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Sceptical Theism, the Butterfly Effect and Bracketing the Unknown

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2017

Alexander R. Pruss
Alexander R. Pruss*
Affiliation:
Baylor University
*
alexander_pruss@baylor.edu
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Abstract

Sceptical theism claims that we have vast ignorance about the realm of value and the connections, causal and modal, between goods and bads. This ignorance makes it reasonable for a theist to say that God has reasons beyond our ken for allowing the horrendous evils we observe. But if so, then does this not lead to moral paralysis when we need to prevent evils ourselves? For, for aught that we know, there are reasons beyond our ken for us to allow the evils, and so we should not prevent them. This paralysis argument, however, shall be argued to rest on a confusion between probabilities and expected utilities. A connection between this paralysis argument and Lenman's1 discussion of the butterfly effect and chaos will be drawn, and the solution offered will apply in both cases.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 81: Religious Epistemology , October 2017 , pp. 71 - 86
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2017 

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References

1 Lenman, James, ‘Consequentialism and Cluelessness’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2000), 342–370 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Cf. Howard-Snyder, Daniel, ‘Epistemic Humility, Arguments from Evil, and Moral Skepticism’, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2 (2010), 1–35 Google Scholar.

3 ‘Agnosticism, the Moral Skepticism Objection, and Commonsense Morality’, in: Dougherty, T. and McBrayer, J. P. (eds.), Sceptical Theism: New Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Op cit. (2010).

5 Alexander R. Pruss, ‘Sceptical Theism And Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism’ (2010) http://prosblogion.ektopos.com/2010/05/22/sceptical_theism_and_plantingas_evolutionary_argument_against_naturalism.

6 Op. cit. (2014).

7 Almeida, Michael J. and Oppy, Graham (2003), ‘Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003) 496–516, 507CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Cf. Raz, Joseph, Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

9 Op. cit. (2000).

10 Op. cit. (2010).

11 Op. cit. 356–358.

12 Op. cit. 357.

13 Cf. the cases in Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987)Google Scholar, chapter 3.