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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
The five weeks' government of Prince Max von Baden (Oct.3–Nov. 9, 1918) is of crucial importance in German history, for it signalizes the end of the First World War and Germany's formal achievement of the parliamentary system. A great deal of material was published about it shortly afterwards, usually with a highly polemical purpose. Thus the Amtliche Urkunden zur Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstandes 1918 published by the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior in 1919 (2nd edition, Berlin, 1924), was motivated by the desire to pin responsibility for Germany's armistice request upon the Supreme Command. It succeeded in dispelling the Stab-in-the-Back Legend as far as educated people were concerned, but these proved only an uninfluential minority during the Weimar Republic. The comprehensive Erinnerungen of Prince Max (Berlin, 1927), written with a large staff of collaborators, provided an exceptionally full account of the period, though one necessarily apologetic in tone and reticent about Max's own weaknesses. The case of the Conservative opposition was ably argued by Count Kuno Westarp, the Conservative leader, in his Die Regierung des Prinzen Max von Baden und die Konservative Partei 1918 (Berlin, 1928). These important works all included the publication of primary documents, though they were necessarily selected in an ex parte manner.
* Matthias, Erich and Morsey, Rudolf (editors): Die Regierung des Prinzen Max von Baden. (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1962. Pp. lxxxv, 699. DM. 68—.)Google Scholar.
1 The genesis of this important publication is analyzed by Matthias and Morsey on pp. xliii–liii of their introduction. The German Cabinet decided upon early publication on June 6, 1919, being specifically provoked by the first pamphleteers of the Dolchstosslegende (for example, Col. Max Bauer, Der Irrwahn des Verstanädigungsfriedens). Matthias Erzberger and Hermann Müiller were commissioned by the Cabinet on July 18 to look over the final version. A much enlarged edition appeared in 1924 under the editorial direction of Prof. Veit Valentin. The latter suspected, incidentally, that the Supreme Command had destroyed documents dealing with its responsibility for initiating the Armistice demand of early October, 1918 (p. 1).
2 Matthias and Morsey analyze the genesis of this publication on pp. liii–lvii of their introduction. The book was assembled over a period of eight years, with Max obtaining copies of many official documents, requesting individuals to set down their memories of specific events, and carefully collating all published material. Max was motivated by an almost masochistic drive for selfjustification, but he also felt a strong obligation to publish nothing which might run counter to the interests of German foreign policy in the 1920's. His remarkable desire to spare the Supreme Command in his narrative, even at the expense of concealing important facts, is strikingly revealed in a letter from Prince Max to Kurt Hahn on September 22, 1921 (pp. lxii–lxiii). Kurt Hahn was the main author of the former's memoirs.
3 Matthias, Erich and Morsey, Rudolf (editors), Der Interfraktionelle Ausschuss 1917–18 (2 vols., Düsseldorf, 1959)Google Scholar.
4 The “October constitution,” hitherto insufficiently studied by political scientists because of its episodic character or the (mistaken) view that it simply anticipated the Weimar constitution, deserves a separate monograph. It differed from the Weimar constitution in its purely parliamentary character (the Emperor had ceased to count), whereas Weimar had many features of “presidential democracy”; the Bundesrat was somewhat weaker than was the Weimar Reichsrat; while the problem of the Prusso-German dualism—the key to Germany's constitutional development—was not explicitly attacked. On the latter point, it is fascinating, to study how Prussian ministers frequently attended the meetings of the Reich Cabinet, while Prince Max refused to perform the duties of a Prussian Premier. It is an interesting question whether the union of Reich Chancellor and Prussian Premier (which men close to Chancellor Brüning and Premier Braun wanted to restore as late as 1931) would have been preserved but for the revolution.
5 The editors argue in the introduction (pp. xi–xvi) that the initiative of the Majority parties was at least as important as the dictate of General Ludendorff in securing the introduction of the parliamentary system, and successfully polemicizes against extreme statements to the effect that the parliamentary parties acted only under military orders when they achieved the constitutional changes of October, 1918 (for example, Rosenberg, Artur, Entstehung der deutschen Republik [Berlin, 1928], pp. 226–27)Google Scholar. It underestimates, however, the crucial role played by General Ludendorff. The new governing coalition was ready and willing to assume power by September, but it was able to do so only because General Ludendorff so permitted. It is significant that he was asked to give, and gave, his imprimatur to the Chancellorship of Max von Baden.
6 The introduction (pp. xvi–xxix) includes a valuable discussion of the genesis of Max's Chancellorship. It shows, largely on the basis of the papers of Conrad Haussmann, how Kurt Hahn intrigued for Max as early as July, 1917 (the time when Bethmann fell). See especially Hahn's letter to Haussmann dated July 22, 1917, where he chronicles his efforts to prevent leading figures from joining the new Michaelis government; his fear was that Michaelis' success would stand in the way of Max's later elevation (pp. xx–xxi). A revealing letter from Max to Haussmann, entitled his “confession of faith” (December 17, 1917) shows incidentally, that Max was far from sharing the political views of the Reichstag Majority. He flatly opposed the parliamentary system, pleading for a Chancellor independent alike of the Emperor and the Reichstag; while in foreign policy he favored an imperial program in the East which secured German control of the Ukraine and the Baltic States, while opposing a clear-cut renunciation of Belgium in the West (xxv–xxvi). Those who championed his Chancellorship either agreed with these views or believed that their disadvantage was outweighed by Max's princely status with its presumed facilitation of the “management” of the Emperor and the Supreme Command. The absence of an alternative candidate (already noted) must have added plausibility to these mistaken views.
7 The editors make valuable observations on the work of Cabinet andChancellor in the introduction (pp. xxix–xxxviii). The infancy of Cabinet government as a German institution is revealed by the fact that it sometimes acted like a British Royal Commission. It invited the testimony of “outside experts,” mostly experienced diplomats or generals, before taking several crucial decisions. There is little of the self-confidence of intelligent amateurs so characteristic of successful Cabinet government.
8 Rosenberg, Artur, Entstehung der deutschen Republik (Berlin, 1928), Ch. VIIGoogle Scholar.
