no. 1 (January-February 1994), pp. 162–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 For Karl Popper, a theory is falsified only if contrary evidence which is reproducible and consistentcan be submitted against it. Thus, he adopts falsifiability as the criterion for deciding whether or not a theoretical system belongs to empirical science, and by extension to social science. See The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London, 1968), pp. 78–92Google Scholar.
6 In 1966, a Grand Coalition government was formed in Bonn, with Kurt-Georg Kiesinger as Chancellor. For a very good introduction to the Grand Coalition's Ostpolitik, see Hacke, Christian, ‘Von Adenauer zu Kohl: Zur Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der Bundesrepublik 1949–1985’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Nos. B 51–52 (21 December 1985), pp. 3–22Google Scholar, especially pp. 10–13; for a superb analysis of the principal themes in West German foreign policy since 1949, including reunification, see Weidenfeld, Werner and Korte, Karl-Rudolf (eds.), Handwörlerbuch zur deutschen Einheit (Frankfurt/Main and New York, 1992)Google Scholar.
7 This is precisely what Henry Kissinger had feared in 1965. See Kissinger's article, ‘The Price of German Unity’, The Reporter: The Magazine of Fads and Ideas, 32, no. 8 (22 April 1965), pp. 12–17Google Scholar, especially p. 14.
8 On the peaceful and functional compatibility of West- and Ostpolitik, see Besson, Waldemar, ‘The Conflict of Traditions: The Historical Basis of West German Foreign Policy’, in Kaiser, Karl and Morgan, Roger (eds.), Britain and West Germany: Changing Societies and the Future of Foreign Policy (London, 1971), pp. 61–80Google Scholar; Teltschik, Horst, ‘The Role of Germany Within NATO and Europe’, in Mattox, Gale A. and Vaughan, John H. Jr (eds.), Germany Through American Eyes: Foreign Policy and Domestic Issues (Boulder, San Francisco, and London, 1989), pp. 158–68Google Scholar; and Staack, Michael, ‘Die Auβenpolitik der Bundesrepublik auf dem Weg in ein neues Europa: Westintegration und Ostpolitik unter veränderten Bedingungen’, Aus Polilik und Zeitgeschichte, Nos. B 4–5 (19 January 1990), pp. 20–30Google Scholar.
9 For imagery on the integration, tying down, and binding of West Germany, see Osgood, Robert E., Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore, 1968), pp. 55–62Google Scholar; Ireland, Timothy P., Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, Conn., 1981), pp. 3–8Google Scholar, 137–41, 171–74, and 221–28; Loth, Wilfried, ‘Die deutsche Frage als europäisches Problem’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Nos. B 51–52 (25 December 1982), pp. 3–13Google Scholar; DePorte, A. W., ‘The Uses of Perspective’, in Tucker, Robert W. and Wrigley, Linda (eds.), The Atlantic Alliance and its Critics (New York, 1983), pp. 29–59Google Scholar; Bulmer, Simon and Paterson, William, ‘West Germany's Role in Europe: “Man-Mountain” or “Semi-Gulliver”?’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 28, no. 2 (December 1989), pp. 95–117CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Odom, William E., ‘The German Problem: Only Ties to America Provide the Answer’, Orbis, 34, no. 4 (Fall 1990), pp. 483–504Google Scholar; Katzenstein, Peter J., ‘Die Fesselung der deutschen Macht im internationalen System: der Einigungsprozeβ 1989–90’, in Blanke, Bernhard and Wollmann, Hellmut (eds.), Die alte Bundesrepublik: Kontinuilät und Wandel, Leviathan: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, Sonderheft 12 (Opladen, 1991), pp. 68–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Trainor, Bernard E., ‘Watching Over Germany: Focus of NATO Shifts from Pact’, International Herald Tribune, 19 February 1990, p. 5Google Scholar.
10 It is now widely argued that the purpose of NATO during the Cold War was, above all, to contain both the Soviet Union and West Germany. To the best of my knowledge, the term ‘double containment’ was first explicitly used by Wolfram Hanrieder in his essay, ‘German-American Relations in the Postwar Decades,’ in Trommler, Frank and McVeigh, Joseph (eds.), America and the Germans, vol. 2 (Philadelphia, 1985), pp. 91–116CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
11 Schwarz, Hans-Peter, ‘Die Politik der Westbindung oder die Staatsraison der Bundesrepublik’, Zeitschrift für Politik, 22, no. 4 (1975), pp. 307–37Google Scholar, especially p. 317.
12 For analyses of the concept, ‘security for Germany and security from Germany’, see Sommer, Theo, ‘The Objectives of Germany’, in Buchan, Alastair (ed.), A World of Nuclear Powers? (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1966), pp. 39–54Google Scholar; Kissinger, Henry A., ‘The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck’, Daedalus, 97, no. 3 (Summer 1968), pp. 888–924Google Scholar, especially pp. 900–1; Goodman, Elliot R., ‘NATO and German Reunification’, Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, no. 76 (Summer 1970), pp. 30–40Google Scholar; Gasteyger, Curt, Die beiden deutschen Staaten in der Weltpolitik (Munich, 1976), pp. 58–83Google Scholar; Horst Teltschik, ‘The Role of Germany Within NATO and Europe’, pp. 162–3; Fröhlich, Stefan, ‘Die NATO und Deutschland: Zur Ausgangssituation 1955 und 35 Jahre danach’, Beitrage zur Konfliktforschung, 20, no. 3 (1990), pp. 77–97Google Scholar; Haftendorn, Helga, ‘Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im atlantischen Bündnis und die deutsche Frage’, in Schroder, Hans-Jürgen (ed.), Die deutsche Frage als Internationales Problem (Stuttgart, 1990), pp. 71–88Google Scholar; and Bahr, Egon, Sicherheit für und vor Deutschland: Vom Wandel durch Annäherung zur Europäischen Sicherheilsgemeinschafl (Munich and Vienna, 1991)Google Scholar.
13 See Franz-Josef Meiers and Laurent Goetschel, Bedingungen Europdischer Sicherheit: Von der Versailler Friedensordnung bis zum Ende des Kalten Krieges (Bern, Stuttgart, and Vienna, 1993), pp. 152–64.
14 For evidence, see Pfeiler, Wolfgang, ‘Geschichte der Vorbehalte: Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Einheit’, Die Politische Meinung, 35, no. 249 (March-April 1990), pp. 14–20Google Scholar; Adomeit, Hannes, ‘Gorbachev and German Unification: Revision of Thinking, Realignment of Power’, Problems of Communism, 39, no. 4 (July-August 1990), pp. 1–23Google Scholar, especially pp. 11–16; Karaganov, Sergei A., ‘Implications of German Unification for the Former Soviet Union’, in Stares, Paul B. (ed.), The New Germany and the New Europe (Washington, DC, 1992), pp. 331–64Google Scholar; and Wettig, Gerhard, ‘Moscow's Acceptance of NATO: The Catalytic Role of German Unification’, Europe-Asia Studies, 45, no. 6 (1993), pp. 953–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
15 It is reported that ‘dedemonize’ is the exact term used by Helmut Kohl. See Szabo, Stephen F., The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York, 1992), p. 85Google Scholar; and Bortfeldt, Heinrich, Washington-Bonn-Berlin: Die USA und die deutsche Einheit (Bonn, 1993), p. 125Google Scholar. See also Roberts, Walter R., ‘Germany I: The Gorbachev Memorandum’, The World Today, 46, no. 10 (October 1990), pp. 180–1Google Scholar.
16 However, the specific language concerning the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy was left sufficiently ambiguous in order to influence Soviet decision-making so that nuclear deterrence would not be undermined.
17 For one article that actually does argue in favour of monocausality, see Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Jr. et at., ‘The Atlantic Alliance and European Security in the 1990s’, Cornell International Law Journal, 23, no. 3 (Spring 1990), pp. 467–509Google Scholar. For example, the authors write: ‘The collapse of East Germany and the apparent willingness of Gorbachev to accept terms considered an anathema by previous Soviet leaders has vindicated Chancellor Adenauer's vision’ (pp. 475–6). See also Gotto, Klaus, ‘Der Realist als Visionär: Die Wiedervereinigungspolitik Konrad Adenauers’, Die Polilische Meinung, 35, no. 249 (March-April 1990), pp. 6–13Google Scholar. For an explicit appeal against monocausal arguments in the context of German reunification, see the brilliant article by Hannes Adomeit, ‘Gorbachev and German Unification’, pp. 1–23.
18 However, the certainty of retrospective knowledge can also be disadvantageous. On the dangers of thinking deterministically about the past, especially in the context of German reunification, see the superlative article by McAdams, A. James, ‘Inter-German Relations in Historical Perspective: The Risks of Biased Hindsight’, in Schmidt, Gustav (ed.), Ost-West-Beziehungen: Konfrontalion und Détente 1945–1989, vol. 2 (Bochum, 1993), pp. 369–79Google Scholar.
19 Thus, Garton Ash has inadvertently overlooked the writings of Kenneth Waltz. For example, Waltz writes: ‘In politics, … powerful agents fail to impress their wills on others in just the ways they intend to. The intention of an act and its result will seldom be identical because the result will be affected by the person or object acted on and conditioned by the environment within which it occurs.’ See Theory of International Politics (New York, 1979), p. 192Google Scholar.
20 For a seminal yet almost totally forgotten article on European security during the Cold War, see Hassner, Pierre, ‘German and European Reunification: Two Problems or One?’ Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, no. 61 (October 1966), pp. 14–37Google Scholar. Quotes from three other articles by Hassner have, however, been used by Timothy Garton Ash.
21 Ibid., p. 23.
22 Ibid., p. 37. For an almost identical line of reasoning, see Henry Kissinger, ‘The Price of German Unity’, p. 17.
23 This example is, admittedly, an oversimplification of current theories, although not entirely incorrect. For an extremely well researched and up-to-date survey of the principal theories of war, including a comprehensive bibliography, see Jack Levy, S., ‘The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence’, in Tetlock, Philip E.el al. (eds.), Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, vol. 1 (New York, 1989), pp. 209–333Google Scholar.
24 On the significant role that the passage of time can play in international relations, see the seminal article by Gaddis, John Lewis, ‘International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War’, International Security, 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992-1993), pp. 5–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Hopf, Ted and Gaddis, John Lewis, ‘Getting the End of the Cold War Wrong’, International Security, 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 202–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
